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Summary
The continued presence and importance of Christian moral values in our daily
lives, coupled with the fact that faith in Christianity is in continual decline, raises
the question as to why having lost faith in Christianity, we have also not lost faith
in our Christian moral values. This question is also indicative of a more pressing
phenomenon: not only have we maintained our faith in Christian values, we fail
to see that the widespread collapse of Christianity should affect this faith.
To tackle this latter phenomenon, I claim, we have to pose the Nietzschean
question of the value of our moral values, so as to see that this value can be a
possible object of questioning.
In chapter one, I consider different approaches found in the history of moral
philosophy that look like potential candidates for this task. I argue that, ul-
timately, the task requires simultaneously taking our familiarity with Christian
moral values as both sui generis and a questionable phenomenon. In chapter two,
I articulate in detail the sui generis nature of this familiarity with moral values,
in terms of the phenomena of habituation and sedimentation. In chapter three,
I consider the possibility of estrangement that is built into our familiarity with
moral values, by focusing on the role of cognition. I demonstrate how cognition,
in the form of self-consciousness, can disrupt the sedimented, habituated nature
of our moral values through a form of ironic disruption. In chapter four, I de-
velop this account by considering the possibility of an appeal to an alternative
moral outlook. To do so, I draw upon the structural isomorphism that is present
between the process of estrangement and a rite of passage.
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This thesis analyses the possibility of posing the question of the value of our moral
values. This task is motivated by the need to face up to the implications of the loss
of the Christian foundations of these values, due to a loss of faith in the Christian
religion. The thesis will not consider the nature of this loss itself, however, nor
the nature of the crisis that it potentially gives rise to. Instead, the specific focus
will lie on how the question of the value of our moral values can be adequately
posed such that this value comes to be seen as a questionable phenomenon.
I take it as evident and uncontroversial that Christianity over the past few
hundred years has been, and still is, declining across Europe1 both in terms of
participation in Christian practices, such as attending church, as well as in how
Europeans identify themselves and their faith.2
1By ‘Europe’ I simply mean to designate the continent spanning from countries typically
thought of as being in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Scandinavia, the Mediterranean, and
the Baltic Peninsula.
2Although participation and identification can vary greatly, I agree with Nienke Moor who
argues for the following: “Recent statistics for the Atlas of European Values show that Europe
as a continent is secular, but religious. Many people do not feel affiliated with a church, but
consider themselves to be religious. Although the percentage of atheists has increased through
time, many Europeans still believe in a higher power and feel some connection with religious
tradition. Although a new tradition within the sociology of religion now focuses on the personal
beliefs of people, instead of church membership and church attendance, we reason that it is still
important to look at the latter. Church attendance, after all, is strongly related to the social
significance of religion. If people no longer share their beliefs by going to church, religious beliefs
are likely to become more diverse and personalized. From this perspective, intergenerational
transmission of a ‘shared faith’ is made more difficult. Church attendance rates can therefore be
considered an indicator of the religious vitality that is present within societies.” See Arts and
Halman 2013, 213. Regarding Church membership, we can consider some statistics published
by Brierley Consultancy in their study “UK Church Statistics No 2 2010-2020.” UK Church
membership has declined from 10.6 million in 1930 to 5.5 Million in 2010, or as a percentage
of the population, from about 30% to 11.2%. By 2013, this had declined further to 5.4 million
(10.3%). If current trends continue, the projection is that membership will fall to 8.4% of the
1
At the same time, although the majority of us are no longer practising Chris-
tians, and do not identify ourselves as Christian, we still perceive the world
through the lens of many Christian values. To name but a few, we find the
following values widely prevalent in European-wide customs and laws: equality in
the eyes of God and the law, modesty, pity, compassion, charity, humility, altru-
ism, and to love one’s neighbour.3 I do not mean to claim here that these values
only belong to Christianity, or that they are exhaustive of the moral values found
in Europe. Rather, my point is that many fundamental values in contemporary
Europe have come to us from Christianity, and, moreover, they remain essential
to our way of living, notwithstanding a loss of faith in the religion.
Now, an inevitable question arises here why having lost faith in Christianity,
we have also not lost our faith in these Christian, moral values. For the most part,
we no longer engage in formal Christian practices, and no longer think of ourselves
as Christian, and, yet, we engage in acts of charity, compassion, humility, etc.,
without, so to speak, as much as a second thought. We readily question the value
of going to church on a Sunday, for example, but not the value of, say, compassion
or pity. This is not to say that we do not, on occasion, question the value of values
such as compassion and pity at particular times in particular situations, but that
we do not tend to question in a probing manner their value and fundamental role
in our lives.
While in this thesis I will attempt to answer this question as to why our
faith in these moral values continues notwithstanding the widespread collapse in
Christianity, it is rather indicative of a more pressing phenomenon: not only have
we maintained our faith in Christian values, we are unable to even see that the
collapse of Christianity should affect this faith. In other words, unlike, say, the
custom of attending church, we do not see our moral values as objects of possible
population by 2025.
3The prevalence is, of course, not necessarily uniform across all European countries. See
Halman, Sieben, and van Zundert 2011 for a collection of survey results concerning European
values from 1980s to the turn of this century.
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questioning in the same manner. We do not see that the value of our Christian
moral values could be a questionable phenomenon. On a day-to-day basis, this
value simply does not show up to us in this way.
Imagine, for a moment, if one were to suggest that our moral values are in
fact in a serious crisis because they have lost their Christian foundations that
justify their right to existence, we might readily imagine the response: the loss of
such foundations seems to have no evident bearing on our faith in moral values;
indeed, these values appear to function just fine in our largely secular society.
Such a response suggests that the crisis itself is not experienced. However, since
our moral values have lost their Christian foundations, and, hence, also their
justification for their existence, the possibility that our moral values could be
otherwise comes to the fore. Moreover, a more troublesome question to engage
with also appears: what if our moral values were, in fact, not good for us, but,
instead, even in some sense harmful?4
To be able to seriously consider the latter question, we have to be in a position
from which we are able to see the value of our moral values as a questionable
phenomenon. By this I mean that we have to be able to bring into view this value
as a possible object of questioning.
I understand this latter task as synonymous with posing the Nietzschean ques-
tion: “what is the value of our moral values?” Indeed, it is in Nietzsche’s moral
philosophy, I will claim, that we find a concern with, and undertaking of, such
a task. The importance and influence of Nietzsche’s philosophy as a critique of
European culture and the values that dominate it has been well documented.5
His diagnosis of the threat of nihilism due to the “devaluation of our highest val-
ues”6 and the resulting crisis facing Europe due to the collapse of Christianity
4The position from which these moral values could be perceived as harmful will be an issue
discussed throughout the thesis, and in particular in chapters 3 and 4.
5See, for example, Habermas 1987, 85-88.
6“What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devalue themselves. The aim is lacking;
“why?” finds no answer” (WP, 2; 1887). Throughout this thesis, the numbers used after the
abbreviated form of Nietzsche’s texts denote the aphorism. When citing other literature, the
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as the foundation of those values has become an important means of our own
understanding of contemporary European society.7 However, the particular task
of posing the question of the value of our moral values has generally been over-
looked by commentators in the secondary literature. Typically, Nietzsche’s work
is interpreted as a response to this question, either in the form of the positing
of a positive normative ethics that accompanies a critique of moral values, or as
a diagnosis of a crisis that is already somewhat evident.8 In both approaches,
the initial task of having to come to see that the value of our moral values is a
phenomenon that can be questioned is overlooked. That there is an issue here,
and that philosophical work is required to overcome it, is not appreciated. As
a result, the resources that Nietzsche’s moral philosophy offers for this task are
either misunderstood, or not exploited as much as they might be.
As an example of such a resource, Nietzsche offers us an interesting example of
this phenomenon of the continued faith in Christian moral values not withstanding
the collapse in Christian faith. In his moral philosophy, Nietzsche often bemoans,
along with Zarathustra, witnessing that Europeans “sit on the self-conceit” of
professing to know what good and evil are (Z III 12 2, BGE 202), even after the
widespread collapse of Christianity. In a telling aphorism in Twilight of the Idols,
Nietzsche finds an example of such self-conceit in those he calls “the English”9:
number after the year denotes the page number. The only other exceptions to this are for both
ancient texts and Wittgenstein’s works, where I follow the custom of using line numbers.
7See GS 358.
8As an example of the former, see Richardson 2004 and Leiter 2002. I discuss their positions
further in chapter 1, section ‘Reductionism and Immoralism’. For the latter, see Reginster and
Reginster 2009, 4: “I propose to take as the principle of organization of Nietzsche’s thought not
a certain philosophical doctrine, but a particular problem or crisis. The systematicity of his
philosophy, in other words, is determined not by a central philosophical doctrine, but by the
requirements of his response to a particular crisis in late modern European culture, namely, the
crisis of nihilism.” Cf. Owen 2014, 3, which is more acutely aware of the task of posing this
question: “However, in raising the question of the value of our European Judeo-Christian moral
values, the value of “morality”, Nietzsche attempts to force an awareness of the salience of this
question, and, hence, of the project of the re-evaluation of moral values into the consciousness
of moral philosophy.”
9The madman passage in the Gay Science and Nietzsche’s criticisms of the “last men” in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, both bring into view this self-conceit. See GS 125, and Z ‘Zarathustra’s
prologue’ 5, respectively. I will consider the figures of the madman and Zarathustra in chapter
4.
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When the English actually believe that they know intuitively what
is good and evil, when they therefore suppose that they no longer
require Christianity as the guarantee of morality, we merely witness
the effects of the dominion of the Christian value judgement and an
expression of the strength and depth of this dominion: such that the
origin of English morality has been forgotten, such that the very con-
ditional character of its right to existence is no longer felt. For the
English, morality is not yet a problem.
TI Skirmishes of an Untimely Man 5
This passage highlights two important features of the Christian “dominion”
which has been dominant in Europe. First, attempts at establishing moral knowl-
edge philosophically, such as in the case of the English through appeal to “intu-
ition,” in fact shows the “depth and strength” of, what I will call, our familiarity
with moral values. The English inadvertently believe that such familiarity (i.e.,
their moral intuitions) is sufficient to constitute moral knowledge, notwithstanding
their loss of faith in Christianity.10
Second, the strength and depth of this “dominion” is seen by the fact that
the “conditional character” of our moral values’ “right to existence” is no longer
“felt.” This suggests that moral values themselves have become a kind of taken-
for-granted ground upon which moral knowledge can be founded.11 Nietzsche
talks of “the English” believing that they have moral knowledge “intuitively,”
and, hence, he most likely has in mind the British intuitionalist tradition that
begins in the Eighteenth Century and runs through to the twentieth Century.12
In this tradition, moral propositions are understood as being “self-evident,” and,
as a result, are taken as foundational for moral reasoning and knowledge.13
Now, Nietzsche’s central claim in this passage is that the reason why “the
English” advocate intuitionalism is because they have forgotten the origin of their
10Nietzsche makes a more general claim about the familiar becoming taken as known is GS
355, which I will draw upon shortly below.
11The manner in which our moral values have become foundational in our everyday lives will
be discussed in chapter 2, section ‘Sedimentation’.
12See Donagan 1979, 17-25 for an overview.
13See, for example, Richard Price’s position in Raphael 1969, 187.
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moral values, and, as a result, they fail to see their “conditional right to existence.”
This criticism is pertinent given that in an earlier published work, Nietzsche had
asserted that some Englishmen - those he calls the “English psychologists” - were,
on the contrary, the ones “whom one has also to thank for the only attempts
hitherto to arrive at a history of the origin of morality...” (GM I 1). While Niet-
zsche’s reference to “the English” here is somewhat idiosyncratic14, we can make
sense of this passage if we look at how Nietzsche isolates particular characteristics
or traits that he considers “English,” which he then associates with particular
thinkers which need not necessarily be of that nationality.
The typically “English” characteristic that Nietzsche identifies in the Twilight
of the Idols passage is that despite being “rid of the Christian God”, the English
“now believe all the more firmly that they must cling to Christian morality...”
(TI Skirmishes of an Untimely Man 5). This is in fact demonstrated rather than
contradicted by the “English psychologists” who take an interest in the origins
of morality in a non- (and perhaps even anti-) Christian manner through the
application of Darwinian evolution, while nevertheless claiming that these origins
still coincide with Christian values, such as altruism and compassion.15
Now, I suggest that what the English are unable to question despite their post-
Christian concerns for origins is, the value of our moral values. What Nietzsche
tries to show here is that they ultimately re-affirm this value (and its positive
evaluative orientation, i.e., that this value is good) when they locate Christian
values unconditionally at their origins. Note, however, that the issue here is not
that the English seek to relocate or re-ground the value of our moral values in
14In the Twilight of the Idols aphorism cited above he explicitly names George Eliot as
his target, and in On the Genealogy of Morals he alludes to Paul Re´e on several occasions.
Both these targets, however, appear, for the same reason, strange given that George Eliot was
immersed in the thought of the leading German thinkers of her day, and Paul Re´e was not even
English but himself German!
15Hence Nietzsche’s description of Re´e: “the Darwinian beast and the ultramodern unas-
suming milksop who “no longer bites” politely link hands...” (GM preface 7). See also more
contemporary writers, such as Richard Dawkins, who display the same English trait. I will
consider Re´e’s position in greater detail in chapter 1.
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the wrong place, say in intuition rather than in reason or emotion. Rather, the
very process of re-grounding our moral values per se, results in “the English” still
taking the value of the moral values for granted. This specific criticism will be
taken up in greater detail in chapter one. Here, I only wish to show how the
appeal to intuition of “the English” demonstrates that moral values have become
so familiar that their value is taken for granted, and that, moreover, they are
taken as known in their familiarity. Additionally, all this occurs notwithstanding
the loss of faith in Christianity, thus demonstrating the extent of its continued
dominance.
Nietzsche’s criticism of “the English” for erroneously thinking that they have
moral knowledge indicates not only their shortcomings, but also helps to point to
the type of inquiry that will ultimately be required to engage with the phenomenon
that “the English” themselves are an example of: the continued faith in moral
values despite the loss of their foundations. The claim here is that “the English”
ultimately take moral values as they are given in their everyday familiarity as
known. Nietzsche makes this criticism in a much more general manner in a passage
in the Gay Science entitled “the origins of our concept of “knowledge”:”
For “what is familiar is known” [Was bekannt ist, ist erkannt]:
on this they [men of knowledge] are agreed. Even the most cautious
among them suppose that what is familiar is at least more easily know-
able [leichter erkennbar] than what is strange, and that, for example,
sound method demands that we start from the “inner world”, from
the “facts of consciousness”, because this world is more familiar to us.
Error of errors! What is familiar is what we are used to [Das Bekannte
ist das Gewohnte]; and what we are used to is most difficult to “know”
- that is, to see as a problem; that is, to see as strange, as distant, as
“outside us.”16
16Nietzsche draws on the phonetic and etymological similarity of the German words “bekannt”
[familiar] and “erkannt” [known], which is entirely lost in English translation. Hegel had already
made the same point in The Phenomenology of the Spirit : “Quite generally, the familiar, just
because it is familiar, is not known [Das Bekannte u¨berhaupt ist darum, weil es bekannt ist,
nicht erkannt]. The commonest way in which we deceive either ourselves or others about under-
standing is by assuming something as familiar, and accepting it on that account; with all its pros
and cons, such knowing never gets anywhere, and it knows not why. Subject and object, God,
7
GS 355
Nietzsche claims here that it is an error to assume that we have knowledge
of something because we are familiar with it, and that, moreover, it is mistaken
to think that we know something better when we come to understand it in more
familiar terms. I am not interested in the plausibility of this claim as a general
claim about knowledge per se, but more specifically with its relevance to knowledge
of our moral values. In fact, in an interpretative sense, this entire thesis can be
read as a detailed exegesis of the GS 355 aphorism as it is applied to the particular
phenomenon of our moral values, and as an analysis of the implications of the
philosophical ideas contained therein.
My interest here is with the idea that since the foundations of our moral values
have been lost due to a loss of faith in Christianity, we can no longer take our
moral values as known in their familiarity. What I mean by this turn of phrase
will be unpacked below, and the strength of this criticism made by Nietzsche will
become more pertinent when I consider different approaches in moral philosophy
in chapter one as potential ways to deal with this phenomenon.
This above passage also offers an initial insight into the type of inquiry that will
be needed to pose the question of our moral values. In this thesis, I will argue that
this inquiry will function as a method of estrangement [Entfremdung] from our
moral values in order to bring into view the value of these values as a questionable
phenomenon.17 I will argue that this method is undertaken by Nietzsche himself
in his moral philosophy, and that, moreover, his work attempts to facilitate his
Nature, Understanding, sensibility, and so on, are uncritically taken for granted as familiar,
established as valid, and made into fixed points for starting and stopping.” See Hegel 1977, 18,
translation modified, and Hegel 1998, 26. As we shall see, Nietzsche differs from Hegel in his
appeal to estrangement as a methodological tool for coming to know the familiar. Cf. Forster
2011a, 238.
17I translate the German Entfremdung with the English word ‘estrangement’ rather than
with ‘alienation’ (unlike in Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann’s translation of Human all too
Human). While the German term is often translated interchangeably with either (as found,
for example, in the translation of the concept in Marx’s work), I prefer ‘estrangement’ since it
carries less pejorative connotations than ‘alienation.’ Moreover, in chapter one, I use the concept
alienation to describe extreme cases of estrangement where familiarity is lost.
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readers to achieve a position of estrangement such that they too can come to
pose the question of the value of our moral values. This method of estrangement
should be understood as a process in which moral knowledge is acquired, since it
will bring into view that which we typically overlook on a day-to-day basis due to
our familiarity with moral values.
Now, taking this as our starting point - the task of posing the Nietzschean
question of the value of our moral values - has several implications which we need
to be aware of. First, we cannot simply take for granted the value of our moral
values as it is already given to us in its everyday familiarity. This is a mistake often
made in interpretations of Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, as well as of justificatory
approaches that seek to reground our moral values on a philosophical basis. When
this occurs, we shall see that the question of the value of our moral values is
ultimately begged. I will consider these positions in chapter one.18 Second, some
kind of philosophical work is required in order to bring into view the value of our
moral values as an object of questioning. I will consider the nature of this work
in chapter three in specific relation to the role of self-consciousness in the process
of estrangement, and then in chapter four, where I will look at the workings of
the process itself. Third, without such work, the value of our moral values taken
in its everyday familiarity remains inconspicuous. As we shall see introduced in
chapter one, and unpacked in chapter two, when we become familiar with moral
values, these values form a part of our everyday experience of the world in a
manner that they are seen but not noticed. I shall argue that this occurs through
a process of habituation and sedimentation. This will explain why we continue
to have faith in our moral values notwithstanding the collapse of Christianity.
Fourth, the task of moral philosophy cannot simply be to represent or faithfully
capture the non-philosophical givenness of the value of our moral values. Instead,
18For example, all interpretations of Nietzsche’s critique as a direct attempt to usurp our
dominant moral values with an alternative ethics make this assumption. See, for example,
Cameron 2002.
9
moral philosophy has to work in some sense against such familiarity so that we no
longer take it for granted. There is an ascetic element here, which, I shall argue,
functions by bringing into view our familiar moral values as strange, in an uncanny
movement.19 In other words, we shall see that it is to render our moral values,
which have become mundane, once again an object of wonder.20 The possibility
of achieving this will be considered in chapters three and four.
When understood correctly, we shall see that the process of estrangement,
which poses the question of the value of our moral values, leads us into a paradox.
We require a certain familiarity with moral values if those values, and the valuable
phenomena perceived through those values, are to show up to us. As Europeans
we acquire such familiarity in virtue of being brought up in European culture,
and participating in its customs. I shall call this requirement the condition of
familiarity. Yet, we shall also see that a characteristic and indication that we
have acquired this everyday familiarity with these values is when the value of
these values becomes taken for granted. Our moral values are able to take on a
foundational role in our everyday lives precisely because their value is no longer in
question for us. From the position of familiarity with our moral values, we cannot
simply render the value of our moral values questionable since our familiarity is
predicated upon this value being taken for granted, and, hence, on not being an
object of questioning. This would then seem to necessitate a critique of these
values from outside of this familiarity. We have to be careful here, however, by
what it means to be “outside” of our moral values. In chapter one, I will argue
19In Jacobsen 2009, 18, the editors of the collection describe the the task of everyday life soci-
ologies in these two ways: “On the one hand, their [everyday life sociologies’] aim is – primarily
via theoretical means – to transcend common-sense perceptions and our taking everyday life for
granted, and to cultivate and invite a scientifically based and sometimes critical perspective on
the everyday world as it is lived (what could be termed de-familiarisation - making the familiar
appear strange). On the other hand, however, they also seek to make everyday life tolerable,
understandable and liveable to people so they can live secure, meaningful and unalienated ev-
eryday lives (what could be called re-familiarisation – making the strange less strange).” I will
argue that the task of moral inquiry here will be to achieve the former rather than the latter.
20Cf. Giles Deleuze’s account of philosophy in Deleuze 1994, 132: “It [Philosophy] would find
its difference or its true beginning, not in an agreement with the pre-philosophical Image but in
a rigorous struggle against this image, which it would denounce as non-philosophical.”
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against the possibility of the positions of “immoralism” and “amoralism” offering
a place outside of our familiar moral values from which to pose the question of
the value of those values. My key claim here is that doing so would respectively
reduce and eliminate the putative moral values that afford familiarity in the first
place. Moreover, I will argue against the possibility of taking up a ‘view from
nowhere,’ since even if such a position were possible, we would lose familiarity
with moral values. The result of this would be that the moral phenomena that
we see through these values, would no longer show up. The paradox can then be
articulated as follows: one must be sufficiently familiar with moral values for such
values, and moral phenomena in the world, to show up to us. Yet, simultaneously,
one must also be sufficiently outside of this familiarity to see the value of those
values as a questionable phenomenon.
I will argue that the solution to this paradox is achieved by taking up a position
of estrangement from our familiarity, which can at once obtain sufficient distance
to bring into view the value of our moral values as a questionable phenomenon,
but without losing the familiarity with those values. Another way of putting it,
is to understand the task as one in which we are to render our familiar moral
values strange. I shall term this requirement the condition of estrangement. Both
the condition of familiarity and the condition of estrangement together will be
sufficient to acquire moral knowledge.
The argument of this thesis, then, will take the following form. In chapter
one, I will bring the nature of the paradox into sharper focus. I will do this by
considering what type of critique is required of moral philosophy to face up to
the loss of the foundations of our moral values. The task will be, as Nietzsche
puts it, to “take morality as a problem.” I will argue against different approaches
found in the history of moral philosophy that look like potential candidates for this
task. I will argue that taking morality as a problem requires taking our familiarity
with moral values as sui generis as well as an object whose value is in question.
In chapter two, I will articulate in detail the sui generis nature of not only our
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familiarity with Christian moral values, but with moral values per se. We shall
see more generally how we become familiar with moral values and the nature of
our moral psychological framework. I will argue, through appeal to Aristotle and
Nietzsche, that our familiarity with moral values is obtained through a process
of habituation, which should in turn be understood in terms of a dynamic of
command and obedience. This dynamic will be shown to function not only at
the social level between individuals, but also at the level of the individual soul
in an ascetic relation of competing forces. The phenomena of habituation and
asceticism will then help to explain how the value of our moral values has become
sedimented over time, such that it is no longer an object of wonder that is open
to questioning.
In chapters three and four, I focus on the task of estrangement. In chapter
three, I consider the possibility of estrangement that is built into our familiarity
with moral values, and focus, more specifically, on the role of cognition. We shall
see how cognition, in the form of self-consciousness, can disrupt the sedimented
nature of our moral values so that their value can be brought into view as ques-
tionable, through a form of internal ironic disruption. I will claim that for this to
occur, the value of the “totality” of our moral values, understood as a coherent
moral outlook, needs to be brought into question. In chapter four, we shall see
that the overall structure of the process of estrangement is isomorphic with the
tripartite movement of a rite of passage: (1) separation from our familiarity with
moral values and the dominant moral outlook; (2) a liminal phase of margin and
reflection; (3) a final phase of aggregation back into the same outlook, but in
an altered relation or position. This will help us understand how it is possible
for the moral inquirer to remain familiar with Christian moral values, whilst also
achieving sufficient estrangement from these values, such that, on return, they are
experienced in a manner that their value is now in question.
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Chapter 1
The Task of Taking “Morality as
a Problem”
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will map out the space in which moral inquiry is to function if
it is to tackle the phenomenon of the continued faith in Christian moral values
notwithstanding the loss of faith in their Christian foundations, and, hence, to
be able to raise the question as to whether our moral values could be harmful to
us. I will bring out the force of the paradox that the inquiry faces by considering,
first, an approach that seeks to face up to the loss of Christian foundations by
re-grounding our moral values on a non-Christian philosophical basis. I shall refer
to these approaches as ‘justificatory’, since they engage in a two-step process: to
capture the principle by which our moral values hang together, and then to justify
this principle philosophically.
I shall draw upon an argument made by Nietzsche that these approaches fail
to genuinely engage with the loss of the foundations of our Christian moral values
because they fail to take morality as a problem.1 I will interpret Nietzsche’s
1Nietzsche often repeats this need to take “morality as a problem” throughout his works,
and he even goes so far as to say on occasion that he is the first philosopher to achieve this. See
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criticism here by arguing that failing to “taking morality as a problem” means
that the approaches ultimately beg the question of the value of our moral values.
The term “morality” here then refers to our Christian moral values, and, what
I will later call the wider Christian “moral outlook” that they belong to.2 We
shall see that these approaches satisfy the condition of familiarity - they attempt
to do justice to our familiarity with moral values when they establish the moral
principle - but they come up short on the condition of estrangement. They assume
the value of our moral values as it is already given in its familiarity, and are unable
to see it as a questionable phenomenon.
Second, I will consider attempts at taking our Christian moral values as a
problem, which are better candidates for achieving a form of estrangement from
our familiarity with moral values, than that of the justificatory approaches. The
specific candidates that I will look at will be all the more relevant in so far as
they have been, albeit erroneously, ascribed to Nietzsche’s own moral philoso-
phy in the secondary literature on the subject. The positions I will consider are
reductionism, immoralism, and amoralism. I will argue that both reductionism
and immoralism risk alienation from our familiarity with moral values in so far
as the former attempts to reduce our familiarity with moral values to more basic
phenomena, and the latter demands a position that lies external to our familiar-
ity with Christian moral values, and internal to an immoral alternative. In both
cases, I will argue that the alienation from our familiar moral values that they
involve renders estrangement from those moral values impossible.
Against the amoralist position I will argue that the elimination of moral phe-
nomena results in the elimination of the problem of morality. I will, however,
also consider a more nuanced version of this account that takes the form of moral
fictionalism.3 I will argue that this nuanced possibility, however, misunderstands
GS 345, D preface 3, BGE 186 and TI Skirmishes of an Untimely Man 5.
2I shall introduce the idea of moral outlooks, of which our Christian moral outlook is an
example, in chapter 2, section ‘Moral outlooks’.
3See Joyce 2005 for a contemporary account of this position. See Hussain 2007 for its
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the nature of the phenomenon of valuing, and that, as a result, cannot adequately
bring into view the value of our moral values. Having considered these various
approaches, I will then be in a position to conclude that the task of taking moral-
ity as a problem requires that the moral inquirer takes our familiarity with moral
values as a sui generis phenomenon that cannot be eliminated or reduced to other
phenomena, but that, at the same time, he or she must bring the value of the
phenomenon into view as an object of possible questioning.
1.2 The Justificatory Approach
In this section, I will consider approaches to moral philosophy that are motivated
by the worry that our moral values are in crisis due to the collapse of Christianity,
and that attempt to face up to this collapse by providing non-Christian, philo-
sophical foundations. These approaches recognise that we can no longer take the
basis of our moral values for granted, and, as a result, inquire into the ontological
foundations of these values. I will begin by outlining the key features of this type
of approach, namely that our moral values are to be captured within a single
principle, and, that this principle is to be justified philosophically. I will then
argue that these approaches fail to face up to the collapse of the foundations of
our moral values and the implications and ramifications that it has, since they
engage in the wrong type of questioning, and, as a result, they ultimately beg the
question of the value of our moral values. We shall see that not only do these
approaches fail to see the value of our moral values as a questionable phenomenon,
but they actually hinder this very possibility due to their designs for justification.
I will first turn to Arthur Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy, as an exemplar of
this kind of justificatory approach. Schopenhauer is aware of the decline in Chris-
tian faith during his own times, and (at least a part of) his moral philosophy can
ascription to Nietzsche.
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be understood as a response to this decline through the grounding of our Christian
moral values on an alternative philosophical basis.4 The following passage from
The World as Will and Representation is indicative of this awareness:
The sublime founder of Christianity had necessarily to adapt and
accommodate himself, partly consciously, partly, it may be, uncon-
sciously, to this doctrine; and so Christianity is composed of two very
heterogeneous elements. Of these I should like to call the purely eth-
ical element preferably, indeed exclusively, the Christian, and to dis-
tinguish it from the Jewish dogmatism with which it is found. If,
as has often been feared, and especially at the present time, that ex-
cellent and salutary religion should completely decline, then I would
look for the reason for this simply in the fact that it does not consist
of one simple element, but of two originally heterogeneous elements,
brought into combination only by means of world events. In such a
case, dissolution would necessarily result through the break-up of these
elements, which arises from their different relationship and reaction to
the advanced spirit of the times. Yet after this dissolution, the purely
ethical part would still be bound always to remain intact, because it
is indestructible.
Schopenhauer 2012, 387, 388; my italics
Schopenhauer offers us a lucid articulation of the central characteristics of the
justificatory approach in his prize-essay response to the question raised by the
Royal Dutch Society concerning “where to look for the source and foundation of
morality.”5
The principle or the main fundamental proposition of an ethical sys-
tem is the shortest and concisest expression for the line of conduct
prescribed by it, or, if it should have no imperative form, the line of
conduct to which it attributes real moral worth. Consequently, this is
its guide to virtue in general, an instruction expressed in one proposi-
tion and thus the o” τι [the what] of virtue.
4The need for this alternative basis, in Schopenhauer’s view, is further supported by his
criticism of Kant’s own attempts at offering a philosophical foundation of our moral values for
remaining too theological. See the first section of Schopenhauer 1995.
5Schopenhauer 1995, 38.
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The foundation of an ethical system, on the other hand, is δ ιo´τ ι [the
why] of virtue, the ground or reason for that obligation, recommen-
dation, or praise, whether such ground be now sort in the nature of
man, in the external circumstances of the world, or in anything else.”
As in all sciences, so in ethics, the o” τι [the what], should be clearly
distinguished from δ ιo´τ ι [the why].
Schopenhauer 1995, 68
We can see from Schopenhauer’s description how the framework of the justifi-
catory approach is necessarily broad in order to capture a variety of different
possible content within the principle, (for example, both descriptive and imper-
ative propositions), and a multitude of possible means of justification (in, for
example, human nature, as seen earlier in the case of “intuition” for the English,
in the world, or in a metaphysical realm). The essential features of this approach
are (1) the depiction of the entire phenomenon of morality or ethics in a single
proposition, and (2) the subsequent founding of the proposition on some kind of
philosophical grounds.
While the first part of the task typically appeals to our familiarity with moral
values and our everyday experience of moral worth, the second part fundamen-
tally requires the employment of philosophical resources to provide a basis for
that everyday familiarity. The idea of this approach is that our pre-philosophical
familiarity with moral values - for Schopenhauer this is the indestructible “purely
ethical part” of Christianity - is to be grounded on a new non-Christian basis,
which requires justification through non-theological, philosophical inquiry:
It is through all these factors [the influence of Kantian philosophy,
progress in the natural sciences, acquaintance with Sanskrit litera-
ture, Brahmanism and Buddhism] that the fundamental philosophical
convictions of cultured Europe have undergone a revolution in the last
fifty years, which many perhaps admit only reluctantly, but which can-
not be denied. In consequence of such a change, the old supports of
ethics have become rotten; yet there is left an assurance itself that
ethics itself can never collapse. From this the conviction arises that
there must be other supports for it, different from those provided until
now, which would be suitable to the advanced views of the age.
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Schopenhauer 1995, 45
This justificatory approach, as Schopenhauer acknowledges, surfaces in many dif-
ferent philosophical traditions. Immanuel Kant, for example, can be seen to take
up the justificatory approach when he defines the task of moral philosophy in The
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals as “the search and establishment of the
supreme principle of morality.” Kant attempts to establish his principle of the
categorical imperative in the “noumenal” realm.6 The justificatory approach is
also undertaken by neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband in his essay ‘Vom Prinzip
der Moral’, which captures morality in the principle “Thue deine Pflicht!” [“Do
your duty!”]7, and grounds it transcendentally in the notion of duty. Schopen-
hauer grounds his principle of “neminem laede, imo omnes, quantum potes, juva”
[hurt no one and help everyone as much as you can] metaphysically in the “Will”,
and, Nietzsche’s once-close ally Paul Re´e, takes on Schopenhauer’s principle but
justifies it empirically in social utility.8
Let us take a closer look at the first part of the two-step justificatory ap-
proach. One might find it questionable as to whether a complex phenomenon
like morality, broadly understood to capture all moral phenomena, could ever be
adequately captured in a concise principle.9 On the other hand, one might be
equally buoyed by the fact that many of the principles that have been formed by
moral philosophers are incredibly similar.10
To challenge the very nature of this approach, I will begin by considering the
following criticism of it made by Nietzsche:
6See Kant 2007, 1197, 5. I follow Schopenhauer here in understanding Kant’s moral phi-
losophy as (in part) an attempt to ground Christian moral values philosophically, due to the
loss of the authority of religion. As seen in the above footnote, Schopenhauer criticises Kant’s
attempts for remaining too theological.
7See Windelband 1915, 205.
8The justificatory approach is also highly prevalent in the Seventeenth Century in figures
such as Locke, Schaftesbury and Hutcheson. See Carey 2006 for an overview.
9See Acampora and Pearson 2011, 112 and Geuss 2005.
10Schopenhauer discusses the challenge of this kind of skepticism and how to meet it in
Schopenhauer 1995, 125-130.
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Their [the ‘historians of morality’] usual mistaken premise is that they
affirm some consensus of the nations, at least of tame nations, con-
cerning certain principles of morals, and then they infer from this
that these principles must be unconditionally binding for you and me;
or, conversely, they see the truth that among different nations moral
valuations are necessarily different and then infer from this that no
morality is at all binding. Both procedures are equally childish.
GS 345
Whether the moral principle captures moral values that are de facto present among
all societies, or only among a particular society, cannot help to establish whether
these moral values are justified or not, and, hence, whether they should be binding,
What is required is precisely a further argument or philosophical account that
shows why they are justified. However, if one already has a certain means of
philosophical justification, based on, for example, a metaphysical system, then the
possible contents of the moral principle will be influenced by it. There is, what
we might call, an interdependence between the tasks of capturing morality in a
principle and of justifying it. That is to say, the criterion guiding what counts as a
valid principle is necessarily dependent on the criterion of what counts as sufficient
justification; and vice versa: what counts as sufficient justification is conditioned
by the moral content of the principle. To return again to concrete examples, some
moral philosophers, such as Schopenhauer, think that the moral principle should
capture moral values that are universally present. This is because Schopenhauer’s
means of justification seek recourse to the realm of the metaphysical. Others,
such as Re´e, believe that it should capture the de facto presence of moral values
in our own society. Re´e’s more modest demands are in line with his attempts
at localised, empirical justification. In starker contrast, Windelband argues that
the moral principle should capture de jure values that might not be present in
our society, but which we should strive towards. This is because they are to be
grounded transcendentally.
Without such interdependence, empirical analysis of the de facto relativity
or universality of moral values cannot establish whether such values are, indeed,
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justified. At first sight, this kind of argument seems to echo an argument made by
the neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband. A brief consideration of this argument will
help to distinguish Windelband’s justificatory approach from the task of taking
morality as a problem, and will, hence, allow further elucidation of the latter.
Windelband distinguishes between the de facto “psychogenetic origins” of
moral values, and the de jure question of their validity. He puts the issue thus:
“[f]or a theory of value which is to settle the question of the vindication or rational-
ity of values, the psychogenetic origin of any particular value is entirely irrelevant
and can never afford a decisive criterion.”11 Similarly, Nietzsche continues the
Gay Science aphorism 345 quoted above by stating that “[e]ven if a morality has
grown out of an error, the realisation of this fact would not as much as touch the
problem of its value.”
The negative force of Nietzsche’s argument coincides with that of Windelband’s
in so far as empirical observation of moral values is insufficient for engaging in the
task of justification. As said, one must already have designs on justification that
offer criteria for how moral values are to be captured in the principle.
Windelband argues that if indeed we are seeking to vindicate and ground
our moral values, then from the off we should be very clear and honest that this
requires establishing that these values should be binding for us. For Windelband
this demands an axiological, transcendental inquiry into the normative conditions
that make moral values and moral action possible. This involves an inquiry into
the a priori form or structure of the moral principle, with a view to ascertaining
universal, de jure content.
Windelband’s inquiry is informative, in so far as his characterisation of the
moral principle as the imperative “Do your duty!” [Thue deine Pflicht!] gives
us a sense of the dynamic of command and obedience, which, as we shall see in
chapter two, is central for moral development, and sits at the heart of our moral
11See Windelband 1921, 213.
20
psychological framework. However, when transcendental inquiry is separated from
its empirical counterpart, as Windelband finds out, it becomes incredibly difficult
to give any content to the moral principle. Windelband succeeds only in giving
insight into the a priori structure of the principle, but struggles to isolate any de
jure or de facto content.12
The dilemma then for the justificatory approach as set up by Windelband is
that if it is acknowledged that justification requires an inquiry into conditions
of normativity, transcendental inquiry’s instruments of justification are limited to
formal structures, and cannot access moral content. If, instead, inquiry is limited
to the empirical, then no recourse to normative justification can be made.
However, Nietzsche’s criticism of empirical approaches in GS 345 importantly
differs from Windelband’s since the invalid inference of the empirical approaches
that Nietzsche identifies is not the move from de facto to de jure content (as
found in Windelband), but from empirical knowledge of the de facto universal-
ity/relativity of morality and its genetic origins to claims of having touched “on
the problem of its [morality’s] value” (See GS 345). The problem with the latter
is that the scope of the principle - i.e., whether our moral values apply locally
to Europe, or whether they have greater universal scope - does not touch on the
problem of the value of those values. Rather, to touch on this problem requires
that the inquiry works with de facto content, (hence, Nietzsche’s ‘Natural History
of Morals’ section in Beyond Good and Evil), but which renders the de jure value
of our moral values an object of possible questioning. In support of this interpre-
tation, we can see more generally how this criticism of Nietzsche’s - that attempts
to capture the moral principle in relative or universal terms fail to touch on the
problem of morality - applies not only to inquiries that begin from the empirical,
12In Windelband 1915, Windelband struggles throughout the essay to articulate any content
for the moral principle. When he finishes the essay he does finally attempt to articulate some
content. However, we are left wondering where it came from, if not simply from the dominant
moral values that we are already familiar with. Indeed, these contents include the Christian
values of sympathy, Sympathie, benevolence, Wohlwollen, and truthfulness, Wahrhaftigkeit. See
Windelband 1915, 410-411.
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but to all inquiries which conduct an investigation into the nature of the moral
principle under accompanying designs for justification.
Nietzsche raises this general criticism in an aphorism of Beyond Good and Evil
in the section ‘The natural history of morals.’
What the philosophers called “a foundation [Begru¨ndung] of moral-
ity” and tried to supply was, seen in the right light, merely a scholarly
variation of the common faith in the prevalent morality; a new means
of expression for this faith; and thus just another fact within a par-
ticular morality; indeed, in the last analysis a kind of denial that this
morality might ever be considered problematic...
BGE 186 ; translation modified13
The main target of Nietzsche’s charge in this aphorism is most likely Schopenhauer
and his text On the Basis of Morality [U¨ber die Grundlage der Moral], although he
makes a more general attack against philosophers who have attempted to construct
a foundation of morality. Nietzsche makes two claims that are of interest here.
First, he argues that attempts at justifying morality remain within that morality,
and express a faith in that morality. Second, he argues that as a result of this,
the possibility of raising that morality as a problem is ‘denied.’ At first sight,
it is not obvious how the second claim relates to the first. That justification
remains within the morality in question, and expresses a faith in that morality,
does not necessarily mean that morality cannot be problematised. This would be
to overlook the possibility of an internal critique that seeks to render morality a
problem from the inside, so to speak. Indeed, Nietzsche himself sometimes talks
of his own attempts at taking morality as a problem as seeking what he calls the
“self-sublimation of morality” (D preface 4).14
13Walter Kaufmann translates ‘Begru¨ndung der Moral’ with ‘rational foundation of morality’.
However, there is no reason to restrict the type of foundation Nietzsche is interested in to rational
ones only. For example, sentimentalists that found moral knowledge on moral intuition would
also be susceptible to Nietzsche’s charges.
14Indeed, internal approaches are often thought to be more preferable in so far as they do
not appeal to normative standards that are justified independently of the morality in question.
See, for example, Honneth 2001, 6. I will consider in detail the possibilities for taking morality
as a problem via an internal critique in chapters 3 and 4.
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What Nietzsche more specifically claims, however, is that the expression of
faith in a morality that occurs during the very process of justification, closes off
the possibility of taking that morality as a problem. To understand why this
occurs, we have to consider in more detail exactly what is being expressed by
such a faith in morality such that possibility of taking it as a problem is “denied.”
When Nietzsche states that justification is a “scholarly variation of the com-
mon faith in the prevalent morality,” the problem cannot be that it expresses
certain values; even values that belong to the Christian morality in question.
This is because, as just said, internal critique remains a possibility. Instead, to
make sense of this, I suggest that the faith expressed, which Nietzsche points to, is
in the value of our moral values. Understood in this manner, Nietzsche’s criticism
would be the following: these justificatory approaches take the value of our moral
values for granted, in so far as they assume this value as it is pre-philosophically
given. They do this when they justify our moral values philosophically. Due to
this, the approaches are unable to see that this value could be questionable, and
that the collapse in Christianity means that this value cannot simply be taken
for granted as it is given in its familiarity. In fact, justification helps to avoid
bringing into question this value since, rather than considering the implications of
the loss of foundations, it readily provides new foundations, and, hence, removes
the possibility of raising the question of the value of these values altogether.
Another way of articulating this criticism is to say that the justificatory ap-
proach expresses a knowledge of what good and evil are in the act of establishing
their philosophical grounds.15 The problem is not that the moral philosophers
take up “the morality of their environment, their class, their church, the spirit
of their time, their climate and part of the world...” (BGE 186), but that they
15Although Nietzsche does not argue for it here, there is also the resultant effect of (certain
forms of) justification strengthening our faith in our moral values. In his History of European
Morals, also written in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century, William Lecky makes this
general point. He claims that justificatory approaches “react upon and strengthen the moral
tendency that elicited it” Lecky 1911, 128.
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take this morality as already known - i.e. as already that which is “the good”
- when they justify it.16 They commit that “error of errors” we saw Nietzsche
describe in the ‘origins of knowledge’ aphorism (GS 355) by taking “the familiar
as known.” By doing so, the approach unavoidably puts the value of the justified
values beyond questioning, begging the question of this value. To return briefly to
Schopenhauer by way of example, his faith in the “indestructibility” of Christian
morality, notwithstanding the decline in Christian faith, is highly indicative of
this.
To conclude, justificatory approaches seek to justify moral values by giving
these values a philosophical foundation or ground [Begru¨ndung]. When they do
this, they not only express a faith in those moral values, but take the value of
these moral values in its given familiarity as known. As a result, they deny that
this value could be an object of possible questioning by closing it off from such
an inquiry.
The justificatory approach attempts to tackle the loss of the foundations of
our moral values. What it fails to perceive, and in fact denies, is that the very
right of existence of our Christian moral values is at stake. It passes over this by
attempting to replace these lost foundations with new philosophical foundations.
Ultimately these approaches remain too familiar with our moral values in so far
as they take the value of our moral values for granted in its familiarity. If we
then return to the paradox facing moral inquiry that was explained at the end of
the previous section, we can see that these justificatory approaches fail to achieve
sufficient estrangement from our familiarity with moral values in order to see that
16Campora and Ansell-Pearson argue, to the contrary, that Nietzsche’s criticism of the justi-
ficatory approach is as follows:“What reasons does Nietzsche have for opposing this effort on the
part of philosophers to supply morality with a “rational foundation?” The answer is that such
an approach is far too simple-minded and results in a reification of the phenomenon of morality,
in the sense that it is being abstracted from its conditions of existence, which are on the one
hand conditions of natural human life and on the other hand conditions relative to specific his-
torical contexts.” Acampora and Pearson 2011, 112. This would suggest that to take morality
as a problem, according to Nietzsche, would simply be to consider the conditions of existence
of morality, and to avoid abstracting away from those conditions. This, however, overlooks the
difficult task of bringing into view the value of our moral values as a questionable phenomenon.
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their value - and, hence their right to existence - could be, and should be, made
an object of questioning.
1.3 Reductionism and Immoralism
In the previous section I briefly suggested that empirically grounding our moral
values in psycho-genetic origins is an example of the justificatory approach and
that, as a result, it succumbs to begging the question of the value of our moral
values. It might, however, be argued that knowledge of the genetic origins of moral
values fails to engage with the problem of moral values only when such knowledge
is employed with the goal of justifying those values. On the contrary, it might
be claimed that an inquiry into origins need not attempt to justify our moral
values based on their original inception (in the original formation of communities,
for example), but rather appeal to origins in a reductionist move that seeks to
question the value of our moral values by explaining moral phenomena in terms
of more basic phenomena.
For example, although I have subsumed Paul Re´e’s moral philosophy under
the remit of the justificatory approach, it might be thought that his account is
more reductionist and revisionary than the likes of Schopenhauer’s and Kant’s.
Reductionism, it might be thought, attempts to take morality as a problem bet-
ter than the justificatory approach, since it draws on empirical analysis to affect
the value of our moral values by reducing those values to ontologically prior phe-
nomena. Rather than maintaining the “indestructibility” of the value of Christian
moral values, the reductionist seeks to readdress the high esteem accorded to these
values.
Moreover, in some cases, the reductionist approach is also accompanied by an
alternative normative ethics, which is to usurp our moral values. Interestingly
enough, in the Anglophone secondary literature Nietzsche is often interpreted as
engaging in the same type of reductionist inquiry as Re´e, albeit while also advo-
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cating his own alternative ethics or “immorality” to the moral values of Europe.17
In what follows, I will begin by considering Re´e’s own position, and will then turn
to this more nuanced interpretation of Nietzsche’s position.
Re´e professes to bring the phenomenon of morality back down to earth. For too
long, he tells us in the opening page of On the Origin of Moral Sentiments, moral
phenomena have been “considered to be something supersensible - the voice of
God, as theologians put it.”18 Even Kant who denies the possibility of knowledge
of the noumenal realm, “saw in moral consciousness something transcendent...”19
Yet, with the advent of Darwinism, Re´e believes it is finally possible to trace
moral phenomena “back to natural causes just as much as physical phenomena:
moral man stands no closer to the intelligible world than physical man.”20 Re´e’s
intentions are not simply to re-ground our moral values, but to cause a devalua-
tion in their value, to tackle the loss of their foundations by reducing the import
that moral values should have in our lives. Thus, as opposed to justificatory ap-
proaches, such as those of Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s that seek to maintain the
“majestic moral structures” and “indestructible and eternal elements” of Chris-
tianity respectively, Re´e, on the contrary, seeks a devaluation of our moral values
by situating them on much more humble grounds.21
Despite his explicit reference to Kant above, it is Schopenhauer who Re´e has
most keenly in his sights. Re´e subscribes to Schopenhauer’s moral principle “ne-
minem laede, imo omnes, quantum potes, juva” [hurt no one and help everyone
as much as you can], but seeks to find its origins in social utility, rather than
in metaphysical will. It has thus been reasonably claimed that Re´e attempts to
naturalise Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy.22 He does this by attempting to re-




21See D preface for Nietzsche’s criticism of Kant’s appeal to such structures, and Schopen-
hauer 2012, 387, 388 quoted above, on Schopenhauer’s understanding of this ethical element in
Christianity.
22Robin Small makes this claim. See Re´e 2003, xx; and Small 2005, 84.
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duce moral phenomena to ontologically prior phenomena. Moral phenomena are
to be fully explained causally by their psycho-social origins, which are in turn to
be established through recourse to evolutionary theory. These origins are objects
of natural scientific inquiry, thus meaning that the scientific inquirer has better
access to moral knowledge than a so-called “moralist.” This is because moral
knowledge, for Re´e, just is knowledge of the origins of moral values. Thus, he
states that “the nature of any [moral] sensation is clear only to the extent that
the history of its origin is also clear.”23
At first sight, this looks like a potential candidate for taking morality as a
problem. Familiar moral values are to be subject to a genetic analysis for the
acquisition of moral knowledge. The value of these moral values is raised in so
far as the origins that are isolated will have a bearing on the esteem to which we
hold these values. Furthermore, it is clear that Re´e believes that this process of
naturalisation will result in a re-assessment of the value of our moral values. They
will lose their transcendent, divine status, and be limited to a utility value based
on their role in social formation and progression.
I will now consider the shortcomings of Re´e’s approach. First, I want to suggest
that there is an important difference between an inquiry that directly bears on
the esteem in which we hold our moral values, such as Re´e’s, and an inquiry
that brings into view the evaluative orientation of this value as a questionable
phenomenon. The difference here is subtle, yet fundamental to understanding
what is required to take morality as a problem. Since, as I shall argue, Re´e’s
account only manages to affect the esteem by which we see our moral values, it
should, in fact, still be understood as falling under the justificatory banner.
Re´e ultimately assumes that moral values in their familiarity are valuable,
and his empirical approach attempts to ground their value in social utility. This
is seen explicitly by the fact that he unquestionably takes up Schopenhauer’s
23Re´e 2003, 92.
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moral principle “neminem laede, imo omnes, quantum potes, juva” albeit without
claiming (like Schopenhauer) that it is universal in scope. Our Christian moral
values do not come from a divine source, Re´e argues, but from social utility. Due
to this, we might say that it is still good to be good, according to Re´e, just not
as good as we perhaps thought.
Even though Re´e attempts to show that our moral values should not play such
a central role in our lives, he, nevertheless, fails to question whether our moral
values are good for us, and, indeed, whether they could be in some sense harmful.
It is this latter question which concerns the evaluative orientation of the value
of our moral values. Re´e, on the contrary, is only able to affect the esteem by
which we hold our moral values; yet, what affects this esteem is precisely the
means of justification that Re´e employs. The process of justification can seek to
increase this esteem (as in the case of Schopenhauer), or decrease it (as in the
case of Re´e). To do so, however, the inquiry already assumes that moral values
are valuable. The possibility that they might not be valuable - and, that, hence,
their right to existence may not be unconditional - is not considered at all. Re´e’s
approach helps to bring this out, since despite his explicit critical intentions,
he takes over Schopenhauer’s moral principle fully, without consideration as to
whether the content of the principle is indeed valuable. The upshot of this is that
the question of the value of our moral values - understood in the sense of the
evaluative orientation of this value - is not touched upon by Re´e’s approach, but
is, instead, begged.
To be clear, Re´e’s appeal to scientific developments and results is not in it-
self misguided. However, when such knowledge is employed to bear only on the
esteem by which we hold our moral values, it takes moral values as the type of
phenomenon whose value cannot be raised. It does not help us to question our
familiarity with moral values, but rather has the opposite effect of consolidating
this familiarity. It works against helping us to see our moral values as a question-
able phenomenon, since despite supposedly losing their transcendent credibility,
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moral values nevertheless find their justification in the “more tangible” empirical
realm of social utility.
Now, as said above, notwithstanding the divergence of Re´e’s account from the
task of taking morality as a problem, Nietzsche has been interpreted as engaging in
a critique of our moral values that is akin to Re´e’s, while, however, also forwarding
an alternative ethics or “immorality” to our familiar, Christian moral values. The
idea here is that Nietzsche’s approach is similar to Re´e’s in so far as it inquires
into the origins of moral values by drawing on scientific developments and results
of the time, but instead of justifying moral values through such an appeal to
origins, it attempts to attack and undermine our moral values while forwarding
alternative values.
Such an approach looks like a better candidate for taking morality as a problem
than reductionism alone since it might be thought that the knowledge of the
origins of moral values can be effectively used to question our familiarity with our
moral values through the process of reductionism, in favour of some alternative
values that avoid the same fate. Moreover, if successful, those latter values could
replace our Christian moral values thus overcoming the issue of the latter’s loss
of foundations.
The combination of the critique of particular moral values with the advance-
ment of a positive ethics has led to what has become known in the Anglophone
secondary literature as the ‘scope problem.’24 The scope problem captures the
issue of how Nietzsche’s own moral philosophy can defend a position which rad-
ically criticises a particular “morality,” whilst allowing him to forward an ethics
of his own.
Moreover, often in the literature the ‘scope problem’ is considered to be the
problem that Nietzsche himself takes up when attempting to “take morality as
a problem.” A clear example of this is given by Frank Cameron in his book,
24See Robertson 2012 for an overview of the issue. See also the chapter with this title in
Leiter 2002, and the beginning of Leiter 1995.
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Nietzsche and The ‘Problem’ of Morality. At the outset Cameron states that,
“[i]n this study I argue that Nietzsche presents a positive morality based on hu-
man flourishing, and that his attack on the prevailing, Christian morality can
only be understood within the context of his fundamental ‘ethical’ preoccupation
with exemplary individuals.”25 Cameron attempts to analytically delineate Niet-
zsche’s supposed engagement with the scope problem by distinguishing between
“Morality” (with an uppercase ‘M’) involving unconditional universal demands,
and “a morality or moralities” (note the lower case ‘m’), which are invented, in-
herited practices. Cameron claims that this distinction affords “conceptual space
by isolating Morality to oppose, and other forms of moralities to affirm.”26 In this
manner, Nietzsche is thought to be able to take Morality (with a capital M) as a
problem.
There are, however, several shortcomings with this interpretation of Niet-
zsche’s moral philosophy, and this understanding of the task of taking morality as
a problem. The central difficulty for such readings is to account for how Nietzsche
can forward a positive ethics in light of his critique of morality. The worry is that
the scope of the latter appears to leave little room for the former. After having
attempted to isolate the ‘positive’ affirmation of certain values, and an attack on
other values, these readings have the task of establishing how Nietzsche is justi-
fied in positing the former as values that we should strive after, in place of our
Christian moral values.27 An appeal to justification is important since without
it, we would be left with little reason to consider seriously different values to our
25See Cameron 2002, 1.
26ibid. An alternative attempt is offered by Richardson 2004, 69: “I’ll argue that we can
reconcile Nietzsche’s naturalizing perspectivism with these claims to higher status for his own
values, by going back to his Darwinian beginning.” Brian Leiter also claims that Nietzsche
argues against what he labels “morality in a pejorative sense,” in favour of his own ethics of the
“higher type.” See Leiter 2008 and Leiter 1995.
27Simon May’s raising of the issue is indicative: “what philosophical principle or psychological
process could he [Nietzsche] posit to justify his core assumption that the radical devaluation of
temporality or ‘becoming’ necessarily results in the stifling of human flourishing and hence in
what he calls ‘descending’ or ‘de´cadent’ life?” May 1999, 5.
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familiar, moral values as viable alternatives.28
Appeal to justification of alternative immoral values suffers from the same
problem that we have seen above in the case of the justificatory approach that
deals with our Christian moral values. That is to say, attempts to justify alter-
native values (that are seen as “immoral” from the perspective of our Christian
moral values - hence terming this position “immoralism”) make the same appeal
to grounds and foundations [Begru¨ndung] as the justificatory approach. By doing
so, immoralism is parasitic on this approach, and, as a result, assumes the value
of the alternative immoral values. In endeavouring to ground immoral values, the
inquirer endorses the value of these values, and can only touch on the esteem ac-
corded to their value through justification. Due to this, the question of the value
of these immoral values is necessarily begged.
Now, one might retort that assuming the value of immoral values is not an
issue for Nietzsche’s own task because he wants to bring into question specific
familiar, Christian moral values that have become dominant in Europe; values
such as pity and self-denial. These are specific values that he explicitly refers
to on a regular basis. Indeed, it might be the case that alternative values need
justification, and their value to be begged, so that our familiar moral values can
be brought into question. And it might be further thought that it is Nietzsche’s
inquiry into origins that is designed to achieve this.
This response is inadequate, however. First, Nietzsche attacks all justificatory
approaches in BGE 186 that result in the construction of foundations, and not
just those that are attempted for a particular morality. This is further supported
28It has been argued that Nietzsche offers an alternative ethics without any justification,
with the sole goal that “people like him” will be influenced by it. See Leiter 1995. The problem
with this is the position still gets no closer to bringing into view the value of our moral values
as a questionable phenomenon. As we shall see in chapter 4, this is because it misinterprets
and devalues the important function that Nietzsche’s appeal to an alternative outlook plays in
his moral philosophy. I will argue that instead of forwarding a normative ethics, Nietzsche’s
appeal to an alternative moral outlook is employed in a liminal phase as a part of the process
of estrangement. This is a temporary phase, however, which comes to an end with a phase of
aggregation or return to our familiar moral values.
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in the preface of On the Genealogy of Morals, where Nietzsche explicitly refers to
the value of pity:
This problem of the value of pity and of the morality of pity... seems
at first to be merely something detached, an isolated question mark;
but whoever sticks with it and learns how to ask questions here will
experience what I experienced - a tremendous new prospect opens up
for him, a new possibility comes over him like a vertigo, every kind of
mistrust, suspicion, fear leaps up, his belief in morality, in all morality,
falters - finally a new demand becomes audible.
GM preface 6 ; last italics mine
Although Nietzsche begins with a concern for the value of pity, he soon realises
that this involves bringing into question “all morality.” Now, the manner in which
Nietzsche employs terms such as “Moralita¨t”, “Sittlichkeit” and “Moral” - trans-
lated sometimes as morality, sometimes as ethics, and even sometimes as mores in
English - throughout his writings is often ambiguous, and most likely intentionally
so. However, at times Nietzsche clearly has in mind Christian moral values, and
at other times he refers to features that belong to any type of morality at all.29
Yet, what is also implied in the passage above is that when one becomes familiar
with moral values, one also becomes familiar with immoral values. That is to say,
not only does a familiarity with moral values render salient moral phenomena in
the world, but also phenomena that conflict with those values, which, hence, show
up as immoral. We have not really understood what it is to act well, for example,
without also having grasped what it would mean to act badly. The result of this
co-dependence is that to bring into question the value of familiar moral values, is
also to bring into question the value of familiar immoral values. If one were able
to see the value of our moral values as questionable, then this would also render
the immoral status of opposing values questionable as well from the perspective of
the moral inquirer who is familiar with moral and immoral values. For example, if
29This distinction will be brought out in detail in chapter 2, section ‘Habituation’.
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I were to bring into question the positive value of, say, the familiar values of pity,
compassion and charity, I would also bring into question the negative value of the
familiar opposing values such as self-reverence, fortitude in the face of adversity,
and emotional self-restraint. As we have just seen, however, immoralism cannot
do this since by attempting to justify immoral values, it begs the question of their
value.
The further result of this is a failure to adequately bring into question the
value of familiar moral values. This is because an attempt to replace familiar
moral values with immoral values does not so much as bring into question the
former, as to replace the content of that which is to be familiar to us - i.e., that
which is to count as “good” and that which is to count as “bad”. Knowledge
obtained by this type of inquiry seeks to dislodge the content of familiar moral
values - say to replace ‘self-denial’ with ‘self-affirmation.’ It fails, however, to
bring into question the value of the values of ‘self-denial’ and ‘self-affirmation.’ It
thus does not “touch on the problem of the value” of these values.30
There is an additional concern with the immoralist position. Moral values are
typically interpreted as being immoral in a reversal of the value of our familiar
moral values. Take, for example, the position taken up by Callicles in book II
of The Republic, where he challenges the conventional understanding of justice
by arguing that its opposite, injustice, is in fact more according to nature than
its conventional counterpart.31 The worry with this approach is that, due to this
reversal, we would lose familiarity with our moral values - we would no longer see
30Note that the task of taking morality as a problem is not necessarily incompatible with the
possibility of forwarding and justifying a positive ethics, but the latter project is of a different
nature to that of the former. Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, I am arguing, deals mainly with
the former task, and his appeal to alternative moral outlooks should be interpreted as helping
with this task. It should also be noted that when Nietzsche often calls his position “immoral”,
he alludes to the fact that from the position of familiarity with our moral values, the task
of estrangement is immoral. This is not the same as forwarding a normative un-conventional
normative position. See Daybreak 41, 42, 43, where Nietzsche engages in a genealogy of the
philosopher, and argues that by running up against tradition and custom, the philosopher is
unavoidably labelled immoral. Socrates in particular would be an excellent example of this.
31See Cooper and Hutchinson 1997, 826.
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the world through them - and, hence, could not bring them into question. This
may not seem like a problem for the immoralist, since a part of their argument
is that conventional immoral values should replace conventional moral values.
However, the danger for the immoralist is that either they underestimate the
nature and depth of our familiarity with moral values which they too might still
be a part of,32 or they remain so external to such familiarity that they can no
longer perceive the world through those values. The risk here is one of alienation
from familiar moral values to the point in which the world no longer shows up
through them in a familiar manner. If, however, such familiarity is lost, then so
is the possibility of bringing into question the value of our familiar moral values.
To return to the paradox facing the moral inquirer, rather than satisfying the
condition of estrangement here, immoralism descends into alienation, thus failing
to satisfy even the condition of familiarity.
In reply to this, one might argue that there is the possibility of taking up a
position that is wholly external to all values, and, thus, that no commitment to
either moral or immoral values need be implicated in the inquiry. If possible, this
would avoid the charge of begging the question of the value of moral and immoral
values. A common way of attempting this in contemporary moral philosophy is to
orient the scope problem around what Gilbert Harman calls, in his classic text The
Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, “the problem with ethics.”33 The
problem is captured in contemporary metaethics as “the problem ... of finding
room for morality, or placing morality within the disenchanted, non-moral order
which we inhabit, and of which we are a part.”34 For this position, since this
non-ethical order is deemed to have been established by the natural sciences, “the
problem with ethics” is the difficulty of answering the question as to whether moral
32We shall see the nature and depth of this familiarity with moral values in detail in chapter
2, as well as the inconspicuousness of their value.
33Harman 1977.
34See Blackburn 1998, 49.
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principles “can be tested and confirmed in the way scientific principles can.”35
A part of the Anglophone secondary literature argues that Nietzsche’s reduc-
tionist “naturalism” demands an investigation that is conducted outside the entire
“ethical order,” and which, in some sense, follows the results and methods of the
contemporary natural sciences. Despite the highly ambiguous and problematic
relation between naturalism and the natural sciences, various attempts have been
made to categorise Nietzsche’s naturalism, and to draw out its implications for
his moral philosophy.
For example, at one extreme, Brian Leiter claims that Nietzsche is a naturalist
in so far as he follows the methods of the natural sciences.36 Various weaker
claims have also been made, such as Janaway’s definition of Nietzsche’s naturalism
in terms of the use of causal explanation akin to that employed in the natural
sciences, Geuss’s understanding of Nietzsche’s (moral) philosophy as a “natural
extension of the empirical sciences”, and Emden’s classification of Nietzsche as a
methodological naturalist following the methods of the ‘life sciences.’37
The general idea that I wish to pursue here is the claim that Nietzsche con-
ducts an inquiry from a ‘value-free’ position that is akin to that of the natural
sciences, and which “finds room for” the entire phenomenon of morality in the
“non-ethical natural scientific world order.”38 It is argued, for example, that he
35Harman 1977, 3.
36This is Nietzsche’s supposed “methodological naturalism”. Thus, Leiter claims that “[l]ike
most of the great philosophical naturalists, Nietzsche’s naturalism is fundamentally methodolog-
ical”, where methodological naturalism involves both continuity with the results and methods
of the natural sciences. See Leiter 2002, 6.
37See Janaway 2007, Geuss 2005 and Emden 2014 respectively. Note that at the other end of
the extreme, Christoph Cox suggests Nietzsche is a naturalist only in so far as his explanations
do not employ the supernatural (Gods and ghosts, for example). See Cox 1999. I think that
Cox’s suggestion is by far the most plausible. However, it is also the least informative since it
does not help us to articulate any further Nietzsche’s method and his task of acquiring moral
knowledge.
38Note that commentators also subscribe Nietzsche to taking a position outside of morality
without associating a strong version of naturalism to him. My subsequent criticisms against as-
cribing to Nietzsche a ‘value-free’ position more generally also apply to these readings. Cameron
is indicative:“A major component of his [Nietzsche’s] work on morality is critique which neces-
sitates a standpoint outside of morality.” (Note again the lower-case ‘m’.) See Cameron 2002,
18.
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reduces the phenomenon of morality to psycho-social-physiological phenomena
that are possible objects of natural scientific inquiry. Thus, Leiter claims that
“... Nietzsche, the philosophical naturalist, aims to offer theories that explain
various important human phenomena (especially the phenomenon of morality),
and that do so in ways that both draw on actual scientific results, particularly
in psychology... but are also modelled on science in the sense that they seek to
reveal the causal determinants of these phenomena, typically in various physiolog-
ical and psychological facts about persons.”39 On this ‘natural scientific’ reading,
the problem is what scope Nietzsche has to forward his own ethics in light of his
reduction of all morality to value-free phenomena.40
Now, an initial doubt arises with this interpretation concerning whether an
moral inquiry could really be conducted from a ‘value-free’ position. Inquiries
are conducted within certain institutions, under specific criteria, in a particular
medium, and so on. There is what we might call a familiar, evaluative backdrop or
moral outlook from which the inquiry is conducted, and through which the inquirer
perceives moral salience in the world. This would suggest that, minimally, some
value would necessarily be involved during the inquiry.41 A potential answer to
this difficulty might be to suggest that the inquiry could isolate the aspects of the
moral outlook in which the inquiry is situated. This outlook could then be reduced
by a separate inquiry. The worry with this suggestion is, however, that, first, if the
subsequent inquiry is to bring these aspects into view it must function in a very
similar, if not the same, moral outlook as the former. If a similar outlook were
sufficient, there would arise the trouble of an infinite regress. Each inquiry would
in turn demand an ever new inquiry into the assumed evaluative background of
39See Leiter 2002, 6. John Richardson follows Leiter here, but argues that Nietzsche reduces
values to facts that are less about individual persons than about natural and “social” selection.
See Richardson 2004, 71.
40Note that this problem also besets Re´e’s approach to the extent that he attempts to ground
Schopenhauer’s moral principle from a ‘value-free’ position.
41Criticisms to this effect have been raised against not only the possibility of value-free moral
inquiry, but also against value-free inquiry in the natural sciences. See, for example, McDowell
1994 and Kuhn 1970. For an overview of the issue, see Lacey 2005.
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the previous inquiry. If, instead, the same moral outlook is employed then the
same values would be assumed by each investigation. This would give these values
a strange or “queer” non-reductive quality, which would be unacceptable for the
reductionist.42
This, however, is not the main issue. A ‘value-free’ approach implies that
moral values are the type of phenomena which are transparent to the inquirer, so
that the inquirer is able to avoid them at will. In this manner, moral phenomena
are brought into view by going “outside” such phenomena, and into the value-free
world of scientific inquiry. The problem is, it is not at all clear that moral values
are transparent in this way, and that they could be circumvented by inquiry. This
is not simply because the inquiry is institutionalised, but because the inquirer
might not have such direct access to his or her familiar moral values. As we shall
see in chapter two, our moral values often function in the background, as a kind
of foundation that affords perception of moral salience in the world: things show
up as valuable since we see the world through those values. Although, elements
of this background can sometimes come to the fore for questioning, we shall see
in chapter three in particular, how this requires, nevertheless, assuming the value
of the wider evaluative background, and, hence cannot be considered in any sense
“value-free”.
Moreover, attempting to take up an entirely external position from our moral
values might not only be an unachievable task, but it can also prove counter-
productive in so far as it moves the inquirer outside of the putative evaluative
phenomena that are required to perceive moral salience in the first place, and,
which, hence, would enable the very possibility of inquiry. In other words, an ex-
ternal, value-free, position would mean a loss of familiarity with our moral values
such that moral phenomena in the world would no longer be salient for us; we
would become alienated from them. If, however, such familiarity is lost, then the
42This term is first used in this context in Mackie 1977.
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possibility of bringing into view the value of our familiar moral values will also be
necessarily foregone.
To further bring out this point and contrast it with what it might mean to
correctly take morality as a problem, we can return to the ‘Origins of Knowledge’
aphorism (GS 355) quoted earlier. There we saw Nietzsche claim that “[w]hat is
familiar is what we are used to [Das Bekannte ist das Gewohnte]; and what we
are used to is most difficult to “know” - that is, to see as a problem; that is, to
see as strange, as distant, as “outside us.” As a close reading of Nietzsche on
this point shows, estrangement from moral values does not mean to take up a
position “outside” of morality, but rather to bring familiar moral values into view
as “outside of us” [als “ausser uns”]. This is fundamental since it indicates that
moral values are not a part of some world which we can easily choose to dip in
and out of at will. Rather, moral values are a part of us, they are (as we shall see
at the end of this chapter) a part of our “flesh and blood.” They are a part of
who we are since, as will become evident in the next chapter, we become familiar
with them through a process of habituation.
To take up an external position to our familiar, moral values then, if at all
possible, would result in moral phenomena seen through those values no longer
showing up to the inquirer. However, if the inquirer remains “inside” either fa-
miliar morality or an alternative immorality, then the task of reduction becomes
an impossible one from within the (im)morality that is to be reduced. This is
because the inquiry labours towards the reduction of the putative values that are
required to perceive the moral salience provided by those values in the first place.
In light of Nietzsche’s consideration of “knowledge” being mistakenly taken
as that which is familiar, (as seen again in ‘the origins of knowledge’ aphorism),
we can see that this naturalist reading makes an appeal to the scientific world
“because this world is more familiar to us.” Moral phenomena that have now
become queer in an ever more familiar scientific world order are to be familiarised
into this value-free order. Knowledge of origins is to help with this task, and by
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doing so it makes the erroneous assumption that “what is familiar is more easily
known.” It re-familiarises the phenomenon (through its attempted reduction)
thus begging, and ultimately eliminating, the question of its value.
It is of course true that a common theme running throughout Nietzsche’s
work is the analysis of moral phenomena in terms of social, psychological and
physiological phenomena. To take a pertinent example, in On the Genealogy of
Morals, Christian morality is interpreted as the upshot of a revolt by a particular
social class; it is analysed as a psychological by-product of this class’ inability for
action; and, it is also considered as this class’ common physiological reaction to
suffering. However, as we have seen in this section, these analyses should not be
understood as being employed either to criticise our moral values by means of
reductionism, nor should they, however, be interpreted as attempts at justifying
alternative immoral values. As we shall see in chapter four, these analyses should
be interpreted, instead, as functioning as part of the process of estrangement that
attempt to bring the value of familiar values into question.
To conclude, in this section I have argued against the possibility of being able
to take morality as a problem from either a reductionist or immoralist position,
or from a combination of the two. The reductionist position can at best only
affect the esteem with which we hold our moral values, but is unable to perceive
the value of our moral values as a questionable phenomenon. As a result, in this
form it is still committed to justifying values. This applies also to immoralism
in so far as it assumes the value of the alternative immoral values. Moreover,
the inquirer conducting the investigation is at risk of becoming alienated from his
or her familiarity with moral values by attempting to take up a position that is
either a “view from nowhere”, or by conducting it from an immoral perspective.
Such alienation results in the inability to perceive the moral phenomena and
values that are to be “taken as a problem”, and, hence, forgoes engaging with the
consequences of their loss of Christian foundations.
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1.4 Amoralism
With the reductionism of Paul Re´e subsumed under the justificatory approach
seen earlier, and immoralism also rejected, there is one final candidate for taking
our moral values as a problem. This is amoralism, and it will be the subject of
this section.
We have seen that the justificatory approach takes up our moral values in their
familiarity. That is to say, it takes our moral values as they are pre-philosophically
given to us, and then seeks to ground them philosophically. It thus meets the
condition of familiarity. This approach, however, denies the possibility of taking
morality as a problem since by justifying the given moral values it puts the value of
these values beyond question. Immoralism, on the other hand, strives to question
the value of our moral values through appeal to, and justification of, alternative
immoral values. However, in attempting to justify those immoral values it assumes
their value. Moreover, it risks losing familiarity with our moral values since it
either takes up a position of immorality, or it seeks a ‘value-free’ position. In the
former instance, the moral salience of the world is no longer perceived through
Christian, moral values, and in the latter, moral salience per se is no longer
seen at all. As a result, we become alienated from our familiarity with moral
values, and, hence, cannot pose the question as to their value. The condition
of estrangement is not met, since such familiarity is lost. The final option to
consider is a position which attempts to neither justify moral values or immoral
values. Instead, its task is to undermine the possibility of such justification by
either eliminating moral phenomena altogether, or, in its more moderate form,
by advocating a form of moral fictionalism. More radical than the reductionist
project, the amoralist denies that there are moral phenomena at all in the world.
As a possible candidate for taking morality as a problem, amoralism might then
be thought to be able to pose the question of the value of our moral values by
questioning the very nature of the value of moral phenomena. This would be an
example of an extreme rejection of the very significance of the loss of the Christian
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foundation of our moral values.
In contemporary metaethical literature, the amoralist position has been theo-
retically posed as an “error theory.”43 The position argues that all moral propo-
sitions are truth-apt, and, yet, false. That is to say, our moral judgements are
indeed propositions, but there is nothing in the world to which they refer. There
is thus nothing in the world which motivates us to act morally.44 It is this view
that I will focus on here, and it is also a position that has been ascribed to Niet-
zsche in the secondary literature. Before turning to it, however, one might already
be sceptical as to whether the broader position of amoralism is really a potential
candidate for taking morality as a problem due to its eliminative intentions. I will
outline this issue first, before turning to a more nuanced account that attempts
to deal with this worry.
The amoralist must, by hypothesis, take up the inquiry from “outside” of the
moral phenomena in question, since such phenomena are conjectured as being
non-existent. The initial concern here is that from this external position, just
as in the case of reductionism seen above, the moral phenomena do not come
into view for the inquirer, and, hence, he or she becomes alienated from such
phenomena. This is not a problem for the amoralist per se since he or she does
not believe that there are really any moral values that would show up in any case.
However, since according to the amoralist, moral values have no actual referent,
there is nothing about them specifically that can be brought into question except
their very existence. Now, if I challenge the existence of moral values, I certainly
challenge their value in so far as if they are shown not to exist, then their value
will also be eliminated. The problem with this, however, is that such a move
ultimately eliminates the possibility of finding our moral values as a problem
43See Mackie 1977.
44For the most part, the amoralist usually crops up in the broader literature as a potential
counterexample to moral judgement internalism rather than as a possible metaethical position.
Here, however, I am more concerned with amoralism in the latter sense, and as a possible
approach to taking morality as a problem. For interest in the figure of the amoralist in the
former sense see Bromwich 2013 for an overview.
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since it eliminates the very phenomena - our moral values - that are to be brought
into view as questionable. I cannot, for example, bring into question the value of
pity if I reject that pity as a value actually exists at all. The very problem, we
might say, is eliminated along with the phenomena.
Now, there is a more nuanced amoralist position that has been ascribed to
Nietzsche in the literature, and which attempts to alleviate some of these worries.
Charles Pigden, for example, argues that “moral nihilism is a minor variant of
the error theory of J. L. Mackie” and claims that Nietzsche endorses it as a kind
of “meta-ethical nihilism.”45 Similarly to the immoralist interpretations above,
Pigden also interprets Nietzsche as positing a normative ethics of his own. To
keep the two tenets consistent - that of amoralism and a positive, normative
ethics - he ascribes to Nietzsche a form of fictionalism. The idea is that there is a
problematic tension between Nietzsche rejecting the existence of moral phenomena
and yet nevertheless offering his own normative position. The solution adhered to
by Pigden, and argued for in greater detail by Nadeem Hussain, is that both the
moral values that Nietzsche questions and the alternative values that he proposes
should be understood as having a fictional ontological status. More specifically,
Hussain argues that, if we accept that Nietzsche rejects the existence of things
having value in themselves, (his metaethical nihilism), and also that Nietzsche’s
free spirits are to engage in value creating practices, (as a new positive, normative
ethics), then some explanation is required as to how the two commitments can
co-exist.
Hussain rejects as a possible answer to this, what he calls, “subjective real-
ism” about valuing. This is the idea that something is valuable in virtue of “the
object, state of affairs, what-have-you, standing in certain relations to agents.”46
45See Pigden 2007. Note also that Danto 1965, Green 2002, Ansell-Pearson 1994 and Hei-
degger 1979 each claim that Nietzsche endorses a more radical, metaphysical nihilism, which
incorporates not only moral propositions, but all propositions tout court. In chapter 3, I will
discuss the role of language and argue that it is efficacious in our familiarity with moral values.
46See Hussain 2007, 170.
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Instead, he claims that Nietzsche has a more radical error theory in mind due
to his commitments to ‘theoretical nihilism’: “the belief in valuelessness, or as
Nietzsche often puts it, goallessness.”47 As a result, Hussain advocates an appeal
to fictionalism to understand the activity of these free spirits in a goalless and
valueless world.48
It should be noted that the appeal to fictionalism here is another attempt
at resolving the ‘scope problem’ that was outlined earlier. In his paper ‘Honest
Illusion: Valuing for Nietzsche’s Free Spirits,’ Hussain claims that this position
is the best solution to what he calls the “interpretative puzzle.”49 Although the
puzzle centres around the meta-ethical question of the ontological status of values,
it nevertheless seeks to allocate space for a positive, normative ethics, although
this time it is done so in light of Nietzsche’s critique of the meta-ethical status of
all values.
There is, however, the same worry with this approach that we saw facing the
version of the scope problem for the immoralist approach. That is, the value of
the positive, normative ethics is assumed as it is posited, and, thus, not brought
into question. These positive values lie outside the scope of the critique of moral
values, and thus their value is necessarily begged.
Hussain might retort that while this may be true, his account concerns how
Nietzsche’s ‘free spirits’ value and the values that they endorse. Thus, he could
argue that this is distinct from the task of bringing into question the value of
moral values, and perhaps it is to come after such a task given that these ‘free
47See Hussain 2007, 166.
48Although I cannot go into detail here, it should be noted that Hussain’s textual support
for his position is limited. He draws on ambiguous passages from HH and GS to justify this
more radical position of the error theory. In chapter 2, I shall argue in detail for understanding
Nietzsche’s account of valuing in terms of, what Hussain might call, ‘inter-subjective realism’ -
i.e, that valuing occurs and is real, but only in so far as it arises within a dynamic of command
and obedience between people in a community. Understood in this manner, there is no need
to go in for a form of error theory, and many of Nietzsche’s more extreme claims about the




spirits’ are of the future. The idea would be that once the question of the value of
our moral values has been posed, new values can be posited, albeit in a fictional
manner.
This response is not open to Hussain, however, since to argue for his position
of moral fictionalism, he draws upon Nietzsche’s critique of moral values in order
to establish his claim for an error-theory about those values. As a result, moral
fictionalism, if correct, would affect how we understand the task of taking morality
as a problem. We should thus consider in greater detail the consequences of taking
up such a position.
Similarly to the justificatory approach, by questioning the nature of the value
of moral values, the fictionalist approach touches on the question of the esteem
that we accord to this value. For example fictionalism de-values our moral values
by eliminating them from the world, and then reinstating them in their fictionality;
yet, similarly to the justificatory approach, it is unable to pose the question as to
their value. This is because it fictionalises the evaluative orientation of this value -
i.e., that this value is good for us - and our familiarity with it, but does not pose its
evaluative orientation as a question. This is perhaps not surprising given that the
interpretative puzzle is concerned only with the meta-ethical issue of the nature
of moral values, and not with bringing into view the value of particular moral
values. The result, however, is that, while in the case of the standard account
of amoralism, the problem of the value of our moral values disappears with the
elimination of moral phenomena, in the case of fictionalism, we might say, the
fictionalisation of moral values results in the fictionalisation of the problem.50
Finally, the fictional amoralist, similar to the eliminative amoralist, inquires
from a position which is supposedly “outside” of the phenomenon in question.
This is fundamental if the phenomenon is to be eliminated, and then reinstated
50Note that this is not to say that fictionalisation and illusion cannot be serious or profound.
See GS Preface 4 (also drawn upon by Hussain in support of his position) where Nietzsche calls
the Greeks superficial “out of profundity.” Rather, the point is that fictionalising the problem
does not go any step further to engaging with it.
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in its fictionality. This elimination is necessarily conducted from a ‘value-free’
position, where the moral phenomena that are referred to by evaluative claims
appear queer. In this manner, the approach follows very closely the reductionist
position. As a result, it also suffers from the same shortcomings. That is, the
moral inquirer ultimately becomes alienated from the familiar phenomena, and,
as a result, neither the condition of familiarity, nor the condition of estrangement,
are met.
To conclude, the advocacy of an error-theory alone is not sufficient to bring
into question the value of our moral values. This is because it only concerns the
meta-ethical grounding of the nature of valuing and of moral values. As we have
seen with the justificatory approach in particular, knowledge of the foundations
of moral values, be they of the metaphysical basis or empirical origins, is unable
to pose the question of the value of moral values. It only affects the estimation
of the positive value already accorded to such values. Attempts at removing such
justification have the same effect; they question the esteem accorded to our moral
values, but they do not touch on the question of what value they have for us.
1.5 The Task
In this final section, I will draw some positive conclusions concerning the nature
of the task of taking morality as a problem, which will then guide the subsequent
chapters of the thesis.
First, the shortcomings of reductionism and amoralism show that our famil-
iarity with moral values has to be taken as a sui generis phenomenon. By this
I mean that the inquirer needs to approach our moral values as a phenomenon
that cannot be reduced or eliminated to other phenomena. It is a phenomenon
that manifests itself, and should not be taken as an appearance or representation
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of some other more basic phenomenon.51 In the case of moral values, this means
taking moral values in their familiarity as moral values. While the condition of
familiarity is necessary for the inquirer to have our everyday moral values (and
the phenomena that show up to them) in view, approaching them as sui generis
during inquiry is essential so that their value can be brought into question. This is
because attempts to reduce and eliminate moral values demand a position “out-
side” of our Christian moral outlook, and, indeed outside of our entire moral,
psychological framework. The result is either a misunderstanding of the very na-
ture of our familiarity with moral values before an inquiry gets off the ground, or
taking up a position in which the inquirer becomes alienated from moral values
such that familiarity with them is lost.
Second, note that the justificatory approach does take our familiarity with
moral values as sui generis. However, it does so in a manner that necessarily
assumes the value of those moral values. Thus, despite satisfying the condition
of familiarity, the inquiry denies that morality could be taken as a problem. It
only touches on the esteem accorded to the value of moral values but cannot see
the evaluative orientation of that value as questionable. Not only then must our
familiarity with moral values be taken as sui generis, but we must also bring the
value of those values into view as a questionable phenomenon. Otherwise, the
condition of estrangement will not be met. This cannot be achieved by remaining
familiar with the value of our moral values, but nor cannot it be realised by taking
up an external position to those values.
A further way to draw the contrast between the approaches we have seen and
the method that is instead required is to consider in greater detail the nature of
the questioning of the value of our moral values. We have seen that the justifica-
tory approach, immoralism, and amoralism, all seek to question the phenomenon
of morality in a variety of ways. The justificatory approach questions the philo-
51Heidegger makes this kind of distinction in Heidegger 1992, 113-115. A “phenomenon” is
“self-showing” [sich zeigen], whereas an “appearance” points to something else.
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sophical underpinnings of the given, familiar phenomenon; immoralism (in one of
its forms in particular) questions the normative claims of the phenomenon from an
immoral perspective, and amoralism questions the phenomenon’s existence from
its “external” vantage point. However, none of the approaches, we might say,
perceives the phenomenon of morality as a questionable phenomenon. The justi-
ficatory approach perceives morality in its sui generis, given familiarity, but does
not perceive it in its given familiarity as questionable. Amoralism and immoralism
attempt to perceive morality as a phenomenon to be questioned but fail to take
it in its sui generis given familiarity as a questionable phenomenon.
Now, so far I have articulated the nature of our relation to moral values in terms
of “familiarity” and the “everyday.” These phenomena, however, are difficult to
grasp and these concepts risk either capturing too many things, or nothing at
all. This is not because they are necessarily ill-defined, but because of the nature
of the phenomena that the concepts attempt to capture. Philosophers have long
been aware of this issue, and in contemporary sociologies of the everyday it is a
point that is well-agreed upon.52 Maurice Blanchot’s articulation is indicative:
“whatever its other aspects, the everyday has this essential trait: it allows no
hold. It escapes.”53 Another way that this is often put is that the everyday
is that which is seen but nevertheless remains unnoticed. Understanding the
nature of this familiarity with our moral values - the task of chapter two - will be
fundamental then to grasp the type of inquiry required. Nietzsche gives a brief
insight into the task when he deliberates on the nature of originality:
Original - Not that we are the first to see something new, but that
we see what is old, long-familiar, seen and yet overlooked by every-
one as if it were new, is what distinguishes genuinely original minds.
[Nicht dass man etwas Neues zuerst sieht, sondern dass man das Alte,
52See, for example, Wittgenstein: “The aspects of things that are most important for us are
hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it
is always before one’s eyes.)” Wittgenstein 2010, 129. See also Jacobsen 2009 for an overview of
the issue in sociologies of the everyday, and their theoretical grounding in philosophical theories.
53Quoted from Jacobsen 2009, 2.
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Altbekannte, von Jedermann Gesehene und Uebersehene w i e n e u
sieht, zeichnet die eigentlich originalen Ko¨pfe aus.] The first discoverer
is generally that altogether ordinary and spiritless fantasist - chance.
WS 200
Here, Nietzsche sets up this dual nature of familiarity. It is that which is seen
[Gesehene], and yet overlooked [Uebersehene]. He suggests that the task is not
simply to see something else, but rather to see that which is already seen, but
to see it “as if it were new.” In the ‘Knowledge of origins’ aphorism of the Gay
Science discussed above, Nietzsche expands on this by suggesting that this task
can be achieved by bringing the familiar into view “as strange”, “as outside of
us.” Thus, while the condition of familiarity suggests that the method for moral
philosophy should be autochthonic, and thus anchored in the familiar, we also
need some form of estrangement from the familiar so that we do not take it as it
is given and beg the question of its value. Only in this manner will we be able
to pose the question of the value of our moral values. This suggests that we are
not to “step outside” of our moral psychological framework altogether, (as if this
were a real possibility), but rather to bring our moral values into view in their
familiarity as strange.
We are now in a much better position to articulate the nature of the task.
Our moral values must be perceived in their familiarity as sui generis, but, as
such, they must be perceived as a questionable phenomenon. Only then can the
implications of the loss of their Christian foundations be appreciated. At this stage
the paradoxical nature of the task should also have become much clearer. How is
the inquirer to take our familiarity with morality as a sui generis phenomenon and
also perceive it as questionable? Or: how can the inquirer be sufficiently familiar
with the phenomenon of our moral values whilst also taking up that familiarity
estrangedly? Finally: how can the inquirer be at once a part of our moral values,
and, nevertheless, perceive them as “outside” of him or herself?
In an aphorism of The Gay Science, Nietzsche puts the issue in his own words
as follows:
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The “Wanderer” Speaks - If one would like to see our European moral-
ity for once as it looks from a distance, and if one would like to measure
it against other moralities, past and future, then one has to proceed
like a wanderer who wants to know how high the towers in a town are:
he leaves the town. “Thoughts about moral prejudice”, if they are not
meant to be prejudices about prejudices, presuppose a position outside
morality, some point beyond good and evil to which one has to rise,
climb or fly - and in the present case at least a point beyond our good
and evil, a freedom from everything “European”, by which I mean the
sum of the imperious value judgements that have become part of our
flesh and blood. That one wants to go precisely there, up there, may
be a minor madness, a peculiar and unreasonable “you must” - for we
seekers for knowledge also have our idiosyncrasies of “unfree will” -
the question is whether one really can get up there.
GS 380
The metaphor that Nietzsche employs here likens European morality with a town,
and the value of our moral values with towers that belong to the town. The
metaphor suggests that just as in the case when we are in the town underneath
the towers we struggle to obtain a perspective on how high those towers are, when
we remain within the European morality we fail to see how valuable the values of
that morality are. To continue the metaphor, we have to in some sense leave that
outlook if we are to be able to take up a perspective from which we can raise the
question of its value.
However, the metaphor is strained by the fact that our familiarity with moral
values and the perception they afford differ radically from our geographical lo-
cation in a town and the perception that it affords. While I can simply change
geographical location to alter my visual perspective, and leave the town if I wish, I
cannot in an analogous manner simply leave my moral values. Nietzsche suggests
that this is because our moral values have “become a part of our flesh and blood.”
I will go into greater detail into the nature of our familiarity with moral values
in chapters two and three, but for now we can notice that Nietzsche is suggesting
that our familiarity with moral values has (not only as we shall see a psychological
dimension, but also) a physiological dimension. This implies that even if I were to
move geographical locations and find a place outside of European morality, this
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would not simply mean that I would be able to take up a position outside of that
morality.
Yet, as this chapter has shown, a value-free perspective is not desirable for
moral inquiry. In fact, if we pay more careful attention to the metaphor, when
the wanderer leaves the town he is still in an environment from which he can see
the town as a town, and is able to perceive the very same, familiar towers, only
now from a distance. Analogously, to leave our familiar, moral values, or to go,
as Nietzsche often puts it, “beyond good and evil,” does not mean to leave our
moral psychological framework entirely. As Nietzsche says in The Genealogy, the
aim of going “beyond good and evil” “does not mean “Beyond Good and Bad”
(GM I 17). It is thus not to take up a value-free view from nowhere. The task
is instead to be able to take up a position from within our moral psychological
framework but which can afford sufficient distance from our moral values so that
they can be brought into view as a questionable phenomenon. It is to be able to
pose the radical question as to whether our moral values could be harmful to us.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have sought to map out the space in which a critique into our
moral values is to function, so that it becomes possible to face up to the fact of the
loss of their Christian foundations. To do this, I have considered various potential
candidates that have appeared throughout the history of moral philosophy. To
show their shortcomings I have appealed to Nietzsche’s criticisms and his own
articulations of the nature and difficulty of engaging in such a critique. This has
been important in not only clarifying Nietzsche’s own position (given the fact that
many of the potential candidates have also been mistakenly ascribed to Nietzsche),
but also to see how moral inquiry will have to function.
I have argued against approaches in moral philosophy that seek to justify moral
values, as well as approaches that seek to reduce or fictionalise moral values. In the
former case, the value of our moral values is begged. In the latter cases, the value of
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our moral values is reduced or eliminated as a possible object of inquiry. I have also
criticised the idea of the need to forward an alternative normative theory to raise
this question. Rather than helping in the task of critique, the alternative theory
parasitically takes over the problems faced by the other justificatory approaches.
Instead, to take morality as a problem requires that one take our familiarity with
moral values as a sui generis phenomenon, i.e, as a phenomenon that cannot be
either explained in terms of another phenomenon or explained away in its entirety;
and to take morality as a questionable phenomenon, and, hence, not simply in its
familiar givenness.
As we have seen, this leads us into a paradox. As Europeans, we already meet
the condition of familiarity. As long as we maintain the sui generis nature of
our familiarity to moral values, then we will not risk becoming alienated from
them. However, to render the value of our moral values questionable, we need to
estrange ourselves from such familiarity so that we can bring the value of our moral
values into view as questionable. This will allow us to see that our moral values
could be otherwise, and, to raise the question as to whether these values could be
harmful for us. We shall see that to achieve this will require philosophical work.
If we are to maintain familiarity but nevertheless find the familiar phenomenon
questionable, we need to find a way of bringing into view our Christian moral
values as questionable in their familiarity.
Finally, it should be noted that the paradoxical nature of this task cannot
be correctly understood merely as a logical puzzle.54 It is, for Nietzsche, funda-
mentally a practical, and moral issue, a challenge to who we are, to everything
“European” about us. Nietzsche claims that our familiarity with Christian, Eu-
ropean values runs right through our “flesh and blood”, and that, as a result,
the very idea of perceiving our moral values as “outside” appears as a mad and
54The nature of the task is then not comparable to the “scope problem” or “interpretative
puzzle.” These latter problems concern issues of logical compatibility. The need for maintaining
familiarity and achieving estrangement concerns our relation to our moral values and hence has
a bearing on our relation to our everyday culture and our location within it.
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unreasonable need that besets those who seek moral knowledge. It is through this
paradox nevertheless that a critique of our moral values has to be undertaken. It
will thus be the central focus of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Our Familiarity with Moral
Values
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will focus on how we can begin to navigate through the paradox
outlined in chapter one: that we require familiarity with Christian moral values
(to perceive moral phenomena in the world through them), and yet, also estrange-
ment from such familiarity (to bring into question the value of these moral values
and genuinely engage with the loss of foundations of these values).1 As we have
seen, this requires taking our moral values in their familiarity as a sui generis
phenomenon in a manner that avoids begging the question of their value, whilst
also achieving estrangement from such familiarity (unlike in the justificatory ap-
proaches), without, however, becoming alienated from this familiarity (as seen in
the cases of immoralism and amoralism).
As a way into this, I will begin by considering the nature of our pre-philosophical
familiarity with moral values. We shall see that to become familiar with moral
1Note that while Nietzsche attempts to pose this question in his works, he never directly
engages with the issues surrounding the possibility of raising this question. This and the subse-
quent chapter will tackle this issue.
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values is not in itself a philosophical task or achievement. Our familiarity with
moral values is prior to any philosophical engagement or inquiry with those values,
and affords the initial and basic relation with those values prior to philosophical
investigation. Estrangement, on the other hand, is of a philosophical nature for
the moral inquirer. It requires a particular type of investigation, which, as so far
understood, demands that our familiarity with moral phenomena be taken up in
a sui generis manner, and, simultaneously, as questionable.
This chapter has two central aims. First it will show how our familiarity with
moral values is sui generis. To do this I will not restrict the account of this
familiarity to particular Christian moral values, but rather to moral values per
se. This will allow me to articulate the nature of our broader moral psychological
framework, and to show that we can be (and indeed are) familiar with more
than one moral outlook. This latter possibility will be important for the task of
estrangement taken up in chapter four, since an appeal to an alternative moral
outlook to that of our Christian moral outlook will play an important role for
the task of estrangement. The second aim of the chapter will be to explain the
phenomenon touched upon in the thesis introduction: how Christian moral values
have remained dominant in Europe despite the widespread decline of Christianity.
This explanation will play a central role in affording us insight into the nature of
inquiry needed to bring the value of these moral values into question, which will
be the main concern of chapters three and four.
This chapter will begin by arguing that our familiarity with moral values is
achieved through a particular process of habituation, captured by the concept
ethesin found in Aristotle’s moral philosophy. I will argue that this habituation
functions via a dynamic of command and obedience that cannot be understood
purely in terms of reason or nature. I will also show how it cannot be reduced
to either mere mechanism or spontaneous instinct. This will be undertaken to
show how our familiarity is sui generis due to the presence of this dynamic. I
will begin by arguing for this at the social level, before showing its applicability
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at the level of the individual soul. For this, I shall appeal to Nietzsche’s moral
philosophy, which, I claim, moves beyond that of Aristotle’s by showing how the
dynamic of command and obedience in the soul functions in terms of an ascetic
relation of willing where the feeling of distance (or what Nietzsche calls the pathos
of distance) between command and obedience affords familiarity with value.
I will then argue that ascetic habituation has led to what Edmund Husserl
calls the sedimentation of our moral values such that they have become fixed and
form a stable background upon which we are able to orient ourselves in the world.
This phenomenon will show how our familiarity with moral values is predicated
on taking the value of our moral values for granted. We shall see that this phe-
nomenon of sedimentation has two effects. On the one hand, through habituation
we are able to become more receptive and active to the moral demands of the
situation. On the other hand, resistance and tension to such activity reduces. I
will argue that this reduction is not a reduction in cognition per se on the part
of the moral agent, as typically argued for in the secondary literature, but rather
that it is a decrease in the possibility of seeing the value of our moral values as a
questionable phenomenon. In other words, I will stress that what is lost due to
habituation and sedimentation is a sense of wonder about the value of our moral
values, rather than a loss in conscious awareness of that value. This will help
explain how our Christian moral values remain dominant notwithstanding the
decline in faith in Christianity. This will be further supported in chapter three
when I consider more specifically the role of cognition in both our familiarity with
moral values and moral inquiry.
2.2 Habituation
I will begin by arguing that our familiarity with our Christian moral values should
be understood as a kind of habituation. However, the account of habituation that
I will forward will, in fact, offer us an understanding of how we become familiar
with moral values per se, as a part of our wider moral psychological framework. I
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will show that habituation is a good candidate for understanding this familiarity
because, when understood correctly, we shall see that it satisfies the condition of
being a sui generis phenomenon. Second, whilst being sui generis, understanding
our familiarity with moral values in this way will also not necessarily lead to
denying that morality could be a problem. Rather than begging the question
of the value of our moral values, it will leave open the possibility of attempting
to bring the value of our moral values into view as a questionable phenomenon.
As a result, the pitfalls that we saw the justificatory approach succumbing to in
chapter one will be avoided. This is because, as we shall see, habituation leads to
sedimentation, and although sedimentation renders inconspicuous the value of our
moral values, it is the type of process that has the possibility of being disrupted
and altered. This will further allow us to explain how despite a loss of faith in
the Christian religion, the value of our moral values is not seen as a questionable
phenomenon.
Before offering an account of our familiarity with moral values in terms of
habituation, I want to first make it clear how this approach differs from the jus-
tificatory approach. It is central to note here that the type of account I will give
specifically concerns our familiarity with moral values, and not with the moral
values themselves. That is to say, while I will offer an explanation as to how we
become familiar with moral values, I will remain neutral on the metaethical ques-
tion of the metaphysical status of our moral values - i.e. whether these values are
metaphysical or contingent - as well as on the question of the scope of those values
- i.e. whether they are universal or relative. My interest will focus specifically on
the process by which moral phenomena come to show up to us in the world.
Now, there is a prima facie sense in which we become habituated to moral
values, which we find first articulated in systematic form in Aristotle’s moral phi-
losophy. Aristotle is the first to delineate habituation as a distinct area of moral
philosophical inquiry. In the Nicomachean Ethics in particular, Aristotle forms
an area of inquiry into morality called ethics [ethos] that analyses habituation
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[ethesin] and the formation of character [hexis].2 I will begin by outlining Aristo-
tle’s position, before then building upon it through recourse to Nietzsche’s moral
philosophy. The reason for this order of explanation is that Aristotle offers us
an account of the phenomenon of habituation in relation to the phenomena of
custom and obedience, which is underdeveloped in Nietzsche’s own moral philoso-
phy. With this in place, it will then become clearer how Nietzsche’s position moves
beyond Aristotle’s through his development of the phenomenon of the pathos of
distance. I will also be able to then defend the position against two potential
objections that argue against locating habituation at the centre of this process of
familiarity.
Aristotle argues early on in the Nicomachean Ethics that moral knowledge
is a form of practical wisdom [phrone¯sis], which necessarily requires correct ha-
bituation for the constitution of virtuous character [arete¯]. An account of this,
Aristotle importantly claims, cannot be adequately given by inquiring into nature
[physis], or reason [logos] alone. To show why this should be the case, Aristotle
considers the position of a potential inquirer into moral matters:
One must begin from what is known, but this has a twofold meaning:
there are things known to us, on the one hand, and things known
simply, on the other. Perhaps it is necessary for us, at least, to begin
from the things known to us. Hence he who will listen adequately
to the noble things and the just things, and to the political things
generally, must be brought up nobly by means of habituation.
Aristotle 2011, 1095b1-7
First, Aristotle makes the same claim that I argued for in the previous chapter, i.e.
that the starting position for the inquirer is with that which is familiar to him or
her, since without such familiarity, moral phenomena fail to show up. Moreover,
he states that to acquire such familiarity in the first place requires being “brought
2It is from the translation of the Greek “hexis” into the Latin “habitus” that the etymological
link can be more clearly seen between the Greek and the English words. This occurred some
time in the middle ages. See Carlisle 2014.
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up nobly by means of habituation.” He then extrapolates this point through
appeal to Hesoid:
For the “that” is a principle, and if this should be sufficiently appar-
ent, there will be no need of the “why” in addition, and a person of the
sort indicated has or would easily get hold of principles. As for him to
whom neither of these is available, let him listen to the words of Hesoid:
This one is altogether best who himself understands all things
.................................................................................................................
But good in his turn too is he who obeys one who speaks well.
But he who neither himself understands nor, in listening to another,
Takes this to his heart, is a useless man.
Aristotle 2011 1095b7-13
“The that” is a first principle, obtained through upbringing, which involves having
practical wisdom [phronesis] as to how to behave morally. Importantly, while there
are different ways of obtaining the first principle depending on the phenomena that
are to be investigated, in the case of ethics habituation is the way.3 I agree with
Myles Burnyeat on this point and his endorsement of the interpretation of several
ancient commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics : “The ancient commentators
are agreed that Aristotle has in mind knowledge about actions in accordance with
the virtues; these actions are the things familiar to us from which we must start,
and what we know about them is that they are noble and just.”4
Aristotle also implies here that although “the why” is necessary for “best”
moral practice, it can come later. It is a contentious issue in the literature what
Aristotle has in mind here by appealing to “the why.” It is well beyond the
scope of this chapter and thesis, however, to consider this in any detail.5 It is of
3See 1098b3:“... and “the that” is the first thing and principle. Some principles are observed
by means of induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others in other
ways.”
4Burnyeat 1980, 71; my italics.
5It is a contentious issue in the literature as to whether “the why” is a part of best moral
practice and, hence, whether and in what sense Aristotle is committed to a form of cognitivism
and intellectualism. See Moss 2012 for a rejection of this position in favour of non-rational
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relevance, though, to note that while habituation without “the why” is sufficient,
in the words of Hesoid, to be “good,” (i.e. through “obeying one who speaks
well”), without habituation one has nothing to further understand and is, again
in the words of Hesoid, “a useless man.”6 As a result, habituation is located at
the centre of the process of becoming familiar with moral values.7
Aristotle also articulates the process of habituation here in terms of obedience.
He states that one can obtain “the that” by “obeying one who speaks well.” This
suggests that the process of familiarity is one of habituated obedience to someone
else who is already habituated well. This is important since, as we shall see
in the next section, the dynamic of command and obedience will be central to
an understanding of the process of our familiarity with moral values in terms of
habituation. Indeed, it will be this dynamic that will show us how habituation is
a non-reducible sui generis phenomenon.
2.3 Obedience to Custom
To further build on Aristotle’s account of the role of habituation in particular I
will now turn to Nietzsche’s moral philosophy. This is because, first, I wish to
draw on particular arguments that Nietzsche offers against competing accounts
of how we understand the nature of our familiarity with moral values. These
positions are that of biological determinism and rationalism. By arguing against
virtue. See McDowell 1998 for a reading to the contrary. It has been argued that the purpose
of the Nicomachean Ethics is to provide such a “why” to those who already have the principle
“the that”. See Burnyeat 1980. I think that this idea is broadly correct although I cannot go
into further details here.
6This priority of habituation is also expressed by John Dewey in his essay ‘The place of
habit in conduct’: “Only the man whose habits are already good can know what the good is”
Dewey 1998, 30.
7My interpretation of The Nicomachean Ethics on the point that familiarity with moral
values occurs through a process of habituation roughly converges with McDowell 1994, Burnyeat
1980 and Vasiliou 1996. It runs against the interpretations of Irwin 1988 and MacIntyre 1988 who
claim that moral familiarity could be achieved without necessarily requiring correct upbringing.
For specific criticisms against McDowell’s interpretation of Aristotle, see chapter 3, section
‘Between Dreyfus and McDowell’ of this thesis.
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them, I will strengthen my claim that the process of habituation is sui generis by
arguing that it involves a non-reducible dynamic of command and obedience that
lies at the heart of our familiarity with moral values. Second, I will argue that
Nietzsche’s understanding of our familiarity with moral values moves beyond that
of Aristotle’s. Nietzsche’s employment of the concept of the pathos of distance,
as we shall see in subsequent sections, will give us a more detailed understanding
of our moral psychological framework, and, will in turn help us to distinguish
between different moral outlooks.
We can see a general indication as to how our familiarity with moral values
should be understood according to Nietzsche if we again return to the ‘origins
of knowledge’ aphorism of The Gay Science (GS 355). There, he defines the
familiar in the following manner: “the familiar is that which we are used to.” The
English translation is somewhat less informative than the original German, which
is “Das Bekannte ist das Gewohnte.” The concept Das Gewohnte suggests not
only that which ‘we are used to’, but also that which we become habituated to
and accustomed to. This corresponds well to the concept of ethesin in Aristotle.8
8In recent Anglophone literature, there have been two main ways that commentators have
looked to Aristotle to interpret Nietzsche’s moral philosophy. The first involves a consideration
of Nietzsche as a possible virtue ethicist. See, for example, Swanton 2014. Cf. MacIntyre
2007. The second turns to Nietzsche for resources to construct a better account of our moral
psychology than the traditional positions offered by the likes of Aristotle, Kant and Hume. See
Katsafanas 2016, Knobe and Leiter 2007. More often than not, it is suggested that Nietzsche’s
account lies closest to that of Aristotle’s. See Katsafanas 2016, Hunt 1991, cf. Knobe and
Leiter 2007. Interestingly enough, in the secondary literature on the continent, it has been
argued, more or less to the contrary of these Anglophone approaches, that an appeal to Aristotle
offers a fundamental “corrective” or “solution” to Nietzsche’s criticism and challenge to our
understanding of morality, and of law and custom in particular. See P. C. Smith 2000 and Mootz
2007, who both appeal to Gadamer’s appropriation of Aristotle. Mootz defends Gadamer on
this issue against Derrida’s “more radical Nietzschean approach.” Here the idea is that recourse
to Aristotle - made by the likes of Heidegger and Gadamer in particular - offers a way out of
the “predicament” that Nietzsche’s own position supposedly leaves us in with regards to our
understanding of moral phenomena. The standard line of criticism is that Nietzsche reduces law
and custom to contingent relations of power and dominance. This interpretation of Nietzsche
as a “positivist” is offered by Habermas 2015, and Vining 1995. See Sedgwick 2013, however,
who offers an excellent rebuttal to these interpretations. In this chapter, I will argue, on the
one hand, that Nietzsche understands our familiarity with moral values as a sui generis process
of habituation in Aristotelian terms. I will thus deny the possibility that an appeal to Aristotle
might help us “overcome” Nietzsche’s position. On the other hand, however, I will reject from the
outset the claim that Nietzsche offers anything like a neo-Aristotelian normative virtue ethics.
The reason for this is that such a normative project is essentially justificatory in its attempts
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Nietzsche expands on this idea in particular relation to moral values as early
as in Human all too Human, in the section entitled ‘On the history of moral
sentiments’. There, he offers his first clear definition of what it means to be
moral. “Being moral or ethical means obeying ancient established law or custom.”
[Moralisch, sittlich, ethisch sein heisst Gehorsam gegen ein altbegru¨ndetes Gesetz
oder Herkommen haben.] (HH 96). It is important to stress that Nietzsche
believes this applies to all types of moralities, and not only to our Christian
moral values. Moreover, Nietzsche has no intentions of making any terminological
distinction of his own here between “moralisch,” “sittlich,” and “ethisch.” They
should all be understood in terms of obedience to laws and customs.
Nietzsche’s adherence to this approach of understanding morality fundamen-
tally in terms of obedience to custom and law is expressed again in his later
book Daybreak, where this time he gives it much greater prominence. In book 1
aphorism 9 he asserts that his “fundamental proposition” [der Hauptsatz] is that
“[m]orality [Sittlichkeit] is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to
customs [Sitten], of whatever kind they may be; customs [Sitten], however, are the
conventional way [herko¨mmliche] of behaving and evaluating” (D 9; translation
modified).9 And once more, this time in Beyond Good and Evil, he makes the
same assertion and develops it further:
What is essential in “heaven and on earth” seems to be, to say it
once more, that there should be obedience over a long period of time
and in a single direction: given that, something always develops and
has developed, for whose sake it is worthwhile to live on earth; for
example, virtue, art, music, dance, reason, spirituality - something
transfiguring, subtle, mad, divine.
at grounding particular virtues as moral knowledge. For criticism of this kind of justificatory
approach, see chapter 1.
9The clear continuity between Nietzsche’s understanding of morality in terms of as custom
from Human all too Human to Daybreak makes Leiter and Clark’s claim in their introduction
to the English translation of the latter text highly implausible. They argue that Nietzsche finds
a new “important role for custom in the phenomenon of morality” (D xxix) in Daybreak that
was not present in his earlier works. Instead, I think that what we find in Daybreak is a more
focused, book-length consideration of this chief proposition, which was nevertheless already
clearly present in Human all too Human.
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BGE 188
Nietzsche relates sustained and directed obedience to the development of famil-
iarity with valuable phenomena and practices. In the same aphorism, Nietzsche
claims, just like we saw Aristotle doing earlier, that this habituated obedience
cannot be fully understood if it is reduced to the phenomena of either nature
[physis] or reason [logos] alone. In making this argument, Nietzsche, similarly to
Aristotle, identifies obedience as the feature of habituation that renders it, in my
terminology, a sui generis phenomenon.
Every morality [Moral] is, as opposed to laisser aller, a bit of tyranny
against “nature” [Natur]; also against “reason” [Vernunft]; but this in
itself is no objection, as long as we do not have some other morality
which permits us to decree that every kind of tyranny and unreason
is impermissible. What is essential and inestimable in every morality
[Moral] is that it constitutes a long compulsion [dass sie ein langer
Zwang ist]...
BGE 188
First, Nietzsche claims not only that every morality is non-reducible to “nature”,
but that every morality works tyrannically against “nature”. As we shall see, this
is because every morality pits “nature” against itself when humans live together
in communities. However, Nietzsche also qualifies this later in the aphorism by
suggesting that morality is still a part of “nature” since, as we shall see, it should
be understood as a kind of second nature.
Second, Nietzsche states that every morality also works in an unreasonable,
tyrannical manner that functions against “reason”. Nietzsche argues for this by
claiming along with Aristotle that humans obey more out of coercion than out of
reason. Obedience is often more akin to a coercive submission to tyranny, than
to compliant adherence grounded in deliberation. Moreover, many of the customs
and laws that have been obeyed throughout the ages, Nietzsche claims, have
been capricious and arbitrary. Again, however, Nietzsche qualifies this later in
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the aphorism by stating that this sustained obedience has made possible the very
development of reason by rendering humans more uniform and regular creatures.10
Now, it should be noted that in the above quoted aphorism from Beyond
Good and Evil, Nietzsche puts both of the terms “nature” and “reason” in scare
quotes. This suggests that he has particular referents in mind as to what he
wishes to contrast the domain of the moral with, and that these referents may
not be what he himself takes reason and nature to be. In what follows here, I
will take up Nietzsche’s claims in relation to two particular positions that offer
rival accounts to our understanding of our familiarity with moral values: that
of biological determinism and rationalism. The aim will be to show how our
familiarity with moral values is sui generis by arguing that this familiarity cannot
be understood solely in terms of nature as understood by biological determinists,
or solely in terms of reason as understood by certain rationalists. Instead, it
should be understood fundamentally in terms of habitual obedience.
The biological determinist position claims that heredity factors that are fixed
at birth are decisive in determining our familiarity with moral values. We are born
as ready-made commanders or obeyers with a propensity for perceiving moral val-
ues and acting in a moral way due to biological inheritance of psycho-physiological
traits. Learning, training, education and upbringing, it claims, have minimal bear-
ing on this process. Knobe and Leiter 2007 argue that Nietzsche himself endorses
just such a position, which they describe in the following manner:
...individuals are simply born with a certain psycho-physical package
of traits (the person’s distinctive type-facts); these type-facts play a
powerful role in determining one’s behavior and values, a far more
powerful role than education or upbringing or conscious choice; in-
deed, a person’s crucial conscious choices and values are themselves
explicable in terms of these type-facts. That one is a “moral” agent
10D 18 makes this same point: “Nothing has been purchased more dearly [through ascetic
self-cruelty] than that little bit of human reason and feeling of freedom that now constitutes our
pride.” The aphorism continues with Nietzsche’s interesting suggestion that we fail to see this
precisely due to such pride.
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is explained by one’s biological inheritance, the type-facts; that one is
not a moral agent is similarly explained.
Knobe and Leiter 2007, 90
Now, there are two arguments that I will make against this account. The first is
that familiarity with moral values requires a process that moves in a uniform di-
rection, thus restricting “nature” to a particular form of development. As we shall
see in much more detail later in this chapter, this does not only mean that certain
behaviours of individuals are fought against within a community, but also that
within an individual certain drives and desires are also attacked and restrained.
The only way that this can occur, I will argue, is through an habitual ascetic
relation of command and obedience between individuals and between competing
forces of the individual soul.11 This phenomenon pits “nature” against “nature”
through the phenomenon of moral development. It is a process by which certain
aspects of nature are held in check and altered.
The biological determinist might reply here that although such a process might
indeed take place, it should be explained more in terms of our biological inher-
itance than in terms of habituation and upbringing. The retort would be that
biological inheritance is the decisive factor for this process. To show why this is
an insufficient response, we have to consider how this whole process of becoming
familiar with moral values only occurs for human beings in virtue of growing up
in a community. As I will argue in greater detail in the subsequent sections of
this chapter, the dynamic of command and obedience arises and exists between
human beings, and in a parallel manner between competing forces of the human
soul. In both cases, this only arises between human beings living in a commu-
nity. As Peter Sedgwick puts it, “[o]ur animality, however, is never conceivable
as mere bestiality. Human animality is something that is tempered and fashioned
11This will be developed in the sections ‘The Continuum of Compulsion and the Pathos of
Distance’ and ‘The Soul’ below. See also TI ‘morality as anti-nature’ 1, 2, where Nietzsche
describes the fight of morality against the passions through (radical) habituated obedience.
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by cultural conditions inexorably associated with communal life. We are, from
the outset, in our origins beings of custom.”12 What the biological determinists
would call a “propensity for command and for obedience” cannot be located solely
in the individual’s genetic make-up. It is rather a phenomenon that only arises
in the social milieu between human beings co-existing in a community. That is
to say, it is only within such a community that anything like a commander and
obeyer could come to exist.
Additionally, the central feature of the dynamic of command and obedience
for familiarity with moral values is stability, or, as Nietzsche puts it, obedience in
a particular direction over a long period of time. This is as true at the level of
the soul (which I shall later come to) for the development of character [hexis] as
it is for the community and the development of politics. This stability, however,
has to be achieved through a process - a political dynamic achieved habitually -
and, hence, cannot be simply given biologically.
Our familiarity with moral values then is not a phenomenon that can be re-
duced to “nature” when that conception of nature reduces the process of moral
habituation to biological traits. The dynamic of command and obedience that
arises among human beings of custom adds, we might say, a new layer to this na-
ture, a second nature. This layer is still natural though in so far as it is dependent
on human activity and relations for its existence and maintenance.13
Let us now turn to the relation of reason to our familiarity to moral values. In
what follows, I will argue against the position that claims that our familiarity with
moral values is determined fundamentally by reason rather than by habituation.
This position suggests that we become familiar with moral values fundamentally
through a process of reasoning, and, not through habituated obedience to custom.
This position is sometimes termed “moral intellectualism,” since it ties the type
12Sedgwick 2013, 44.
13See Siemens 2015 for an account of the conflictual relation between first and second nature,
understood in terms of the distinction between law and nature.
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of reasoning required to obtain familiarity with moral values to cognitive activity
and propositional knowledge, in contrast to practical know-how.14 Thus, this
position is essentially a form of moral cognitivism, which suggests that we can
obtain moral knowledge by questioning our reasons for doing that which is just
and right.15
The main argument against this position that I will raise is that people, laws,
and customs command, and that the nature of this command is never purely
cognitive. This is because command functions via imposition that compels one into
obedience. This occurs because, as Aristotle argues in the Nicomachean Ethics,
customs are obeyed due to an imposition of command that is more tyrannical than
reasonable. This is because we are on the whole more receptive to laws [nomoi]
and customs [e¯thee¯]16 than to reason and speech [logos] alone. Thus, Aristotle
writes: “[a]nd, in like manner, it is not sufficient if people when they are young
attain the correct rearing and care; rather, once they have reached adulthood they
must also make a practice of these things and be thus habituated. And for these
matters - indeed, for life as a whole more generally - we would need laws. For
the many obey the governance of necessity more than of speech [logos], and of
punishments more than of what is noble.” (NE 1180a1-5). This is because we
find ourselves as a part of “the many”17 as akratic.18
To see how this is the case, we can consider how the enforcement of law and
14See, for example, Williamson and Stanley 2001. See also Noe¨ 2005 for a criticism of this
position.
15This position has, for example, often been ascribed to Socrates due to his equation of virtue
with knowledge. See Segvic 2006 for an overview of the arguments for and against.
16The main difference between law and custom here refers to whether it is written or unwrit-
ten, and to who the enforcer is: “But whether these laws are written or unwritten would seem
to make no difference, nor whether, through them, one person or many will be educated, just
as it does not matter either in the case of music or gymnastic and the other practices. For just
as it is the laws and customs [e¯the¯] that hold sway in cities, so also it is the speeches and habits
of the father that do so in households...” 1180b1-5.
17The “many” [hoi polloi] here should not be understood as reference to a political class, but
rather to all those who have not arrived at ethical virtue. Barring those touched by the divine,
this includes everyone.
18“So the person lacking self-restraint is like a city that votes for all that it ought to vote for
and has serious laws, yet it makes use of none of them...” 1152a 15, 20. I will not be able to go
directly into the issue of akrasia here. See Burnyeat 1980.
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custom is often achieved violently. It does not simply function in a manner of
making someone “see reason,” but rather of compelling them into obedience.19
As a result, it typically involves the suffering of pain20 and also its infliction.
Nietzsche, for example, describes how the command of “thou shalt” has been
burned into the memory via instruments of torture in previous (but not so distant)
centuries in Europe.21 Michel Foucault also highlights this in the introduction
to Discipline and Punish, where he argues that in Europe we have become less
barbarous not because we have become “morally better” and more reasonable,
but because we have been made more uniform and regular through disciplinary
mechanisms.22
Nietzsche develops this argument by considering the phenomenon of promise-
making, which we shall look at in greater detail later in the chapter. We are
not particularly good at keeping our promises until we become highly regulated
creatures. Due to this, laws and customs need to be en-forced until our behaviour
to them becomes habituated.23 Over time, when the authority of the custom no
longer becomes a question for us it is obeyed out of its own authority. Thus, in
Daybreak Nietzsche states the following: “What is tradition? A higher authority
which one obeys, not because it commands what is useful to us, but because
it commands” (D 9).24 At this stage, obedience to that command, even if it
19John McDowell’s own Aristotelian account does not follow Aristotle as faithfully here as
McDowell perhaps thinks, since McDowell fails to consider this violent aspect of rendering
obedient. I will consider this criticism against McDowell in detail in chapter 3.
20Thus, Aristotle says that “[f]or living in a moderate and controlled way is not pleasant to
the many, especially the young. Hence by means of laws, the rearing and the regular practices
involved must have already been put into the proper order, for once these become habitual, they
will not be painful” 1179b33. See the above footnote on how we should understand Aristotle’s
use of “the many.”
21See GM II 3.
22See Foucault 2014.
23As we shall see later, this suggests that the formation of the individual is achieved through
habituation, and, hence, through social participation. See Siemens 2006 who argues for this
being Nietzsche’s position.
24Jean-Marie Guyau makes the same point: “Is it not precisely the characteristic of natural
inclinations, habits, customs, to command the individual without giving any reason? Custom
is respected in individual consciousness or in the state, as Pascal has said, “for this one reason
that it is accepted.” And: “[t]he authority of law is sometimes based “entirely on itself” without
attaching itself to any principle. “The law is law, and nothing more.”” Guyau 1898, 89.
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is capricious, affords familiarity with value: “...this tyranny, this caprice, this
rigorous and grandiose stupidity has educated the spirit. Slavery is, as it seems,
both in the cruder and in the more subtle sense, the indispensable means of
spiritual discipline and cultivation, too” (BGE 188).
This is not to say, however, that reason has no part to play in the process by
which we become familiar with moral values. I will develop the more cognitive
elements of this familiarity in chapter three in particular. Here, it can be noted
that the force that compels obedience in an habitual manner is not a brute force.
While customs may be “unreasonable” and “stupid”, they are also often infused
with reason, in particular in the form of laws. Thus Aristotle states: “[t]he com-
mand characteristic of a father does not have such strength or compulsion behind
it, nor indeed does the command of one man in general, unless he is a king or
something of that sort. But the law does have a compulsory power, it being
speech [logos] that proceeds from a certain prudence and intellect” (NE 1180a20).
Indeed, this is further brought out by Aristotle’s characterisation of the figure of
the ‘skilled legislator’: “And perhaps it is necessary also for someone who wishes
to make others better through his care, whether these be many or few, to attempt
to become a skilled legislator [nomothete¯s], if it should be through laws [nomoi]
that we become good” (NE 1180b25). The point here, however, is that we do not
come to see such reasons for acting ethically well in a passive or inert manner,
but rather as themselves compulsory powers.
To conclude, in this section I have claimed that the habitual process of obedi-
ence is essential for becoming familiar with moral values. I have argued against
two competing accounts of this familiarity that attempt to explain the decisive
factor of its acquisition either in terms of nature or in terms of reason. Instead, I
have attempted to show that our familiarity only arises through the interrelation
of human beings co-existing in a social dynamic of command and obedience. This
is not to say that biology and reason do not have a part to play in the process,
but rather that they are not determining factors on their own.
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In the next section, I will lend support to the claim that this dynamic - which,
as we shall see, is essentially a dynamic of command and obedience - is the defining
feature of our familiarity with moral values, which renders this familiarity a sui
generis phenomenon. I will do this by arguing that this familiarity cannot be
reduced to either pure mechanism or pure spontaneity. To do so, I will expand
on the notion of obedience, and I will introduce in greater detail the role of
command. I will continue to draw upon Nietzsche’s moral philosophy, and appeal
to Aristotle’s work in support when appropriate. I will claim that we should
understand our familiarity with moral values as occurring on a sui generis, yet
variable, continuum of compulsion. This will help us to later explain how we
can become familiar with different values from different moral outlooks, and to
tentatively suggest that one particular outlook - the Christian moral outlook - has
become dominant in contemporary Europe.
2.4 The Continuum of Compulsion and the Pathos
of Distance
In the previous section, I argued that force is an important part of habituation
since compulsion is required to make people obey customs and laws. However, it
would be reductive and erroneous to fully equate compulsion with force. One can,
as the classic example goes, forcefully move or throw a stone, and do so repeatedly,
but the stone will never become compelled and habituated to continue moving in
such a manner.25 If a legislator imposes law and custom solely through the use
of force - if we take the notion of “tyrannical” in its most extreme sense - then
in fact the legislator should no longer be understood as a legislator at all, since
that which is imposed would no longer be law, but only force. Indeed, we might
say that the sole imposition of force in relation to a living being is more akin to
25See Aristotle 2011 1114a.
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the wielding of power of a savage, than that of the skilled legislator suggested by
above Aristotle. Aristotle employs the term ‘brutishness’ [the¯riote¯s] to capture
this type of imposition, and notes that it lies outside the domain of the moral.26
Nietzsche also conceives of the extreme tyrant in terms of a savage animal. It
is what he infamously terms the “blond-beast” and the “beast of prey,” who he
suggests is the true ancestor of the “noble class.”27 As we find in Aristotle, this
beast exerts force and not legislation and acts outside the boundaries of law and
custom:
Here there is one thing we shall be the last to deny: he who knows
these “good men” only as enemies knows only evil enemies, and the
same men who are held so sternly in check inter pares by custom,
respect, usage, gratitude, and even more by mutual suspicion and
jealousy, and who on the other hand in their relations with one another
show themselves so resourceful in consideration, self-control, delicacy,
loyalty, pride, and friendship - once they go outside, where the strange,
the stranger is found, they are not much better than uncaged beasts of
prey [...] One cannot fail to see at the bottom of all these noble races
the beast of prey, the splendid blonde beast prowling about avidly in
search of spoil and victory; this hidden core needs to erupt from time
to time, the animal has to get out again and go back to the wilderness...
GM I 11
Nietzsche also highlights the fact that communities and social classes that are
“strangers” to the “noble class” often experience the activity of that class as
barbaric. This is because they do not experience the activity as a compulsion,
but as an externally imposed force. Now, while the imposition of pure, tyrannical
force is wielded by the savage animal and not a legislator, it is imposed on an
object that is more akin to what Aristotle terms an “animate tool” rather than
a subject capable of being compelled.28 This is because in this case, power is
26“Each of these conditions [due to nature, passivity, or illness] falls outside the defining
boundaries of vice, as does brutishness as well” 1149a.
27See GM I 11 and GM II 17.
28“But neither is there friendship for a horse or an ox, nor for a slave in so far as he is a
slave: there is nothing common, since a slave is an animate tool, and a tool an inanimate slave”
NE 1161b.
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exerted on an object purely for instrumental purposes.29 This means of exerting
force resolves into the dynamic that we would call causal and mechanical. That
is to say, the movement of an object is affected in a causal manner based on the
instrumental demands of the subject. No command or obedience is required here.
Neither the savage animal, nor the animate tool can then be said to be engaged
in a dynamic of compulsion. In other words, no commanding or obeying occurs,
and we are not yet in the sui generis domain of the moral. For there to be
habituated obedience that compels action, the legislator must take the subject
as a subject that is to be legislated for, and the subject must feel the force as
a compulsion that is to be obeyed. In other words, there must be a relation of
command and obedience.30
Now, the dynamic of command and obedience is not simply a fixed phe-
nomenon that one acquires or enters into as one develops a second nature. The
structure is highly variable. Indeed, I want to suggest that we should think of
this dynamic as lying on a continuum of compulsion that is bounded by two non-
inclusive extremes: that of the savage beast at one end, and that of the animate
tool on the other. These extremes do not lie on the continuum since they do not
involve compulsion, but instead brute force and instrumentalisation, respectively.
On the continuum there is always a fluid dynamic of command and obedience;
there are no strict oppositions between the two. However, the dynamic can still
29Nietzsche notes that at times ruling classes can treat their subjects as instruments: “...when
the ruling caste constantly looks afar and looks down upon subjects and instruments and just
as constantly practises obedience and command, keeping down and keeping at a distance...”
(BGE 257). Nietzsche fails, however, to make the important distinction between “subject”
and “instrument” that I will make in this section. This could be because Nietzsche wants to
emphasise how the ruling class can and often does descend into tyranny in relation to the ruled
class.
30An interesting consequence of this, although I cannot explore it further here, is that both
our relation to others and our own self-relation is mediated by this phenomenon of compulsion.
See Sedgwick 2013, 45, who explains how the primitive community is the “space of law” in
which “the human self emerges,” and along with it, “reason” and “freedom”. “To be human,”
Sedgwick explains, “means in the first instance to be a communal creature whose world is always
already mediated by obedience and to discover oneself as an individuated being in the context
of such mediation. To be human, in other words, means to be an animal which is both capable
of feeling, acknowledging, and acting on the peculiar kind of compulsion that is associated with
the commanding power of something that is deemed ‘higher’ (i.e. authority).”
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vary greatly depending on the end of the continuum that is considered. For ex-
ample, as will become more apparent in what follows, towards the non-inclusive
bound of the savage beast the structure of command and obedience is more tyran-
nical and active, and towards that of the animate tool it is more receptive and
passive. This image of the continuum will give us a further insight into the na-
ture of our moral psychological framework, where by such a framework I mean to
indicate the phenomena and apparatus that are studied in what is now called in
contemporary philosophy, our “moral psychology.”
I want to claim here that Nietzsche moves beyond Aristotle’s position by ex-
plaining how the distance that opens up in this dynamic between command and
obedience is fundamental for understanding how we become familiar with moral
values. In this phenomenon of compulsion, there is a gap between the command
issued, and resultant compliance to realise that command. Nietzsche claims that
it is the feeling or experience of this distance that affords familiarity with moral
values. This is what Nietzsche terms the pathos of distance. I will elucidate the
nature of this, first at the level of the social - i.e., between social classes - before
then considering how it functions at the level of the individual - i.e., at the location
of the soul. Although we will only arrive at a more complex and nuanced account
of our familiarity with moral values when we turn to the level of the individual,
the dynamic at the social level will offer us the conceptual resources needed to
understand the functioning of the soul.
Importantly, the pathos of distance can be felt in different ways depending
on the structural relation of command and obedience that is experienced at each
end of the continuum, which Nietzsche represents at the social level in terms
of two contrasting social classes. The so-called ‘ruling class’, Nietzsche claims,
experiences the pathos of distance from the position of command in contrast to
the ruled class that is subordinate to them.
Rather it was “the good” themselves, that is to say, the noble, pow-
erful, high-stationed and high-minded, who felt and established them-
selves and their actions as good, that is, of the first rank, in contradis-
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tinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebeian. It was
out of this pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create
values and to coin names for values: what had they to do with utility!
GM I 2
This gives the rulers a feeling of “establishing” themselves and their actions as
good in virtue of being legislators. They experience the distance as the product
of their command, and they, thus, become familiar with values through a form
of self-designation. The ruled class, on the contrary, experience this distance
from the role of the obedient, and, thus their familiarity with values is one based
on the feeling of obligation of what they ought to do in order to comply with
the command. Their familiarity with values is thus more in tune with becoming
compelled by an imposed force that is not their own. This can give rise to a
re-active pathos, which involves the experience of distinction negatively from the
position of obedience in contrast to those who command.31 I will return to this
reactive pathos later in the chapter.
So far in this thesis I have employed the terminology of ‘becoming familiar with
moral values’ to remain neutral on the metaphysical question of the metaethical
status of these values. We can now see that the phrase has to capture both the
feelings (towards opposite ends of the continuum) of becoming compelled to obey
externally imposed customs (as in the case of the ruled class), and the feeling of
self-determining customs that are to be followed (for the ruling class).32 It should
also include the numerous intermittent stages between these two positions, which
lie on the continuum.
To conclude this section, Nietzsche’s account suggests that for familiarity with
moral values to occur at all, a political structure of command and obedience is
31See GM II 11. I shall expand further on this reactive pathos later in the chapter. See
section ‘moral outlooks’.
32Thus, with both these positions in mind, Nietzsche states that “[t]he moral discrimination
of values has originated either among a ruling group whose consciousness of its difference from
the ruled group was accompanied by delight - or among the ruled, the slaves and dependents of
every degree” (BGE 260).
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necessary. Moreover, an experience of distance between commander and obeyer is
fundamental for becoming familiar with values.33 This can occur in different ways
depending on whether the distance is felt more from the position of command or
more from the position of obedience.
In the next section, we shall see how this political model can shed light on
the functioning of command and obedience at the level of the individual soul
participating in a community. This occurs in the phenomenon better known as
willing.
2.5 The Soul
Before continuing further, we might well question at this point the suitability of
the terms Nietzsche introduces to capture the phenomenon of our familiarity with
moral values and the broader framework of our moral psychology, such as that of
the “noble,” the “ruling class,” the “slave” etc. They appear, to say the least,
rather antiquated as a means to explain the nature of habituation and of our fa-
miliarity with moral values. One reason for this is that many archaic, hierarchical
institutions and customs have been replaced by modern, democratic ones funda-
mentally based on the value of equality. Nietzsche speculatively suggests that
this movement is one of the results of Christianity becoming dominant Europe,
33This does not mean that Nietzsche crudely endorses slavery, as is sometimes suggested in
some of his aphorisms, such as in BGE 257: “[e]very enhancement of the “human” type has
so far been the work of an aristocratic society - and it will be so again and again - a society
that believes in the long ladder of an order of rank and differences in value between human and
human, and that needs slavery in some sense or another” (BGE 257; translation amended). See
also Ansell-Pearson 1994 who suggests that here there is a “tyrannical” aspect to Nietzsche’s
political thought. The point is rather that value is experienced through distinction at both
the level of the nobility in relation to subjects, and at the level of the obedient in relation to
the rulers, with, as already said, a multitude of degrees in between. Moreover, fundamental to
Nietzsche’s own position is the requirement for the presence of both pathoses of distance for the
advancement of culture, which suggests not only a “noble” class, but also a strong opposing
class that battles against its instrumentalisation. This is expressed no more clearly than in the
epilogue of The case of Wagner.
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and the subsequent secularisation of Christian moral values.34 I will attempt to
support this speculative claim later in this chapter. The result of this movement,
however, is not the loss of this dynamic of command and obedience. On the con-
trary, not only do we see it present in the newer democratic institutions, we also
find it in many of the more traditional ones, such as in that of the family (be-
tween children and parents), the workplace (between workers and bosses), schools
(between students and teachers), and hospitals (between patients and medical
professionals).
Now, the explanatory force of these concepts come more sharply into view
when we see that the political structure outlined above also serves to help us
understand not only the development of human second nature at the level of the
social, but also at the level of the soul.35
While so far we have understood the “pathos of distance” as a social pathos,
i.e. as a discriminative feeling that arises in different ways on either side of a ‘class
divide’, it is at the level of the soul that we find a more detailed account as to
how we become familiar with moral values. In aphorism 257 of Beyond Good and
Evil, Nietzsche makes the transition from the social pathos to what I shall call
the ‘soul pathos’:
Without the pathos of distance which grows out of the ingrained differ-
ence between strata [Stande] - when the ruling caste constantly looks
afar and looks down upon subjects and instruments and just as con-
stantly practises obedience and command, keeping down and keeping
at a distance - that other, more mysterious pathos could not have
grown up either - the craving for an ever new widening of distances
within the soul [Seele] itself, the development of every higher, rarer,
more remote, further-stretching, more comprehensive states - in brief,
34See BGE 202, where Nietzsche claims that “the democratic movement is the heir of the
Christian movement.”
35Nietzsche employs the term ‘Seele’ to designate the soul. We shall see here and in chapter
3 how he has in mind what we would now call the human psyche, which comes from the Greek
‘psuche’, and thus does not have the further connotations that are attached to the use of the
term in Christianity. This is helpful since the notion of the human soul that I wish to develop
here is part of our moral psychological framework that is not exhausted by our Christian moral
values.
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simply the enhancement of the “human” type, the continual “self-
overcoming of the human,” to use a moral formula in a supra-moral
sense.
BGE 257 ; translation modified
Nietzsche suggests that out of the “social pathos” comes a “mysterious pathos”
that occurs in the individual. Here, the distance between command and obedience
occurs within the individual soul. Nietzsche’s point in this aphorism, however, is
not an historical one concerning the genesis of the different pathoses. Instead, it
is only as a political power relation of command and obedience that anything like
a soul pathos can come into being.36 This is supported in On the Genealogy of
Morals, when Nietzsche argues that the inception of the soul occurs simultaneously
with the formation of communities.37
In further support of interpreting the dynamic of the soul in these political
terms, Nietzsche claims that it is precisely this dynamic that we find functioning
in the will:
In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying,
on the basis, as already said, of a social structure composed of human
“souls.” Hence a philosopher should claim the right to include willing
as such within the sphere of morals [den Gesichtskreis der Moral] -
being understood as the doctrine of the relations of supremacy under
which the phenomenon of “life” comes to be.38
BGE 19 ; translation modified
36Aristotle is also acutely aware of this issue throughout the Nicomachean Ethics. For exam-
ple: “.. and just as a child ought to live in accord with the command of his tutor, so too the
desiring part [of the soul] ought to live in accord with reason” NE 1119b10. For an historical
overview of this issue, including its prevalence in Plato, as well as in modern German thought
pre-dating Nietzsche, see Parkes 1996 chapter VII.
37“All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward - this is what I call
the internalization of the human being. Thus it was that humans first developed what was later
called their “soul” [Seele]” (GM II 16; translation modified).
38This explains Nietzsche’s earlier evocation in Beyond Good and Evil that the “soul-
hypothesis” should be seriously considered, albeit in terms of a political plurality. “... the
way is open for new versions and refinements of the soul-hypothesis; and such conceptions as
“mortal soul,” and “soul as subjective multiplicity,” and “soul as social structure of the affects,”
want henceforth to have citizens’ rights in science” (BGE 12).
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Understood as a political structure of willing, the soul should also be thought of
as a part of the sui generis phenomenon of our familiarity with moral values, and,
hence, to lie at the heart of our moral psychological framework. We have seen that
the social pathos of distance arises out of the experience of the distance between
commanding and obeying, and that this occurs between social classes of different
powers. At the level of the soul, the distance occurs between competing drives and
affects that form a relation of command and obedience that gives rise to a structure
of willing. This will can be structured in a variety of political configurations in
an analogous way to the level of the social. This renders the manner in which we
become familiar with moral values more complex. The individual soul is like a
polis of competing forces that are configured in a fluid ascetic dynamic.39
To lend plausibility to this account of willing, we can consider again the phe-
nomenon of promise-making. At the level of the individual soul, when a promise
is made, the soul becomes configured in a relation of command and obedience to-
wards a particular goal.40 If this goal is to command other competing forces of the
soul then it must compel them to obedience. This demands a certain receptivity
and activity of the subordinated forces to the end of the commanding force. This
creates an ascetic structure, since some forces are held in check by others so that
the promise can be realised and not betrayed.
This structure can be formed in different ways. It essentially involves, how-
ever, a compromise between a violent imposition of force on the one hand, and a
“contractual” relation on the other. At the level of the state, we can think of the
individual as giving a promise to participate in society and the advantage it offers.
If the promise is broken, the state violently punishes the offender. At the level of
39Note here, however, that the limits of the analogy between the social and the level are given
by the fact that agency cannot be ascribed at the sub-personal level as it is at the social level.
40Nietzsche calls this the ‘ruling thought’. See BGE 19: “Therefore, just as sensations (and
indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be recognised as ingredients of the will, so, secondly,
should thinking also: in every act of the will there is a commanding thought - let us not imagine
it possible to sever this thought from the “willing,” as if any will would then remain over!”
(translation modified). We will consider the role of thinking in the dynamic of command and
obedience in more detail in chapter 3.
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the soul, the commanding forces that are injured as a result of the promise being
broken have claims to “compensation” and “repayment” from the culpable wills.
We, as we say, ‘beat ourselves up’ over having failed to keep a promise. Here, one
can perceive an equivalence between the amount of pain inflicted as compensation
by the hurt force of command, and the injury caused to it through a failure to
maintain the promise. We are ‘harder on ourselves,’ the greater the importance
we give to the promise that we break.41 This, however, suggests that the violent
imposition can only be inflicted in this proportionate manner because the forces
of the soul are already in a relation of command and obedience of a “contractual”
nature. This makes sense in so far as we might say that the competing forces of
the soul are co-opted ascetically into the pledge.
Now, when this occurs, a space opens up between the command issued, and
the habituated obedience required to meet the command. I have suggested earlier
that the feeling of this distance - what Nietzsche calls the pathos of distance - is
a fundamental part of becoming familiar with moral values, and, in this specific
case, with the value of the particular promise being made. The further that the
realisation of the promise lies away from being achieved, the greater the demand
for the promise to become fixed. This is how asceticism functions:
41An example from literature comes to mind that clearly brings out a case in which the
infliction of pain for equivalent compensation for injury is very high. In The Grapes of Wrath,
the character John Joad - the uncle of the protagonist Tom Joad - cyclically drinks himself to
the verge of suicide due to blaming himself for the death of his wife. The promise at work here, is
one of the strongest of them all - the marriage vow. After these episodes, John typically comes
back into the narrative in a calmer, temporarily-satisfied manner, having vented his power
(i.e. of the injured drive) on himself (i.e. on the perceived drives that caused the injury by
breaking the promise). In virtue of the contractual relation between the drives, more generally
speaking, compensation “consists in a warrant for and title to cruelty-” (GM II 5); and here more
specifically, to ascetic self -cruelty. Yet, at this stage, as the example helps to bring out, there
is no “moralisation” of John’s culpability, and thus no spiritualisation of the ascetic self-cruelty.
The form of self-harm is direct and barbaric. This helps to shed light on why the infliction
of cruelty arises within a soul composed of competing drives. The infliction of cruelty is not
instrumental, but a contractually justified discharge of power. In this particular case, however,
without such moralisation, the result of the infliction of cruelty is less clearly constitutive of
a particular goal, and is instead more destructive. Moralisation here would require the fixing
of a higher goal that the infliction of self-cruelty serves - what we shall see Nietzsche call the
“spiritualisation” and “deification of self-cruelty.
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In a certain sense, the whole of asceticism belongs here: a few ideas are
to be rendered inextinguishable, ever-present, unforgettable, “fixed”,
with the aim of hypnotising the entire nervous and intellectual system
with these “fixed ideas” - ascetic procedures and modes of life are
means of freeing these ideas from the competition of all other ideas,
so as to make them “unforgettable.”42
GM II 3
One might think that Nietzsche only has in mind here the particular extreme
practices of asceticism that are traditionally exercised by ascetic priests. This
would be a mistake, however. It should be seen that just as the ascetic priest
fixes the idea of celibacy through ascetic practices such as self-mortification and
self-flagellation, so too does the athlete fix the idea of running a marathon through
exercises of aske¯sis such as training, diet, and sleep. The variable at play here that
affects the strength of the fixing is, as said above, the felt distance between the
commanded goal, and its attainment through habituated obedience.43 Nietzsche’s
quote of Tertullian in On the Genealogy of Morals brings this point out: “[f]or the
faith offers us much more... something much stronger ; thanks to the Redemption,
quite other joys are at our command; in place of athletes we have our martyrs”
(Citation by Nietzsche of Tertullian, quoted from GM II 15).44 The movement
42See also GM II 1 (translation modified). “To breed an animal with the right to make
promises - is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of the human
being? Is it not the real problem regarding the human being?” See also GM II 3 that links
this with the infliction of pain: ““If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in:
only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory” - This is a main clause of the oldest
(unhappily also the most enduring) psychology on earth.” GM II 3.
43It should be clear from what follows that I understand asceticism as a phenomenon that
explains the development of second nature, rather than solely as a historical phenomenon. In his
essay ‘A Theory of the Social Function of Asceticism,’ Richard Valantasis makes this distinction
in the following manner: “The theorists understand asceticism as a large and pervasive cultural
system; while the historians view asceticism as specific religious practices relating to social with-
drawal, restriction of food, regulation of sexuality, and the formation of religious community.
The larger cultural systems of the ascetical theorists locate asceticism at the centre of cultural,
social, and individual engagement in every sphere of cultural expression; the particular religious
practices of the historian locate asceticism only in the religious or philosophical arenas” Valan-
tasis, Wimbush, Byron, and Love 1995, 544. Anglophone interpreters of Nietzsche typically
interpret him as a ‘historian’. See Berry 2006, Clark 1990, Nehamas 1985. Interpreters on the
continent, instead, tend to interpret him, like I do here, as a ‘theorist.’ See Foucault 1986.
44Moreover, although I cannot go into any great detail here, Nietzsche claims in the third
essay of On the Genealogy of Morals that all of our ideals so far have been ascetic ideals, and,
hence, not only those of the ascetic priest.
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here towards Christianity is one in which the distance between the commanded
goal or promise and its realisation through habituated obedience is widened, to
the point where it becomes ‘spiritualised’ or ‘deified’:
Almost everything we call “higher culture” is based on the spiritual-
isation of cruelty, on its becoming more profound: this is my propo-
sition. That “savage animal” has not really been “mortified”; it lives
and flourishes, it has merely become - divine.
BGE 229
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche makes the same claim, and in parentheses asserts the
constitutive nature of the self-cruelty of ascetic practices. “I pointed cautiously [in
BGE 229, D18, 77, 113] to the ever-increasing spiritualisation and “deification” of
cruelty which permeates the entire history of higher culture (and in a significant
sense actually constitutes it)” (GM II 6).
In the next section, I will consider in greater detail this “spiritualisation”
involved in Christianity, and will return specifically to the role of asceticism in
two sections time to support an account as to how the dominant moral values
of this outlook have become inconspicuous and sedimented, and, thus, remain
dominant for us despite the widespread collapse of the Christian religion.
2.6 Moral Outlooks
I began this chapter with the aim of offering an account of our familiarity with
Christian moral values. However, this task quickly evolved into a more general
account of how we become familiar with moral values per se. This has demon-
strated how this familiarity should be understood as a sui generis phenomenon
essentially involving the dynamic of command and obedience, which functions on
a variable continuum. Now it is possible to return to the question of the specific
character of our familiarity with Christian moral values to refocus the task once
again on posing the question as to their value.
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First, I will outline two moral outlooks that can be extrapolated from the
account of our moral psychological framework given so far in this chapter and
that can be found on opposing ends of the continuum of compulsion. When this
is complete, I will then attempt to support Nietzsche’s speculative claim that one
of these outlooks has become dominant in Europe.
In an above section, I argued that on the continuum of compulsion towards
the end of the savage beast, familiarity with moral values occurs through a self-
command that distinguishes itself from that which is compelled to obey. However,
one of the reasons for appealing to the idea of the continuum is that it depicts
the central idea of a dynamic and fluid relation of command and obedience. This
is important because, while, for example, towards one end of the continuum com-
mand is more prevalent, this does not mean that obedience is absent. Indeed,
in the case of the ruling class, they are a class that has their own values and
customs, which they constrain each other to follow.45 Moreover, it is these values
and customs that are self-determined in distinction from the ruled class.46
The pathos of distance of the ruling power in contradistinction from the ruled
class is fundamental here for a familiarity with value that is based on a feeling of
command. (“Only people like us are capable of participating in our customs.”)
The task of the ruling class is to maintain a moral outlook that is readily realisable
for them through customs and practices of aske¯sis, but which remains out of reach
of the ruled class.
The central feature of this outlook, (which I shall call from this point on the
45Self-restraint of the courtly nobility, for example, serves “as a prestige value, a means of
distinguishing themselves from the lower groups harrying them, and they did everything in their
power to prevent these differences from being effaced” Elias 1982, 387. “This explains why, in
such elevated classes, affect-control and self-constraint are generally more highly developed than
the lower classes: fear of loss or reduction of social prestige is one of the most powerful motive
forces in the transformation of constraints by others into self-constraints.” ibid, 296.
46The feeling of the ruling class in relation to the ruled class is highly variable. For example,
the knightly caste “occupied his social position far more securely and as a matter of course than
the courtly noble.” As a result, Elias notes, the knightly caste felt only contempt towards the
lower classes. When, however, this caste was forced to ally itself with the prince and become
members of the court, they came to feel embarrassment and repugnance towards the (much
closer and now threatening) lower classes. See Elias 1982, 392.
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‘noble outlook’), is the cultivation of and participation in exclusive practices of
aske¯sis and customs, which affords distinction from obedient subjects, and, most
importantly, the accompanying feeling of such a distinction. This gives rise to a
constellation of values that function in celebrating the achieved well-being of the
class, by identifying, maintaining, and enhancing their attained level of “health”
and “happiness” that their power affords, and that lies out of reach of the ruled
class.47
If we now turn towards the other end of the continuum towards the animate
tool, we find a familiarity with moral values that occurs through obedience to a
quasi-externally imposed force. The relation to this force of command is funda-
mental in defining the nature of the outlook of the ruled class. Thus, for example,
if this force is seen largely as external, then we arrive at an outlook of the ruled
class described by Norbert Elias in The Civilizing Process :
The behaviour of these lower groups may be coarser, but it is more
uniform and in a way more of a piece. They lie more vigorously in their
own world without any claim to upper-class prestige, and therefore
with greater scope for discharge of the affects; they live more fully
in accordance with their own manners and customs. Their inferiority
vis-a-vis the upper class, their gestures both of subordination and
resistance, are clear and relatively unconcealed like their affects, bound
by clear, definite forms.
Elias 1982, 431
If, however, the ruled class come to have designs and claims on becoming rulers
then this gives rise to, as suggested earlier, a reactive pathos of distance. This
is not simply a feeling of distance between the command and the compulsion to
meet it, i.e., of the command as a forcefully imposed “thou shalt.” It is also ac-
companied by a desire to command. This is seen when the ruled class attempts
to imitate the practices of aske¯sis and customs of the ruling class to become like
47See also BGE 260 where Nietzsche talks of the ‘self-glorification’ of the ruling class.
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them. This requires (at both the level of the social and the soul) taking up a po-
sition of command. This possibility is typically attempted by a middle class, such
as that of the bourgeois in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
whose intentions to become aristocrats involved a desire to further distinguish
themselves from the lower class in the same manner as the aristocracy.48 This
phenomenon is also described by Jacques Rancie`re in his account of the pleb’s
revolt in ancient Rome:
They [the plebs] establish another order, another partition of the per-
ceptible, by constituting themselves not as warriors equal to other
warriors but as speaking beings sharing the same properties as those
who deny them these. They thereby execute a series of speech acts
that mimic those of the patricians [...] In short, in Ballanche’s terms,
from being “mortals;” they have become “men;” that is, beings engag-
ing in a collective destiny through words. They have become beings
who may very well make promises and draw up contracts.
Rancie`re 1999, 24-25
There is another case, however, where a more dramatic restructuring of power
occurs from the position of obedience. It is this latter option that I will explore
further here since it will help us to understand Nietzsche’s claim that the current,
dominant moral values in Europe are Christian in nature.
As we noted Nietzsche arguing above, Christianity “deifies” the ascetic struc-
ture of willing that we find present, and often restricted to, aristocratic societies.
This deification is a complex process. The central aspect of interest here is how
it effectively creates practices of aske¯sis, which are not exclusively limited to the
ruling class (and, as we saw above, functioned as an active means of distinction
from the ruled class) but rendered universal practices of obedience to the exter-
nal command of a single God; (hence their “deification”).49 The success of this
48See Elias 1982.
49See for example Gal. 3:26-28 “For in Christ Jesus you are all sons (and daughters) of God,
through faith. For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is
neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free, no longer male and female, for you are all one in
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deification is witnessed by the dispersal of spiritualised, ascetic practices across
the social classes, and in a mirroring fashion, across the competing forces of the
soul.50 The central feature of this outlook (from now on termed the ‘Christian
moral outlook’) is thus the collapse of the hierarchical distinction (and feeling of
distinction) between classes (and, hence, also between wills), in favour of a dis-
tinction and feeling of distinction between God and His obedient subjects, where
the latter are all considered equal from this position (i.e. in the eyes of God).51
This gives rise to a familiarity with a set of values that differ greatly from those
of the noble outlook, say of ancient Rome. Michael Forster considers seven essen-
tially opposing values of the two outlooks with ancient Greece and Christianity
in mind. Here are three of them by way of example:
(i) Homer, and in his train the predominant Greek and Roman tra-
dition, had admired honor [timeˆ] and renown [kleos], but had de-
spised people who lacked them. By contrast, for the New Testament:
“Blessed are ye when men shall hate you, and when they shall sep-
arate you from their company, and shall reproach you, and cast out
your name as evil,” but “Woe unto you, when men shall speak well of
you” (Luke, 6:22, 26). (ii) Homer, and in his train the predominant
Jesus Christ.” See also, for example, Mark 8:34, Matthew 12:50, John 8:31-32. See ESV et al.
2008. Isaac of Nineveh also offers an interesting example of this advocacy of equality: “Up to
this mystery [the contemplation of God] there are teachers and disciples, there are greater and
smaller, there are the great and the mediocre. But in the perception of grace this knowledge
is equal; there is no ascent and descent in it. Then it will not be so that some will know and
feel less while others will learn more or be more illuminated! Rather, all will have the complete
fullness, without lacking, the complete perfection without increase or decrease. And there will
be no great and no small, as it is with other revelations, but all will be raised up to the same
level of perfection without variance or change. There will be no rich and no poor, no givers and
no receivers.” Quoted from Hagman 2011, 42.
50Historically speaking, the spread of Christian asceticism is well documented from the 3rd
and 4th centuries after Christ since it coincides explicitly with the rise of monasticism. See
‘Asceticism and monasticism, II: Western’ in Casiday and Norris 2007. It is more contested in the
first two centuries after Christ. See, for example, Vaage and Wimbush 2002. Patterson’s article
in particular in this volume is highly informative: “The itinerant social radicalism characteristic
of the earliest sayings-tradition [found in Q and the Gospel of Thomas] is a form of aske¯sis. It
is a series of performances done for others to see. The aim of these performances is to separate
those who participate in them from the dominant social ethos, to create a new network of
social relations in which an alternative symbolic universe might be articulated.” See Vaage and
Wimbush 2002, 61.
51The bishop Cyril’s offering of the bible to the Roman prefect Orestes in Alexandria is
emblematic of the extent to which Christianity had encroached on the ruling power of the
nobility by AD 415. See Wessel 2004, 35.
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Greek and Roman tradition, had admired the warlike and the brave
but despised the weak. By contrast, for the New Testament: “Blessed
are the peacemakers”; “Blessed are the poor in spirit . . . Blessed
are the meek” (Matthew, 5:9, 3-5). (iii) Homer, and in his train the
predominant Greek and Roman tradition, had admired the politically
powerful but despised the politically weak. By contrast, for the New
Testament: “Whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that
humbleth himself shall be exalted”; “The kings of the gentiles exercise
lordship over them; and they that exercise authority upon them are
called doers of good [euergetai]. But ye shall not be so: but he that is
greatest among you, let him be as the younger; and he that is chief,
as he that does serve” (Luke, 14:11, 22:25-26).
Forster 2011b, 355-356
If it now may be permitted to speculate for a moment as to which of these opposing
outlooks is most present in Europe today, we can see two recurring themes. First,
there is the continual overcoming of hierarchical distinctions; and, second, there is
a loss of faith in God as legislator. Taking up the first theme, this marginalisation
of hierarchical distinction is seen most clearly in the democratisation of political
power, the growth in the middle classes, the development of a consumer-based
culture, and the advocacy of universal human rights.52 All these moves express
at once the universalisation of contemporary customs in so far as they are open
to anyone and everyone, as well as the equal footing of all who participate in
them. This all points towards the dominance of the Christian moral outlook in
contemporary Europe in so far as it exhibits these particular features.53
52Victor Turner argues for this: “The reader will have noticed immediately that many of
these properties [equality, humility, absence of rank, no distinctions of wealth, unselfishness,
total obedience, etc.] constitute what we think of as characteristics of the religious life in the
Christian tradition [...] What appears to have happened is that with the increasing specialization
of society and culture, with progressive complexity in the social division of labor, what was in
tribal society principally a set of transitional qualities “betwixt and between” defined states of
culture and society has become itself an institutionalized state. But traces of the passage quality
of the religious life remain in such formulations as: “The Christian is a stranger to the world,
a pilgrim, a traveler, with no place to rest his head.” Transition has here become a permanent
condition. Nowhere has this institutionalization of liminality been more clearly marked and
defined than in the monastic and mendicant states in the great world religions.” V. Turner
1995, 106. I will return to Turner’s understanding of the ritual process and liminality in chapter
4.
53Nietzsche notes the role of the Reformation had for this in taking the power away from the
Church as a noble institution of rule, and instead giving to the ‘plebeian’ state. See GS 358.
85
This is not to say, however, that noble values are no longer present in con-
temporary Europe. Certain noble phenomena show up to us at times, although
noble values for the most part have become more marginalised. We often see, for
example, values such as honour, warlike bravery, and political power expressed in
the mediums of literature and film, and we still often feel a certain affinity with
them. I shall come back to the presence of noble values in particular in chapter
four. Nevertheless, the continual movement away from hierarchical distinction is
more indicative of the dominant of values that come from the Christian outlook.
I have introduced the term “outlook” in this section to describe the constel-
lation of values and phenomena that belong to Christianity, and which belong
to a noble, ruling class. One may question at this point, however, whether it
makes sense to talk of different outlooks here rather than of merely different val-
ues that co-exist, albeit sometimes in conflict, from within the same outlook. To
answer this, I will unpack in greater detail exactly what I mean by the term ‘moral
outlook.’
First, a moral outlook has a form of internal coherence. I follow Fabian Freyen-
hagen here in understanding this coherence in a broad manner, to include not only
moral propositions, but also actions and dispositions that form a part of social
practices and institutions.54 This coherence is a form of consistency between the
values, dispositions and beliefs within an outlook; as Freyenhagen puts it, to-
gether they are “mutually supportive.”55 There can of course be inconsistencies
within outlooks, which can be addressed internally, by, for example, testing their
coherence within the wider backdrop of the values of the outlook.56
Second, the elements of a moral outlook are often unified in a manner that
allows us to talk of an outlook “as a whole.” This unity can be provided by a
principle, such as Aristotle’s concept of eudaemonia, or by a moral exemplar, such
54See Freyenhagen 2013, 258.
55ibid, 259.
56I will consider this form of critical reflection - what John McDowell calls ‘piecemeal reflec-
tion’ - in detail in chapter 3, section ‘Between Dreyfus and McDowell’.
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as Jesus Christ. Indeed, we have seen in chapter one how philosophers engaged in
the justificatory approach attempt to locate and articulate just such a principle
that unites our moral values. There we saw that Schopenhauer, for example,
thought the principle could be articulated as “hurt no one and help everyone as
much as you can,” and Windelband as “Do your Duty!”57 This feature of unity
will be important when we come to consider how our dominant moral outlook can
be brought into view as a whole in chapter four.
Third, it is variable as to how “closed off” an outlook can be from other
outlooks. Freyenhagen gives the example of Nazism as a highly coherent and
“hermetically sealed off” outlook, with a high level of internal coherence, which,
however, has little overlap with other outlooks. Nietzsche argues that the Chris-
tian outlook, on the other hand, attempts to profess itself as the only moral
outlook, leaving no space for others: “But this morality [Christian morality in
Europe] resists such a “possibility,” such an “ought” [that there are and ought to
be other moralities before, alongside and after this morality] with all its power:
it says stubbornly and inexorably, “I am morality itself , and nothing besides is
morality” (BGE 202). The noble outlook attempts to seal itself off from the ruling
class, although by doing so it admits of the existence of other, albeit “inferior”,
moral outlooks. I shall consider in chapter four the commensurability that ex-
ists between the Christian and noble outlooks in particular, when I look at the
possibility of taking up the position of the noble outlook during the process of
estrangement.
Now, it can be tentatively suggested, based on the moral psychological frame-
work so far outlined, that the unifying principle in the Christian moral outlook is
obedience to a higher power. To re-iterate, this form of obedience is not pure obe-
dience, but involves moments of command. However, these moments are typically
employed as a means by which to achieve greater obedience. The higher power,
57Not unsurprisingly both of these principles capture much more closely the nature of the
Christian moral outlook than that of the noble outlook.
87
here, has traditionally been God, but with the loss in faith in Christianity, faith in
God has also been lost. As a result, there have been continued attempts to replace
this power by another authority that is universal in scope, such as “humanity,”
“compassion” or “duty,” by philosophers engaged in the justificatory approach.
Since God is no longer recognised as the legislator of our moral values, this
raises an obvious question: why is the Christian moral outlook still dominant
today despite the collapse of our faith in the Christian religion? And: why do our
moral values still remain authoritative despite the loss of faith in God as legislator
of these values? I will attempt to offer an explanation for this phenomenon in the
next section.
2.7 Sedimentation
In this section, I will begin by arguing for the more general claim that the process
of habituation which stabilises the dynamic of command and obedience results
in the central values of an outlook becoming sedimented, and that due to this
sedimentation, the value of these values becomes inconspicuous. I will then turn
to the specific case of our Christian moral outlook to see how the value of our
moral values remains inconspicuous despite the widespread loss of faith in the
religion.
Ascetic practices must be performed habitually to achieve a stable dynamic
of command and obedience. This is because when such habituation occurs, the
commanded goal is ascetically fixed in the process. When successful, this ascetic
fixing, I claim, results in the sedimentation of the values expressed by the com-
mands and customs of a moral outlook. I take this concept of sedimentation from
Edmund Husserl, who introduces it to describe a variety of phenomena.58 In Ex-
58In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl locates the concept of sedimentation in the
phenomenon of ‘retentional modification.’ See Husserl 1969, 319. In Experience and Judgment
he locates it in the movement from ‘predicative judgments’ to ‘declarative statements.’ See
Husserl 1973, 62. In the Origin of Geometry and The Crisis of the European Sciences, he
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perience and Judgment, Husserl offers us a general definition, and in doing so, he
links sedimentation to the phenomenon of habit. There, he states that sedimen-
tation is “the continuous transformation of what has been originally acquired and
has become a habitual possession and thus something non-original.”59 I want to
apply this to the domain of the moral by arguing that our ‘habitual possession’
of moral values - i.e., our habituated obedience to/command of values - renders
them ‘non-original’ since this process of habituation (and ascetic fixing) takes us
away from aspects of the phenomenon that were originally in question.
Husserl later employs the concept of sedimentation to describe specifically
how the origin of the scientific discipline in geometry has become overlooked by
subsequent geometers. However, he does in places suggest that the phenomenon of
sedimentation extends beyond the discipline of the natural sciences. For example,
in the Crisis of the European Sciences he writes the following:
What was lacking, and what is still lacking, is the actual self-evidence
through which he who knows and accomplishes can give himself an ac-
count, not only of what he does that is new and what he works with,
but also of the implications of meaning which are closed off through
sedimentation or traditionalisation, i.e., of the constant presupposi-
tions of his [own] constructions, concepts, propositions, theories.60
Husserl 1970, 52
This closing off of “the implications of meaning” through sedimentation of the
considers it in terms of how the meaning of the origins of geometry have been taken as given by
subsequent geometers. See Husserl 1970, 52, 353-378. I will be mostly interested in Husserl’s
employment of the term in the latter two texts.
59Husserl 1973, 275.
60See also Husserl 1973, 71: “If in this sphere of perception, which constitutes indeed only
part of the total sphere of doxic objectivating lived experiences, we are going to distinguish
different structures, such as those of passive pregivenness and of the active orientation of the
ego, of interest, of receptivity and spontaneity, then it is necessary to emphasize at the same time
that such differences are not limited to the sphere of perception or even in general to the sphere
of doxic lived experiences, but that these structures are to be found in all the other spheres of
consciousness. Therefore, there is an original passivity not only of sensuous givens, of “sense
data,” but also of feeling and, in contrast to this passivity, there is an active, objectivating
orientation, not only in perception, but also in evaluation and in pleasure. In these cases, too,
there are analogues of self-evidence and, therefore, of perception as well, in the original giving
of values, of ends, etc., in themselves.”
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presuppositions of “constructions, concepts, propositions, and theories” involves
two features that I think can be applied to how we become habituated to moral
values.
The first feature of sedimentation is that, due to ascetic habituation - i.e,
the habitual obedience to a particular command, the latter of which is fixed as-
cetically by such obedience - the structure of command and obedience becomes
stabilised.61 This stabilisation affords the possibility of moral values becoming
not only capable of being captured in a concept, (as we shall see later in chapter
three), but also solidified through such conceptualisation. By this I mean that,
while at their inception, our moral concepts are often shaky, unfixed, and perhaps
even provisional, over time they become more stable, certain, and secure. We
become able to take their value as given and no longer in question.
The achieved stability of our moral values through this process can be seen in
how our customs and laws often have their own authority for being valuable. This
was seen earlier in this chapter. Often no further appeal need be made to justify
or rationalise the value of customs and laws since they are considered valuable
in so far as they still command. For this to be possible, those customs and laws
have to be maintained over time to the point where they, and the values that they
express, become solidified. This maintenance is aided by the conceptualisation of
the values into written law and custom.62 We can see the result of this process of
solidification in another manner when we look at how the evaluative orientation
of our moral concepts have come to be taken as ‘facts’ in contemporary debates
in moral philosophy.63 This is seen most explicitly in the debate between moral
61This affords the possible formation of a hexis, or character.
62We shall see the effect of conceptualisation on the process of sedimentation in greater detail
in chapter 3, section ‘Self-consciousness’.
63Nietzsche makes this claim in the preface of On the Genealogy of Morals: “One has taken
the value of these “values” as given, as factual, as beyond all question; one has hitherto never
doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing “the good human” to be of greater
value than “the evil human,” of greater value in the sense of furthering the advancement and
prosperity of humans in general (the future of humans included).” (GM preface 6; translation
modified). I will analyse this aphorism further in chapter 4.
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naturalism and non-naturalism, which is grounded in the shared assumption that
moral values are facts, where by the term ‘facts’ we understand an experience that
is taken as true based on (self-)evidence. (I.e., the fact that our moral values are
valuable).64 The debate then centres around what type of ‘fact’ our moral values
should be understood to be.65
The second feature of sedimentation is familiarisation that affords a foundation
upon which we are able to orient ourselves in the world. Sedimentation not only
affords stability for our moral concepts, it also fixes those concepts such that they
can be relied upon as an unshakeable ground upon which further experience can
be based.66 This happens because as habituation renders our moral values stable,
these values become more familiar to us. Due to this, they become something
we can rely upon, something that we need no longer question; that they are
valuable becomes something taken for granted. As a result, we take them as an
unquestionable ground.67 When this happens, things show up to us in the world
as morally salient due to this foundation. The values of the outlook typically
then recede into the background, and it becomes possible to act morally in a
quasi-instinctive manner (with varying degrees of active command and receptive
obedience depending on the nature of the outlook.)
Now, this process of sedimentation, I claim, can help us to account for how the
Christian moral outlook can and indeed does remain the dominant moral outlook
of contemporary Europe despite a widespread decline in faith in the Christian re-
64As such, a ‘fact’ should not be understood as something that must be cognitive. It can also
include, for example, emotivist positions that take moral utterances to be self-evident expressions
of sentiment.
65See, for example, Crisp 1996.
66With reference to the experimental sciences, Steinle puts this feature in the following man-
ner: “It is not only a process of stabilization we see here, but also of a sort of sedimentation:
The now stable elements serve as an unshakable foundation, as the unquestioned ground for
further research,” or, in our case, further experience in the world. See Hyder and Rheinberger
2009, 211.
67Dodd elaborates Husserl’s notion of sedimentation and describes this particular feature as
follows: “Once something is familiar, thus by implication no longer strange, or a question that
remains to be addressed, the result is that I am in a position to see implications that would
have remained invisible were the obvious not obvious. Familiarity is solid ground on which to
stand, it is something on which to rely.” Dodd 2006, 70.
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ligion. To see how this is the case, first, it should be considered how the solidifica-
tion and familiarisation of our moral concepts over time - i.e. their sedimentation
- has the double effect of at once facilitating, strengthening and improving our
moral responsiveness, whilst also removing resistance, friction and tension to such
responsiveness.68 Now much depends here on what we understand is being ame-
liorated by activity, and that which is being eliminated or overcome in the same
process.69 I will suggest that responsiveness is ameliorated in so far as we become
more receptive to and capable of acting on the moral demands of the situation,
and argue that the tension that is reduced concerns the possibility of bringing
into question the value of the moral values that are expressed. This double effect
of habit will help explain how as we become more familiar with Christian values
we at the same time lose the possibility of taking them as objects of questioning.
The general amelioration of action due to ascetic habituation is put rather
eloquently by Norbert Elias:
The more the strong constraints of individual conduct are tempered,
the more violent fluctuations of pleasure or displeasure are contained,
moderated and changed by self-control, the greater becomes the sensi-
tivity to shades or nuances of conduct, the more finely attuned people
grow to minute gestures and forms, and the more complex becomes
their experience of themselves and their world at levels which were pre-
viously hidden from consciousness through the veil of strong affects.
Elias 1982, 419.
68This has been termed by Fe´lix Ravaisson the ‘double law of habit’. See Carlisle 2014
who locates the discovery of this law with Joseph Butler, and its subsequent elaboration by
Ravaisson. We should perhaps be wary of calling it a ‘law’ given that I have so far understood
laws as functioning on the continuum of compulsion rather than in “nature.” Here, I will call it
the “double effect of habit.”
69Philosophers have articulated this double effect in many different, and often conflicting,
ways. Hume, for example, suggests that custom increases active habits, and diminishes passive
habits. Bichat argues that habit decreases feeling and increases judgement. Maine de Biran
claims that repeated sensation fades and that movement becomes easier and more precise. See
Carlisle 2014, 27-31. Neither of these contrasts capture the phenomenon of our habituated
obedience to custom satisfactorily. In what follows, I will stress how the value of our moral
values becomes less and less a possible object of cognitive questioning as we increase our ability
to respond to the moral demands of the situation.
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However, it is the second effect of ascetic habituation - the reduction in tension
and resistance - where we find the explanation as to how we have maintained
our faith in Christian values. This reduction, I claim, should be understood as a
reduction in the availability of the value of our moral values to us as an object of
questioning. The idea here is that as we become more habituated and responsive
to the demands of the moral situation, the value of the values in play during such
response becomes more and more inconspicuous. Maine de Biran describes this
effect most forcefully:
Reflection, in the physical as well as in the moral sense, requires a
point of support, a resistance: but the most common effect of habit
is to take away all resistance, to destroy all friction... Reflect on what
is habitual! Who could or would wish to begin such reflection? How
should one suspect some mystery in what one has always seen, done, or
felt? About what should one inquire, should one be in doubt, should
one be astonished? Heavy bodies fall, movement is communicated; the
stars revolve over our heads; nature spreads out before our eyes her
greatest phenomena: and what subject for wonder, what subject for
inquiry could there be in such familiar things?
De Biran 1929, 4770
It is important to note, however, that reflection itself can become habitual. Ni-
etzsche makes this argument in the ‘origins of knowledge’ aphorism of the Gay
Science: “Here is a philosopher who fancied that the world was known when he
had reduced it to the “idea”: Was it not because the “idea” was so familiar to him
and he was so well used to it - because he hardly was afraid of the “idea” any more?
How easily these men of knowledge are satisfied!” (GS 355). The dichotomy that
de Biran brings out should not be understood as a contrast between habituation
and reflection, but rather it should be between habituation and wonder. This
contrast is also made by Nietzsche in the ‘origins of knowledge’ aphorism. There
he states that “[w]hat is familiar means what we are used to [das Gewohnte] so
70A part of this citation is also quoted in Carlisle 2014.
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that we no longer marvel at it, our everyday, some rule in which we are stuck, any-
thing at all in which we feel at home” (GS 355; my italics). Habituation contrasts
with wonder in so far as that which becomes habituated is no longer a cause for
curiosity, intrigue, doubt, and fundamentally, linking all these adjectives together,
a point of question. It is then not that our moral values become less cognitively
available, but that the manner in which they appear cognitively, when they do
indeed appear to us in congition, is in an everyday, familiar manner. They show
up as moral values that are morally valuable, and, hence, whose value (as a moral
value) is not in question.71
Now, it is not yet clear how or why habituation has this effect of reducing the
possibility of questioning, and how this relates more directly to our moral values.
Indeed, that we should understand familiarisation in terms of sedimentation and a
taking-for-granted of the value of our moral values, appears at this stage as more
of a truism than as an explanation. Let us then consider this more closely.
It might be thought that the value of our moral values becomes less open to
questioning because habituation engenders the forgetting of that value. There is
something right about this idea in so far as when obedience becomes habitual,
and hence compliant, we act out of second nature and seem to forget why the
original obedience (and the customs we are obedient to) was ever an issue. Think
for example of a child who initially goes through the motions of coming to obey
the commands of his or her parents, before then endorsing and engaging in those
very same customs once they become an adult. Or, in a parallel manner, we can
think of customs that were once practised out of obedience to God, such as the
giving of alms, and which are now continued despite a loss of faith in God. Much
turns here, however, on how we understand the phenomenon of forgetting value
71In chapter 3 section ‘Between Dreyfus and McDowell’ I argue in greater detail for this
contrast against the dichotomy of habituation/reflection found in Hubert Dreyfus’ moral phi-
losophy. More generally, there is a large amount of literature that argues that habituation and
the development of expert know-how involves non-cognitive “flow.” See Csikszentmihalyi 1996
for the classic text on this topic.
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in this context.
A potential candidate would be to understand this forgetting of value in terms
of how we come to forget a piece of propositional knowledge. As an advocate of
this position we can turn again to Paul Re´e. Re´e argues that we have forgotten the
value of our moral values, but are able to continue to engage in moral practices
and perform moral actions through habit. Re´e locates the value of our moral
values in social utility, whose origins lie in the original formation of communities.
Here, he claims, a need developed to praise particular actions which benefited the
group, and discourage others that harmed it. With the development of language
and the linguistic designation of beneficial actions as morally good, an association
of ideas was formed between the good and praiseworthy actions. This association
was maintained and enforced through customs.72 Re´e’s central idea that is of
concern to us here is that since habituation creates these associations, it is able
to maintain valuable practices even once the knowledge that moral values are
valuable has been forgotten. That is to say, for Re´e, we have forgotten that
moral values are valuable since we no longer realise that they have a social utility
function. However, he believes that values remain since we habitually express
them due to their association with praise and blame.
The main problem with this position is that it is difficult to see how it is
possible to forget that our moral values are valuable. Indeed, as argued above,
our familiarity with values comes from a feeling of distance between command
and obedience. If this feeling was forgotten, then this would instead suggest that
what was once valuable had ceased being so. Since, however, our familiarity with
values is typically enforced on a daily basis through obedience to customs and
laws, this would imply that we could continually forget that which we experience
as valuable on an everyday basis. This is highly implausible. Nietzsche makes
this criticism against Re´e in On the Genealogy of Morals :
72See Re´e 2003.
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In the second place, however: quite apart from the historical unten-
ability of this hypothesis regarding the origin of the value judgment
“good,” it suffers from an inherent psychological absurdity. The utility
of the unegoistic action is supposed to be the source of the approval
accorded it, and this source is supposed to have been forgotten - but
how is this forgetting possible? Has the utility of such actions come
to an end at some time or other? The opposite is the case: this utility
has rather been an everyday experience at all times, therefore some-
thing that has been underlined again and again: consequently, instead
of fading from consciousness, instead of becoming easily forgotten, it
must have been impressed on the consciousness more and more clearly.
GM I 3
Thinking that we could forget the value of our moral values in the manner that
we forget a piece of propositional knowledge is akin to taking that value as, what
contemporary philosophers would now call, a propositional attitude about our
moral values. To forget this would render our moral actions meaningless. As seen
in contemporary debates on the issue, supporters of intellectualism ascribe in the
very least to implicit knowledge of propositional knowledge for the undertaking of
“intelligent actions.”73 The main way in which intellectualist accounts understand
the intelligibility and value expressed in action is through appeal to “internal”
propositional states that engage with propositional content.74 However, if such
propositional content is not available to the actor since it has been forgotten, then
the action cannot be considered meaningful and expressive of value.
This also has repercussions for Re´e’s understanding of habituation. Since ha-
bitual actions, once value has been forgotten, are devoid of meaning, they become
reduced to a kind of rote habit. It is a habit that is, as Nietzsche describes,
”something purely passive, automatic, reflect-like, molecular, and fundamentally
73See, for example, Bengson and Moffett 2011, 7,8.
74See Bengson and Moffett 2011, 7 which gives a concise overview of the position in the
following manner: “[I MIND] A state σ is a state of Intelligence if and only if σ is or involves
a certain type of internal state of engaging propositional content. [I ACTION] An individual x
exercises a state of Intelligence in performing an action φ (i.e., x φ-s Intelligently) if and only
if x φ-s and x has some state σ such that (i) σ is or involves a certain type of internal state of
engaging propositional content and (ii) σ is appropriately causally (or otherwise explanatorily)
related to the production of φ.”
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stupid” (GM I 1). It is unable to meaningfully move anything; it is “vis inertiae”
(ibid).
To avoid this, we have to appreciate that the experience that our moral values
are valuable is continually re-enforced and sedimented through our habituated
obedience. These values are continually fixed through our ascetic holding in check
of competing forces of the soul, to realise the expression of such values in action.
It cannot be this aspect then that is forgotten. Instead, a better candidate is
that, due to such sedimentation, what we come to forget is that the value of our
moral values is a possible object of questioning. How we could come to forget
such a thing, however, is not obvious. Indeed, such forgetting implies that before
the sedimentation of our moral values, their conditional right to existence was
experienced, and, hence that their value was not taken as given. However, for
this to be the case suggests that these values could have been otherwise, and
that, hence, before they became established, they were in competition with other
values.
This way of understanding the nature of forgetting helps to understand how we
can, and indeed do, become more cognitively receptive to morally salient phenom-
ena in the world as we become habituated, (this is the first effect of habituation),
and, yet, the demands on cognitive questioning diminish since we come to take
the laws and customs as they are habitually given to us as authoritative. (This is
the second effect).
We can, then, now come to see how Christian moral values remain dominant
despite the widespread loss of faith in the religion. As our Christian moral val-
ues have become dominant over the past 2000 years, these values have become
sedimented. This has meant that these values have become ascetically fixed, and,
thus, have been rendered “unforgettable.”75 Competition with alternative and op-
posing values has, as a result, ceased, and our moral values are taken as “facts.”
75See GM II 3.
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The value of these moral values is continually expressed through our actions and
customs. What has become forgotten, however, is the possibility of bringing
into question the value of these moral values. Their evaluative orientation - i.e.,
whether they are good for us, and not, say, harmful - is taken for granted.
Now, when we lose our faith in God as legislator due to the recent, widespread
collapse in Christianity, what becomes affected is the unity of the outlook due
to a loss of identification of the principle by which the outlook can be thought
of as hanging together.76 I have already suggested above that there have been
many attempts to replace God as authoritative power, whilst maintaining the
constellation of values that make up the outlook. Arguably, these have not been
successful, in so far as there is no great consensus of a new principle among Eu-
ropeans that they identify with. However, these attempts are indicative of the
fact that the moral values themselves continue to function in a sedimented man-
ner, such that their value remains a familiar, taken-for-granted part of everyday
experience. People may understand the unity of the constellation of values in
different ways, and, hence, no longer under the rubric of Christianity, but the
values themselves remain familiar. In other words, the loss of God as legislator
has not directly disrupted the evaluative orientation of the value of our moral
values.77 Moreover, even without a universal unifying principle, I will continue to
talk of a moral outlook here since, as we shall see in chapter three, to bring into
question our Christian moral values will mean to bring into question the value of
the Christian moral outlook as a whole.
76This helps explain the occurrence of the phenomenon of fragmentation that Max Weber
discusses in ‘Science as a Vocation.’ See Weber 1958, 126. Unfortunately it is beyond the scope
of the thesis to consider this phenomenon in further detail.
77Owen claims that Nietzsche experienced this in his contempories, resulting in a shift in
focus in his later works: “By the time of composing Book III of The Gay Science it appears
to him [Nietzsche] that his contemporaries, while increasingly characterised by atheism, do not
understand this loss of faith to undermine the authority of Christian morality. It is not that
they act in accordance with morality while no longer believing in it, but that they still believe




To conclude, I will consider how understanding our familiarity with moral values
in this manner can help us to see the possibility of bringing into view the value of
our Christian moral values. I have argued that our familiarity with moral values
is achieved through a complex process of habituation, which essentially involves
a stable and ascetic dynamic of command and obedience. Through analysis of
our moral psychological framework, I have argued that we can be familiar with
different moral outlooks, and that towards opposing ends of the continuum of
compulsion we can see two opposing outlooks in particular: a ‘noble moral outlook’
and a ‘Christian moral outlook.’ It is the latter outlook that we now find prevalent
in contemporary Europe, notwithstanding the decline in Christianity. Due to the
sedimentation of these Christian moral values, we no longer come to see their
value as an object of questioning despite a loss of faith in God as legislator of
those values.
Sedimentation, however, is not a fixed phenomenon that is unalterable. In-
deed, Edmund Husserl, who introduces the concept, argues, for example, that the
the work of the philosopher “is to make vital again, in its concealed historical
meaning, the sedimented conceptual system which, as taken for granted, serves
as the ground of his private nonhistorical work.”78 Sedimentation is an historical,
variable phenomenon that depends on the stability of the ascetic structure of com-
mand and obedience and the feeling of distance that such a dynamic gives rise to.
Habitual continuation of the dynamic to maintain such stability is essential for
its perpetuation. If we are to pose the question of the value of our moral values,
we will require, minimally, an engagement with such sedimentation.
On the one hand, simply showing that our values have gone through such a
process of sedimentation will not be sufficient to pose the question of the value of
our moral values since it has to be further shown that this value is something that
78See Husserl 1970, 71.
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is at stake for us now. On the other hand, the goal of moral inquiry cannot be
to only disrupt this sedimentation by changing the ascetic structure of command
and obedience that affords familiarity with our Christian moral values. Disruption
alone would result in a loss of familiarity with our moral values, and, hence, a
foregoing of the possibility of posing the question as to their value.
What is required is a type of disruption which maintains our familiarity with
our Christian moral values, while, nevertheless, affording sufficient estrangement
from them such that the value of these values comes into view as a questionable
phenomenon. This gives rise to at least two pertinent questions. First, can this
required disruption be initiated consciously by the moral inquirer? And, second,
what type of disruption is required? The latter question will necessarily involve
the relation of command and obedience in the soul of the inquirer as well as his or
her social and political relation to others in the community. The former question
concerns the possible role of cognition in moral inquiry and the type of work it is
able to undertake to bring into view the value of our moral values as a questionable
phenomenon.
In the next chapter, I will tackle the former question and, hence, look at the
role that cognition is able to play in moral inquiry. I will analyse what type of
cognition is required to initiate or cause the required disruption to sedimentation.
In chapter four, I will then turn to the issue of the moral inquirer’s social situation,
where I will argue that estrangement should be understood as a movement that
follows the structure of a ‘rite of passage’ that will locate the role of cognition,
as a form of self-consciousness, in a liminal phase of reflection. In this phase, an
aspect-shift towards an alternative and opposing moral outlook will ultimately be
required as a part of achieving a temporary inversion of values, and which will
play a central role in achieving estrangement from our Christian moral outlook.
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Chapter 3
Familiarity and the Possibility of
Estrangement: The Role of
Cognition
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will focus on the cognitive aspect of moral inquiry, and the role
that it is to play in bringing into question the value of our moral values. That
cognition will have an important role to play in moral inquiry, has already been
established in chapter one and chapter two, when I argued that the task of moral
inquiry task is to see the value of our moral values as a questionable phenomenon,
and that due to habituation and sedimentation we no longer see this value as an
object of wonder. In chapter two I focused on developing a basic account of the
functioning of our moral psychology. There, I emphasised the important role of
force and compulsion that arises within a dynamic of command and obedience,
and of habituation which affords the possibility of a stability of the soul and the
possibility of willing. What was lacking, however, was precisely an account of the
more cognitive elements of this structure. I will develop such an account in this
chapter.
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My approach will be to consider what form of cognition is minimally required
in order for anything like a structure of command and obedience to be possible.
I will thus build an account based on the moral psychological framework that I
outlined in chapter two. The overarching aim will be to see how the possibility of
estrangement is already built into our familiarity with moral values with specific
concern for the role of cognition. We shall see, however, that the minimal form
of cognition required for the realisation of a structure of command and obedience
is insufficient for moral inquiry, since, fundamentally, it is not self-reflective. This
will then lead me to consider a more complex form of cognition, that of self-
consciousness. I will analyse the role that self-consciousness has in our familiarity
with Christian moral values, and, finally, what scope there is to employ it for the
task of moral inquiry.
It should be noted that the account I offer will be limited to understanding
the highly complex phenomenon of consciousness only in terms of the dynamic
of command and obedience. On the one hand, this will offer an interesting angle
from which to approach this phenomenon. On the other hand, I will be unable
to consider certain forms of consciousness that might still be relevant to moral
experience, such as phenomenal consciousness and consciousness that arises from
the senses, but which would ultimately take me too far afield.
I will develop my account by considering alternative accounts and the chal-
lenges they pose. For example, I will consider a version of the ephiphenomenalism
of self-consciousness, which challenges the very possibility of moral inquiry as I
have so far understood it in the thesis, as well as a cognitivist approach, which
gives a privileged role to language and self-consciousness. By dealing with these
positions, I will be able to establish the role that self-consciousness plays in our
familiarity with moral values. I will also consider two accounts of radical, critical
reflection to understand the role that self-conscious reflection will have to play
in the task of estrangement. These will be two separate versions of internal cri-
tiques, one piecemeal, and the other a more radical form of ironic disruption. I
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will ultimately argue against piecemeal reflection for failing to be able to bring
our Christian moral outlook into view in its entirety. I will argue against ironic
disruption being sufficient on its own, since it risks assimilating the experience
of crisis into the Christian outlook rather than engendering a more radical break
from it. Throughout, I will also further draw on Nietzsche’s works in line with my
appeal to his position in the previous chapter, which offered the required resources
to understand our moral psychological framework.
In chapter four, I will then situate self-conscious reflection and the role it is to
play in moral inquiry in the wider structure of estrangement. We shall see that
it will be located in the middle phase of a tripartite movement whose structure
mirrors that of the phenomenon of a rite of passage. This middle phase will be a
liminal phase of reflection, where one is able to experience a radical inversion of
values.
3.2 Minimal Consciousness
In this section, I want to suggest that we can begin to understand the role of
cognition in moral experience by looking at how it features in the moral psycho-
logical framework outlined in the previous chapter. This will mean considering
what type of cognition is present in the dynamic of command and obedience. We
shall see that by starting out from this framework, we do not necessarily need a
strong form of cognition to arrive at a stable, ascetic structure of command and
obedience. I will start by considering a minimal form of cognition that affords the
basic functioning of this structure. I will then outline its limitations in particular
relation to the task of moral inquiry, before turning to a stronger form of cogni-
tion, that of self-conscious reflection, which plays a more complex role in enriching
this structure through concept determination, and which can play a more direct
part in moral inquiry by disrupting the sedimentation of our moral values.
To obtain a dynamic of command and obedience a particular form of cognition
is required. I will suggest that this cognition need not be reflective, or linguistic,
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and, yet, it is also not unconscious. In the previous chapter, we have seen how
the structure of the soul is a fluid dynamic of command and obedience, which can
be situated on a continuum of compulsion bounded between two non-inclusive
extremes, that of the savage beast and the animate tool. On the continuum there
is neither pure spontaneous activity, nor pure passive mechanism. Instead, at
the level of the soul in particular, we should think of there being an undecided
contest of competing forces, drives and affects that ultimately gives rise to the
very possibility of willing, and acts of will.
A central difference between mechanism and pure spontaneity, on the one
hand, and acts of will, on the other, is the requirement for an ordered structure of
the soul, where competing forces form a dynamic of command and obedience. For
there to be a resultant act of will, the forces must settle into an ascetic structure
such that they are compelled into obedience under a guiding command. The idea
is that to settle into such a structure a minimal form of cognition is necessary.
Nietzsche suggests this when he writes that “intelligere... is actually nothing but a
certain behaviour of the instincts toward one another” (GS 333); and similarly in
BGE 36: “...thinking [Denken] is merely a relation of these drives to each other...”
He is even more explicit in an aphorism in Beyond Good and Evil : “Therefore,
just as sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to be recognised
as ingredients of the will, so, secondly, should thinking also: in every act of the
will there is a commanding thought [kommandierenden Gedanken] - let us not
imagine it possible to sever this thought from the “willing,” as if any will would
then remain over!” (BGE 19; translation modified.)
Nietzsche’s formulation here can lead to confusion in so far as one might think
that these drives and instincts themselves “think” at the sub-personal level. To
avoid this, I will limit the claim to the idea that a minimal form of cognition
should be seen as taking place within the dynamic of command and obedience.
To show how this is the case, I will consider an example where I think this minimal
form of consciousness is present.
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Let us consider the example of young infants being brought up by their par-
ents. Parents issue commands to infants in a variety of ways, through utterances,
facial expressions, gestures, postures, and so on. The means of response of infants,
even as young as 6-12 months, are typically interpreted in terms of being compli-
ant or defiant.1 Thus, before the commands of the parents become semantically
meaningful to infants, the infants respond in a manner that cannot be grasped
in purely causal or purely spontaneous terms. However, nor can they be grasped
in terms of linguistic understanding, or self-conscious reflection, since the infants
have not yet acquired mastery of a language. Infants are not simply pushed or
pulled to move in a particular direction, yet, nor do they deliberate in any sub-
stantive sense on their course of action.2 Nevertheless, they do “feel” themselves
under a compulsion of command. This feeling cannot simply be a case of “pain
compliance,” where painful stimuli is used to channel behaviour; it must instead
be in some sense cognitive since it involves the infant experiencing the command
as a command, i.e., as something - such as a gesture or facial expression - that
has a compelling force.3
Although it is difficult to articulate this form of minimal cognition as a feeling
of being compelled, we can infer that it must involve the soul of the infant be-
1In the psychology literature on this topic, much of the discussion revolves around the role
of parental caregiving in infant obedience. See Hay 1984 for an overview, and also Stayton,
Hogan, and Ainsworth 1971. What is agreed upon across the literature is that infants of such
an age already act in terms of compliance and defiance.
2See, for example, Cowley 2003, 232-233: “The third and fourth months of an infant’s life
manifest what, following Trevarthen, is called ‘primary intersubjectivity’. Today it is beyond
dispute that, behaviourally, this phase is marked by closely meshed, affectively charged infant-
caregiver activity. At one level, the label identifies the consequences of a qualitative change
in interaction that allows caregivers and infants to enact an interactional ‘dance’. Rhythmical
bodily movements, mutual gaze and facial expression are accompanied by delicately modulated
vocalization reminiscent of waltzing or falling in love [...] The coupling of infant and caregiver
is seen – not in terms of signals and messages - but as driving and driven by how a child’s
brain-body system responds to prompts and demands.”
3It may well be argued that as infants grow up and obtain the capacity for self-conscious
reflection and language use, the dynamic of command and obedience changes. John McDowell,
for example, argues that the change occurs due to the infant becoming initiated into the “space
of reasons” as he or she grows up in a community and acquires a language and tradition. I will
engage critically with this position later in this chapter, when the question of the role played by
self-reflection and language in our familiarity with moral values becomes more salient.
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coming structured into a dynamic of command and obedience in relation to the
issued, parental command. It is easy to witness a slight pause on the part of the
infant on reception of the command, as if he or she were “weighing up” the best
course of action. Indeed, this pause is often much more exaggerated in infants
than it is in children and adults since infants have undergone less habituation.
We should not, however, take this “weighing up” in any thick reflective sense,
but rather in a thin sense of a minimal form of cognition or “primitive thinking,”
which arranges the forces of the soul of the infant into a structure that affords
compliance and defiance.4 The action that then follows from the infant expresses
compliance or defiance, and, from this, gives an insight to the parent or observer
into the structure that the infant’s soul has formed.
This minimal form of consciousness has the following features. Its contents
are not linguistically structured; it is non-reflexive in the sense that it is unable
to take itself or another conscious act as an object or higher order thought; and it
is not unconscious since it involves a cognitive feeling of compulsion, which when
unpacked involves a thin process of “weighing up,” which, however, should not be
understood to involve any complex reflexive, deliberation.
It should be seen, however, that this kind of minimal cognition, as so far
understood, is not adequate for the task of moral inquiry. The key feature that
it lacks, which the latter task requires, is that of reflexivity. The task of bringing
into view the value of our moral values will have to involve some form of meta-
cognition or reflection, since it will require rendering this value as it is already
experienced in its familiarity, as a further object of possible questioning. As
argued in chapter two, the value of our moral values has become sedimented, and
thus taken for granted in its familiarity as valuable. To question this will require
4This can help us to understand why Nietzsche claims that this kind of thinking was the
earliest kind of thinking among humans: “Setting prices, determining values, contriving equiv-
alences, exchanges - these preoccupied the earliest thinking [Denken] of humans to so great
an extent that in a certain sense they constitute thinking as such...” (GM II 8; translation
modified).
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a form of reflexive consciousness, since it requires taking our consciousness of
the sedimented value of our moral values and disrupting such sedimentation by
rendering it an object of wonder and reflection. In other words, our familiarity
with moral values is to be taken up as an object of meta-cognition such that in
their familiarity, these values show up as strange.
Now, the obvious candidate for providing this kind of higher order meta-
cognitive thinking is that which is traditionally called self -consciousness. I will
consider this in the next section, by analysing how it functions in the dynamic
of command and obedience of the soul. Once I have done this, I will then turn
to a contemporary debate in the literature to defend my account of thinking and
self-consciousness against plausible alternatives.
3.3 Self-consciousness
Rather than immediately looking at how self-consciousness can function in moral
inquiry, I will begin by considering how it functions in moral experience, and,
more specifically, how it can be efficacious in our familiarity with moral values.
There are two reasons for this. First, I wish to see to what extent the possibility of
estrangement is already built into our familiarity with moral values. Given that,
as we have seen in chapter one, this familiarity is a necessary condition for moral
knowledge, our familiarity with moral values is a good starting place to see what
resources this familiarity can already offer us for the task of estrangement. Second,
as we shall see in the next section, it has been argued that self-consciousness
is not only absent during highly skilled moral action, but that it destroys the
phenomena experienced during such action when it occurs at the same time as
that action. Self-consciousness here is considered detrimental to moral expertise,
and, as a result, incapable of accurately capturing the experience of such expertise.
By arguing that self-consciousness has an important role in our familiarity with
moral values in this section, I will be in a stronger position to reject this account
in the next section, and to set up the positive role that self-consciousness can play
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in moral inquiry.
The question then that I will begin with here is how self-consciousness func-
tions in moral experience, and, more precisely, the role it plays in the dynamic
of command and obedience. The topic of self-consciousness, similarly to mini-
mal cognition considered in the previous section, is so vast that I will only seek to
tackle the issue from this latter perspective, (i.e., in strict relation to this dynamic
of the soul) with the ultimate aim of articulating the type of self-consciousness
required for the task of estrangement.
Since it is Nietzsche who I have interpreted as offering the resources for a
construction of our moral psychological framework in terms of the dynamic of
command and obedience, I will begin by considering how he understands the
phenomenon of self-consciousness. We shall see that he provides a useful starting
point. In an aphorism on the phenomenon of consciousness in book five of The Gay
Science, he makes the following claim: “That from the start it [consciousness] was
needed and useful only between human beings (particularly between those who
commanded and those who obeyed)” (GS 354; my italics). First, it should be
noted that when Nietzsche employs the term ‘consciousness’, Bewusstsein, he has
in mind self-consciousness, as opposed to a minimal form of cognition outlined in
the previous chapter, or to other kinds of non-reflexive consciousnesses, such as
phenomenal consciousness. This is seen by the fact that in the same aphorism he
talks of other cognitive activities which do not come to this level of consciousness,
and he also describes this consciousness as a kind of “mirror”, which suggests that
this consciousness fundamentally involves a kind of reflexivity.5
Second, the parenthetical remark from the above quotation is what I will take
5I agree with Mattia Riccardi in taking Nietzsche to be indicating a form of self-consciousness
in this aphorism. See Riccardi in press: “Firstly, consider that Nietzsche describes the kind of
consciousness he is dealing with as “one’s becoming conscious (Sich-bewusst-werden) of some-
thing”, a formulation which implies the kind of reflexivity we normally capture with the notion of
self-consciousness. Support to this reading is also lent by Nietzsche’s “mirror” metaphor, which,
too, suggests some sort of reflexivity. Self-consciousness, moreover, is such a high cognitive
ability that we can easily expect it to serve as differentiating us from other animals.”
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as guidance to construct an understanding of the role of self-consciousness in our
familiarity with moral values. Nietzsche suggests that the utility function of self-
consciousness comes from the fact that human beings find themselves in a dynamic
of command and obedience, which arises due to humans coming to live together
in communities.6 An obvious manner in which one might think self-consciousness
would offer an advantage for a community is the fact that it offers the possibility
of “representing” the feelings and psychological states of individuals and groups.
Nietzsche suggests this in GS 354:
That our actions, thoughts, feelings, and movements enter our own
consciousness - at least a part of them - that is the result of a “must”
that for a terribly long time lorded it over humans. As the most endan-
gered animal, human beings needed help and protection, they needed
their peers, they had to learn to express their distress and to make
themselves understood; and for all of this they needed “conscious-
ness” first of all, they needed to “know” themselves what distressed
them, they needed to “know” how they felt, they needed to “know”
what they thought.
GS 354
However, this utility of self-consciousness as a means of “self-knowledge”, which
is employed for the sake of self-expression to others, only makes sense if it can
be communicated. Nietzsche’s idea here is that self-consciousness arises between
human beings simultaneously with language due precisely to this need.7 Nietzsche
makes this claim in GS 354:
The emergence of our sense impressions [Sinneseindru¨cke] into our own
consciousness, the ability to fix them and, as it were, exhibit them
6See chapter 2 on the simultaneous development of the social pathos and the soul pathos.
See section ‘The Soul.’
7In Marx and Engels 1972, 51 the same claim is made: “...language, like consciousness,
only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. Where there exists
a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not enter into “relations” with anything, it
does not enter into any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist
as a relation. [Self-]Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and
remains so as long as men exist at all.” Marx and Engels, however, do not consider how it arises
in the sui generis relation of command and obedience as I will attempt here.
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externally, increased proportionately with the need to communicate
them to others by means of signs. The human being inventing signs
is at the same time the human being who becomes ever more keenly
conscious of itself. It was only as a social animal that humans acquired
self-consciousness.
GS 354 ; translation modified8
To lend plausibility to Nietzsche’s claim here, I will consider how the co-development
of self-consciousness and language are useful for human beings living in a commu-
nity, but I will narrow the scope of this to its specific utility with respect to the
dynamic of command and obedience at the level of both the community and the
individual soul.
In the previous chapter, I argued that our moral values have become sedi-
mented over time. We saw there that this occurs due to the fixing of our moral
concepts so that they become stable, and the familiarisation of these concepts such
that they become taken for granted and foundational for further experience.9 This
fixing occurs ascetically: a structure of command and obedience is formed where
forces of the soul (desires, instincts, drives) are held in check - i.e, rendered obe-
dient - to a commanding goal. For the solidification of this structure to reach a
form of stability (of character at the level of the soul and of political stability at
the level of the community) habituation is required. Now, in the previous section,
I argued that a minimal form of cognition can be inferred as playing an important
role in this dynamic of command and obedience. I want to suggest here that the
utility of self-consciousness should be found in the same place, in its ability to
help with the fixing of our moral values in a more powerful manner than the form
of minimal cognition is capable of.
8By “human signs” Nietzsche clearly has language in mind: “In brief, the development of
language and the development of consciousness (not of reason but merely of the way reason enters
into consciousness) go hand in hand” (GS 354). See also BGE 268: “For only this conscious
thinking takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication, and this fact uncovers
the origin of consciousness.” And: “Words are acoustical signs for concepts; concepts, however,
are more or less definite image signs for often recurring and associated sensations, for groups of
sensations” (ibid).
9See chapter 2, section ‘Sedimentation’.
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To give an insight into the role of language here, let us return briefly to the
example of the parent and the infant raised in the previous section. The form
of non-linguistic, minimal cognition seen expressed in this case remains relatively
internal to and across the subjective states of the individuals - (the parent and
the infant). The stability that arises occurs at once between the infant and the
parent, who together briefly form a dynamic of command and obedience, as well
as at the level of the soul of the infant, since the infant’s soul becomes structured
into a dynamic of command and obedience in response to the command of the
parent. What is “in the world”, so to speak, is the initial non-linguistic command
issued by the parent, and the resultant act of the infant. Now, what language adds
to this dynamic, as suggested by Nietzsche in the above cited aphorism, is a more
powerful means of fixing the command, and, as a result, of stabilising the dynamic
of command and obedience. This is achieved by externally fixing the command
in language, which offers a medium distinct from the dynamic of command and
obedience of the individuals and of the dynamic functioning between them.
This external, linguistic fixing renders self-consciousness efficacious in struc-
turing the soul in two interrelated ways. Language can be employed, on the one
hand, as an active expression of the power of command through the activity of
concept determination. As such the possibility of this activity typically belongs
to those who have this power of command. As Nietzsche explains, “[t]he right of
the masters to confer names extends so far that one should allow oneself to grasp
the origin of language itself as the expression of the power of the rulers: they say
‘this is such and such’, they put their seal on each thing and event with a sound
and in the process take possession of it” (GM I 2).
On the other hand, language has a role in representing the command as a duty
or promise that is to be realised through obedience. The power of conceptual
representation that language offers here is not simply that it can represent a
command symbolically. More than this, it allows for a goal to be externally
fixed much further beyond one’s current state than in the case of non-linguistic
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commands. In the previous chapter, I argued that there was a relation here
between the fixing of the command, and the distance that the command stands
from its realisation: the greater the distance, the greater the demand for the
fixing of the command.10 Language offers a more powerful externalisation of
command that creates such a distance. This is captured most succinctly in its most
extreme form in Christianity where “the Word becomes God.” This represents
a difference from language as an expression of (human) power through concept
determination of a ruling class.11 However, this difference is one of degrees and
emphasis. Concept determination is not wholly absent from the Christian moral
outlook, but it is either subsumed under a means of obedience, or moved into
the realm of the divine. Similarly, in the noble outlook, the externalisation of
commands as duties to be obeyed are very much present, but these are subsumed
under expressions of power that distinguish the nobility from a lower class. In
other words, the two different ways in which language can be efficacious in our
familiarity with moral values - the expression of the power of command through
concept determination, and the externalisation of the command as a duty to be
obeyed - are typically both present in the dynamic of command and obedience,
but one aspect can subsume the other depending on which end of the continuum
we consider.12
Now before expanding further on the role of self-consciousness and language
in the dynamic of command and obedience by considering alternative philosoph-
ical accounts, there are a couple of basic worries that first need to be addressed.
10See chapter 2, section ‘The continuum of compulsion and the pathos of distance.’
11Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, it should be noted that language plays an
important role in the deification of the ascetic structure discussed in chapter 2. See Harpham
1987, 12-13, and the phenomenon of, what he calls, the coinciding of “logos and theology.”
12Much of the literature on the role of self-consciousness in Nietzsche’s works, considers
whether it is causally efficacious for moral action. My suggestion here is that its efficaciousness
should not be understood in causal terms at risk of falling into a mechanical account, but rather
in terms of compulsion seen at play in the dynamic of command and obedience. Commentators
typically miss this because they are concerned with other forms of consciousness. Katsafanas
2005, Riccardi in press and Leiter 2001 all agree that Nietzsche endorses a causal account but
disagree on whether self-consciousness is causally efficacious or epiphenomenal.
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First, there is the worry that not withstanding my attempts to show how self-
consciousness has an efficacious role in our familiarity with moral values, ulti-
mately its role in this process is superfluous, or at least that we could do without
it and still be able to act morally. This is not a major concern for me given that I
have not sought to argue that self-consciousness is necessary to achieve familiarity
with moral values, but rather for the weaker claim that it can and indeed does
play an efficacious role in how we become familiar with moral values. The reason
why I have been interested in the role that self-consciousness plays is to see if we
can find resources there for the task of moral inquiry. However, it is true that
Nietzsche, in the same aphorism that I have leaned on heavily to offer an account
of the efficacy of self-consciousness, seems to claim, in fact, that self-consciousness
is entirely superfluous, and, hence, has no influence on our familiarity with moral
values. It is worth then considering what Nietzsche’s claim here amounts to.
Second, there is a worry that self-consciousness might in some sense distort
its contents. This is another claim that Nietzsche forwards in GS 354. This is
a more serious concern since if self-consciousness has a distorting effect on that
which it captures, then the nature of the distortion would have to be ascertained
to see what effect this would have for the possibility of moral inquiry. If, for
example, the representation that self-consciousness provides of our moral values
is not faithful, then this would jeopardise the possibility of faithfully bringing the
value of our moral values into view as a questionable phenomenon.
To begin with the first worry, Nietzsche seems to make a claim about the
superfluousness of self-consciousness in the Gay Science aphorism that I have been
considering in detail in this section: “We could think, feel, will, and remember,
and we could also “act” in every sense of that word, and yet none of all this would
have to “enter our consciousness” [...] The whole of life would be possible without,
as it were, seeing itself in a mirror” (GS 354).13
13It is also a claim that has had considerable attention from commentators. For interpreta-
tions of Nietzsche as an epiphenomenalist about self-consciousness see Leiter 2001: “The second
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Note that there is the further worry that if self-consciousness functions only
as a mirror, as Nietzsche suggests here, then it would not be able to engage in
the type of disruption of our sedimented moral values that is required to see not
simply the familiar value of our moral values, but to bring this value into view as
something questionable. As a result, self-consciousness would not be able to play
any part in moral inquiry.
I will, first, briefly argue against understanding Nietzsche’s claim here as a
broad epiphenomenal claim about the efficaciousness of self-consciousness. As
the continuation of the aphorism GS 354 bears witness, Nietzsche qualifies this
statement of the superfluousness of self-consciousness by claiming, albeit some-
what ambiguously, that self-consciousness is epiphenomenal only for the ‘human
savage’ and the ‘hermit’. What these two figures have in common is that they
are human but live in isolation, external from human communities. What I think
Nietzsche means to suggest by this is that they engage in the type of minimal
cognitive thinking that we saw in the previous section, due to some exposure to
human communal living during upbringing. This thinking is a minimal, necessary
requirement for creating a stable dynamic of command and obedience that can
bring about an act of will. That is to say, they exercise some form of self-restraint
such that the phenomenon of willing arises. Hence, they are able to perform ac-
tions. Yet, they do not require self-consciousness to act since they do not live
within human communities. They have no need to communicate their psychologi-
cal states to others to form a stable dynamic of command and obedience. Human
beings that do live in communities, on the contrary, do engage in and benefit from
such communication. Due to this communication, self-consciousness is employed
in a manner that affects our familiarity with moral values. As suggested above,
it affords the use of language as an expression of the power of command, and the
argument grows out of Nietzsche’s claim that our conscious life is essentially epiphenomenal,
that what rises to the level of consciousness is simply an effect of something unconscious, or
perhaps even something physical” Leiter 2001, 291. See also Gemes 2009, Risse 2007.
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positing of more extreme duties and promises to be realised through obedience.
We might say it affords a widening of the soul that could not be achieved without
it.
Let us now turn to the more serious concern of the distorting effects of self-
consciousness. In the same aphorism, Nietzsche claims that all self-consciousness
- hence, even for those living in communities - distorts its contents:
Owing to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we
can become conscious is only a surface- and sign-world, a world that
is made common and meaner; whatever becomes conscious becomes
by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd
signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corrup-
tion, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalisation. Ul-
timately, the growth of consciousness becomes a danger; and anyone
who lives among the most conscious Europeans even knows that it is
a disease.
GS 354 ; translation modified
This is an oft-quoted aphorism in the Nietzsche scholarship. However, most of
the attention has fallen on attempting to elucidate the corrupting and falsifying
nature of self-consciousness in terms of its epistemological significance, typically
in terms of the conceptualisation and propositional articulation that the content
of experience undergoes when it comes to the level of self-consciousness.14 This
overlooks, however, the central characteristic of self-consciousness that Nietzsche
describes to account for its distorting nature. In this aphorism he describes con-
sciousness as animal consciousness, thierischen Bewusstseins. At first sight, this
manner of articulating the nature of the distortion appears as a contradictio in
14In the Anglophone secondary literature, the distorting effects of consciousness are often
taken up as an epistemological problem, and has been labelled Nietzsche’s “falsification thesis.”
See, for example, Welshon 2014: “...the falsification thesis is an epistemological claim and not
a genetic or psychological claim. The falsification thesis has to do not with how the contents of
basic conscious experience are generated but with whether the contents so generated are true
or false.”Welshon 2014, 97. Clark 1990 first introduced and argued for Nietzsche’s adherence to
this “falsification thesis.” See Katsafanas 2005 and Riccardi in press who take it up specifically
in terms of conceptualisation.
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adjecto given that self-consciousness is something fundamentally human, arising
only in human communities.
Now, one might think that by the term ‘consciousness’ employed by Nietzsche
in the above quote, Nietzsche is not referring to self-consciousness but to a type
of consciousness that animals also share in. This would then make sense of Ni-
etzsche’s qualification of its nature as animal-like. This response is untenable,
however, given the way the aphorism continues. Nietzsche talks of this form of
consciousness as “a net of communication between human beings” (GS 354; my
italics) based on a complex language that animals do not have access to. It should
thus still be understood as referring to a form of reflexive self-consciousness, which
is the same self-consciousness that is the subject of the entire GS 354 aphorism.
Instead, I want to suggest that the “animal” nature of self-consciousness con-
cerns the way in which language develops as a complex form of “herd signals” and
“common signs”. This is supported by an aphorism from Beyond Good and Evil :
Which group of sensations [Empfindungen] is aroused, expresses itself,
and issues commands in a soul most quickly, is decisive for the whole
order of rank of its values and ultimately determines its table of goods.
The values of a human being betray something of the structure of its
soul and where it finds its conditions of life, its true need. Assuming
next, that this need has only brought close to each other such human
beings who could suggest with similar signs similar requirements and
experiences, it would follow on the whole that easy communicability
of need - which in the last analysis means the experience of merely
average and common experiences - must have been the most powerful
of all powers at whose disposal humans have been so far. The human
beings who are more similar, more ordinary, have had, and always
have, an advantage; those more select, subtle, strange, and difficult to
understand, easily remain alone, succumb to accidents, being isolated,
and rarely propagate. One must invoke tremendous counter-forces
in order to cross this natural, all too natural progressus in simile,
the continual development of the human toward the similar, ordinary,
average, herdlike - common!
BGE 268 ; translation modified
Nietzsche suggests here that what is distorted by self-consciousness is the more
“select, subtle, strange” experiences, as opposed to the more common experi-
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ences shared by similar human beings. The typical answer as to why this oc-
curs is because of some form of conceptualisation that occurs at the level of self-
consciousness. I do not want to argue against this, but, as said above, I want
to consider the significance of the distortion involved in terms of the role of self-
consciousness in the dynamic of command and obedience. To do so, we need to
distinguish between the different uses of language in our familiarity with moral
values. First, it can be employed as an expression of the power of command,
which is an act of concept determination that distinguishes between classes, in-
dividuals and forces of the soul. Second, it can represent and help linguistically
fix duties and promises that lie well beyond the current state of individuals and
groups, and, hence, help to bring such individuals and groups together. In the
former case of concept-determination, it is true that such determination would
distort the “select, subtle, strange” experiences due to the conceptualisation that
it involves. Yet, it is important to note that this use of language can also have
the opposite effect of contributing to the progressus in simile in so far as it seeks
to distinguish through concept determination, rather than to bring together that
which is similar. As such, this would provide a potential “counter-force” to this
process, through an attempt to isolate that which diverges from the “common.”
This implies that in the above cited aphorism, Nietzsche has in mind the latter
role of language as a means of externally fixing a shared command for similar
human beings. This latter function has the power to externalise the command of
duties and promises to render them potentially compelling to a wider audience of
“similar human beings.” Language here has a greater power of bringing together
similar human beings through the external articulation of a shared command. The
distortion that occurs here then should not only be understood in terms of the
conceptualisation of “select, subtle, strange” experiences, but also in terms of the
external fixing - involved in this conceptualisation - of shared commands that are
to be obeyed en masse by similar human beings. Self-consciousness then not only
aids sedimentation, as seen above, through the fixing of moral values in linguistic
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concepts, it can also function in bringing the similar together, at the expense of
the unique through such fixing. Now, the distortion of the unique, here, is not a
direct concern for moral inquiry since the object of concern is our moral values,
and their value. However, the role of self-consciousness, as so far explained, raises
particular problems for understanding its potential role in such inquiry. That is to
say, rather than seeing how self-consciousness may help disrupt the sedimentation
of our moral values, we have seen, on the contrary, how it contributes to such
sedimentation.
In the next section, I will defend my account of the efficacious role of minimal
cognition and self-consciousness in our familiarity with moral values against two
alternative accounts. This will help, first, to clarify the role of self-consciousness
in our familiarity with moral values by arguing for my above claims against plau-
sible alternatives, and, second, to offer greater detail as to how this role of self-
consciousness will be able to function in the task of moral inquiry.
3.4 Between Dreyfus and McDowell
In a recent contemporary debate, the role of self-consciousness in moral experience
and moral inquiry has been discussed from two distinct positions. In this section, I
will situate my account between these two positions, forwarded by Hubert Dreyfus
and John McDowell.
Both Dreyfus and McDowell take up contrasting positions with respect to the
role of self-consciousness in moral action and in moral inquiry. Both positions
have strengths that I wish to draw upon in support of my own position, and
by articulating their shortcomings, the role that self-consciousness has to play in
moral experience should become clearer. Moreover, we shall also see the potential
that self-consciousness has for the task of moral inquiry, which is of interest here.
On the one hand, I will argue with McDowell and against Dreyfus’ epiphe-
nominalist position that self-consciousness has a fundamental role to play in our
familiarity with moral values at what Dreyfus calls the “expert” level, and that
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it also has a role in moral inquiry. On the other hand, I will argue with Dreyfus
against McDowell, that when we become familiar with our moral values compul-
sion is central to the process, and, as a result, we do not simply come to have our
eyes passively “opened to reason.” This will be important since it will suggest
that the conceptual sphere does not go “all the way down,” as McDowell thinks.
I will then ring-fence the correct position in between these two accounts.
Dreyfus offers us, what is often called, a “non-cognitive” account of moral
action. To be more specific, we shall see that Dreyfus is committed to the po-
sition of, what he calls, “expert moral action” occurring without any cognitive
functioning at all on the part of the moral agent, unlike merely “competent” or
“proficient” actions, which, he claims, do often involve cognition.
On analogy with chess and driving it would seem that the budding
moral expert would learn at least some of the ethics of his commu-
nity by following strict rules, would then go on to apply contextual-
ized maxims, and, in the highest stage, would leave rules and prin-
ciples behind and develop more and more refined spontaneous moral
responses.15
Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991, 236, 237
Moreover, Dreyfus claims that at the level of the “expert”, cognition is not only
absent, but that it is detrimental to highly skilled moral experience since when it
occurs, it causes a breakdown of the experience. “Mindedness,” Dreyfus claims,
“is the enemy of expert coping,” where expert coping is “direct and unreflective”
and “nonconceptual and nonminded.”16 As a result of this, according to Dreyfus,
when the “expert” moral agent reflects, it is impossible for him or her to accurately
take up the contents of his or her moral experience. This has the implication
that for a moral inquirer, self-consciousness has no access to expertly-experienced
15Although Dreyfus does not explicitly say that expert moral action is non-cognitive, he is
committed to this position since he claims that moral action is analogous to highly skilled action,
and that highly skilled action occurs non cognitively.
16Dreyfus 2007, 355.
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moral content. As a direct result of this, any attempts to bring the value of
moral values into view as an object of questioning by such an expert would be a
non-starter. This is because any such questioning would occur on the plane of self-
conscious reflection. In other words, if Dreyfus’ position were to be correct, there
would be no scope for the moral expert to self-consciously access his or her moral
values. Dreyfus then endorses a weak form of epiphenominalism here in so far
as he admits of the presence and importance of self-consciousness for developing
moral competence through the following of customs, rules and laws, but denies its
presence at the highest “expert” level. In the previous section, I argued that self-
consciousness has a part to play in moral experience as an expression of the power
of command, and as a fixed command compelling obedience. If Dreyfus’ account
is right, however, then I would have at best described a person with a competence
in moral matters, but who has not yet acquired the level of “expertise” described
by Dreyfus. I will address this issue later in this section.
McDowell, instead, offers us a rationalist account of moral action with self-
consciousness at its centre. Contrary to Dreyfus, McDowell argues that moral ex-
perience is always already conceptual, making it readily amenable to self-conscious-
ness and reflection.17 This means that the moral inquirer has direct access to the
contents of moral experience through self-conscious reflection. If McDowell’s ac-
count were to be correct, then moral inquiry should be a relatively straightforward
affair through, what we shall see McDowell call, “radical, piecemeal reflection.”
Before unpacking this issue and addressing it, I will note the common starting
point of both positions and the return to the individual accounts to consider
them, and the challenges that they pose, in greater detail.
17McDowell not unlike Dreyfus has a different starting point from that of moral action, but
then argues that “something parallel” occurs in the case of morality: “The idea of the conceptual
that I mean to be invoking is to be understood in close connection with the idea of rationality,
in the sense that is in play in the traditional separation of mature human beings, as rational
animals, from the rest of the animal kingdom. Conceptual capacities are capacities that belong
to their subject’s rationality. So another way of putting my claim is to say that our perceptual
experience is permeated with rationality. I have also suggested, in passing, that something
parallel should be said about our agency.” McDowell 2007b, 338-339.
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Both positions reject the possibility of “detached” reflection or deliberation
sufficiently capturing the particulars of the moral situation or moral experience of
an agent. By “detached” reflection or deliberation they both have in mind gen-
eral rules and maxims that concern moral behaviour. They agree that reflection
on such rules and maxims can never adequately capture the “particulars” and
“specifics” that are experienced by an moral agent in a moral situation.18 They
both further agree that this is because a process of learning and habituation is
required to become morally proficient, and that while such rules and maxims can
be useful reference points during this process, they ultimately become inadequate
for capturing the specifics that the moral situation affords, and that the moral
agent becomes competently sensitive and responsive to.19 As a result of this, the
moral inquirer, like any moral agent, must be sufficiently habituated in order to
be able to perceive moral salience in the world. This means that there is no way of
circumventing the requirement of habituation through direct awareness of moral
rules, or through an appeal to first nature.20
At this point, however, Dreyfus’ and McDowell’s positions diverge quite radi-
cally. This is seen most starkly when we consider again the position of the moral
inquirer. For Dreyfus, once one has been sufficiently habituated, not only do those
general rules and maxims fall away, but all of one’s nuanced responses become non-
cognitive. They become so situation-specific that they can no longer be captured
linguistically. Thus, Dreyfus states that when an expert is responding to the de-
mands of the situation “there is no thinking subject and there are no features to be
thought.”21 He bases his argument on an analysis of the “phenomena”: “The phe-
18McDowell in response to Dreyfus on this point states the following: “I reject the idea
that the content of practical wisdom, as Aristotle understands it, can be captured in general
prescriptions for conduct, determinately expressible independently of the concrete situations in
which the phronimos is called on to act” McDowell 2007b, 340. For Dreyfus on this issue, see
Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991.
19See McDowell 2007b, 341 and Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991.
20I argued for this myself by considering Aristotle’s moral philosophy in chapter 2. See section
‘Habituation.’
21Dreyfus 2007, 358, my italics.
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nomena show that embodied skills, when we are absorbed in enacting them, have
a kind of content which is nonconceptual, non-propositional, non-rational (even
if rational means situation-specific,) and non-linguistic.”22 This has extreme im-
plications for the moral inquirer, since not only do moral experiences escape the
possibility of being accurately articulated linguistically on Dreyfus’ account, they
a forteriori elude any possibility of being brought into question. Moreover, as
suggested above, Dreyfus argues that self-consciousness even becomes prohibitive
since it destroys the particular contents of the experience that are accessed by the
moral agent when in the midst of action.
McDowell argues against Dreyfus that although generalised rules and max-
ims are unable to capture the specifics of moral experience, such experience is
conceptually structured, and, hence, can still be captured linguistically by self-
consciousness.23 Moreover, although McDowell concedes to Dreyfus that many of
our actions often do not issue from a prior mental act of reason, the content of
moral experience during the action can still be brought into view after the event
precisely because they are structured conceptually. Under McDowell’s account,
then, the moral inquirer, as long as he or she is correctly habituated, has the pos-
sibility of accessing even the most situation-specific contents of moral experience,
ex post facto. Moreover, such a possibility is to be realised through recourse to
language through self-consciousness.
Let me now attempt to pinpoint the central locus of divergence between the
two accounts, which I will then be able to navigate between for the remainder of
the section.
22Dreyfus 2007, 360.
23“Dreyfus pictures rationality as detached from particular situations—as able to relate to
particular situations only by subsuming them under content determinately expressible in ab-
straction from any situation. He makes a compelling case for the claim that the skills exercised
in embodied coping cannot be characterized in such terms. If rationality is essentially situa-
tionindependent, that feature of embodied coping establishes that it cannot be permeated with
rationality. But I think we should reject the picture of rationality as situation-independent.”
McDowell 2007b, 339. Although McDowell talks of ‘rationality’ here, he states at the beginning
of the paper that “conceptual capacities... belong to their subject’s rationality.” He thus clearly
has language in mind.
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Both positions agree that many of our actions occur without any need for a
prior self-conscious state ‘behind’ the action. However - and here we start to see
the fundamental difference - the absence of any such prior self-conscious cognition,
according to Dreyfus, is precisely the mark of expert moral action. To engage in
complex moral tasks without any cognition is a sign of high attainment. McDow-
ell, instead, argues that the very structure exhibited by prior self-consciousness is
the model that should be extended to include actions that proceed without such
prior intent.24 This expansion essentially involves the extension of the conceptual,
rational domain of prior reasoning to those actions that are undertaken without
prior reasoning.25 Thus, while for Dreyfus a move away from prior reasoning to
non-cognitive action shows greater competence, for McDowell this greater com-
petence is shown by the fact that conceptual capacities still essentially function
even when no prior reason is acted upon.
Now from this divergence we can start to understand how they offer different
accounts of how actions come about without prior reasoning. According to Drey-
fus, these expert actions are motivated by, what he calls, the “solicitations” of
the situation. Importantly, Dreyfus distinguishes them from “facts” and “propo-
sitional structures.”26 The moral expert obtains sufficient sensitivity to these
solicitations such that they “attract and repulse” him or her into responding to
the situation in a “spontaneous manner,” without the need (or even the possi-
bility) of cognitive engagement with them. Indeed, Dreyfus argues that the very
nature of such solicitations denies the possibility that they could ever be captured
in propositional form: “qua solicitations they cannot be made explicit as features
and data for then they wouldn’t draw us to act. In such a case, their motivating
power would be lost. They can only be solicitations in so far as one is actually
24“So the structure of what Aristotle offers as an account of deliberation should be relevant
more widely than where action issues from reasoning” McDowell 2007b, 341.
25McDowell argues that “rationality in the strong sense” as “responsiveness to reasons as
such” permeates both prior reasoning (and “standing back”) and “absorbed coping”. See Mc-
Dowell 2007a, 366.
26See Dreyfus 2007, 356, 357.
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responding to them.”27 Here the difference between the two positions becomes
most salient. Dreyfus argues that only solicitations can motivate: “[o]ne way to
put my point is that openness to objective affordances may well draw on rational-
ity but it doesn’t draw anyone to do anything.”28 McDowell responds that “[t]o
an engaged agent, an affordance can be a solicitation. And its being a solicitation
does not conflict with its being a fact, something to which a rational animal can
be open in operations of conceptual capacities.”29
I am now in a position to offer a first articulation of the position that I think
is the correct one that lies in between McDowell’s and Dreyfus’ accounts, before I
then defend it in specific dialogue with their individual positions. I will argue that
solicitations cannot be ineffable forces of attraction as Dreyfus suggests, since, in
the case of morality in particular, this mistakenly takes the moral expert out of
the moral realm altogether, and ultimately safe-guards expert moral experience
from moral inquiry. As a further result of this, which would have repercussions for
the task of moral inquiry that I am concerned with here, it would be impossible
to bring into question the value of our moral values, since self-consciousness and
language are essential for this task. On the other hand, I will argue that solici-
tations cannot only be conceptually structured facts or affordances as suggested
by McDowell since reason alone, as McDowell understands it, is not sufficient to
compel us to moral action. Moreover, we shall see that moral inquiry cannot sim-
ply function through a form of piecemeal reflection that considers the coherence
of these facts and affordances, since such a process is unable to bring into view
the value of the Christian moral outlook as a whole.
The correct position that finds the middle ground between these two positions
understands solicitations as commands that are forces, but which are neverthe-
less experienced as commands, and, hence, as compulsions. This experience of a
27Dreyfus 2007, 357, 358.
28See Dreyfus 2007, 356, 361.
29McDowell 2007a, 369.
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command as a command has a cognitive element as a part of the compulsion. It
need not be linguistically structured, although it often is. This means that for
moral inquiry, self-consciousness can access parts of the dynamic of command and
obedience and, hence, of our familiarity with moral values, contra Dreyfus, but
that to achieve a disruption of their sedimentation, reflective engagement with
compulsion-free facts and affordances, which McDowell’s position proffers, will
not be sufficient.
To make these arguments, I will first consider Dreyfus’ position in greater
detail. I will focus on his commitment to the idea that self-conscious reflection
destroys the moral phenomena experienced by the expert, and the result that this
has for the possibility of moral inquiry.
In his paper ‘Towards a Phenomenology of moral expertise’ written prior to
his debate with McDowell, Dreyfus suggests that the manner in which we learn
to become moral experts parallels how we become experts at certain skills. He
claims that the experience of an moral expert is analogous to the experience of,
for example, a grandmaster chess player, or a professional athlete.30 In this paper,
Dreyfus offers the following example as to how the analogy is to work in the case
of moral action:
To take a greatly oversimplified and dramatic example, a child at some
point might learn the rule: never lie. Faced with the dilemma posed
by Kant - an avowed killer asking the whereabouts of the child’s friend
- the child might tell the truth. After experiencing regret and guilt
over the death of the friend, however, the child would move toward the
realization that the rule, “Never lie,” like the rule, “Shift at ten miles
per hour,” needs to be contextualized, and would seek maxims to turn
to in different typical situations. Such a maxim might be, “Never lie
except when someone might be seriously hurt by telling the truth.”
30“The rest of this paper is based on a conditional: if the skill model we have proposed is
correct, then, in so far as moral comportment is a form of expertise, we should expect it to
exhibit a developmental structure similar to that which we have described above. On analogy
with chess and driving it would seem that the budding moral expert would learn at least some of
the ethics of his community by following strict rules, would then go on to apply contextualized
maxims, and, in the highest stage, would leave rules and principles behind and develop more
and more refined spontaneous moral responses.” Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991, 236-237.
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Of course, this maxim too would, under some circumstances, lead to
regret. Finally, with enough experience, the moral expert would learn
to tell the truth or lie, depending upon the situation, without appeal
to rules and maxims.
Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991, 237
Now, although it is clear that with a more contextualised and nuanced response
to the situation the moral expert need no longer appeal to maxims and rules,
it is not yet clear from this example whether Dreyfus thinks that cognition is
present or not in this process. Dreyfus describes the response of the moral expert
as “intuitive” and “spontaneous.” Yet, in this paper, Dreyfus appears to concede
the possibility of reflecting on such intuitions: “Thus, when faced with a dilemma,
the expert does not seek principles but, rather, reflects on and tries to sharpen
his or her spontaneous intuitions by getting more information until one decision
emerges as obvious.”31 This looks like Dreyfus admits of a role for reflection at
the expert level of moral action, and a certain access to the “intuitions” that are
involved at this level.
However, first, it should be noted that the moral expert only requires to reflect
on his or her intuitions when facing a dilemma or problem, as a means of getting
back on track, and to return to the flow of spontaneous response. That is to say,
reflection only comes on the scene, according to Dreyfus, when there is some form
of breakdown of the spontaneous moral response of the expert. Reflection here is
then not a part of the spontaneous moral response of the expert itself, but rather
occurs only when things go wrong.
The question remains, nevertheless, as to whether this reflection during break-
down can access the content of the moral experience of the expert. In this partic-
ular paper on moral expertise, Dreyfus gives no further indication whether this is
the case or not, since he fails to expand on his understanding of the nature of the
intuitive, spontaneous response, and the nature of the reflection involved during
31Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991, 245.
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breakdown. To answer the question, we have to return to Dreyfus’ employment
of the analogy of moral actions with highly skilled actions. Again, in this paper,
Dreyfus does not offer much in the way of explanation of the intuitive, sponta-
neous response in highly skilled actions. He does, however, go into much greater
detail concerning this phenomenon in his exchanges with McDowell. Indeed, one
of his main arguments against McDowell is that during highly skilled action, or
what Dreyfus also calls “absorbed coping”, all forms of cognition are not only
absent, but the presence of such cognition is detrimental to the performing of the
highly skilled action. In fact, Dreyfus claims that whenever cognition comes on
the scene, there is a ‘regression’ from expertise to mere competence:
If the ego were always implicitly monitoring its coping, attending to
what one was doing wouldn’t degrade one’s performance. But in gen-
eral paying attention to a solicitation as one responds to it leads to a
regression from expertise to mere competence. If the expert coper is
to remain in flow and perform at his best, he must respond directly
to solicitations without attending to his activity or to the objects do-
ing the soliciting. There is no place in the phenomenology of fully
absorbed coping for mindfulness.
Dreyfus 2007, 374
The presence of cognition does not only “break the flow”, but “produces inferior
performance.”32 This suggests that, according to Dreyfus, any form of reflection,
even that of the expert on his or her “intuitions” can never be a part of highly
skilled action, but instead belongs to the period of breakdown. Moreover, reflec-
tion can never accurately capture the contents of that highly skilled experience
since whenever such reflection comes on the scene, the very phenomena of expert
coping is destroyed. Thus, Dreyfus says, “[m]indedness is the enemy of expert
coping,” where by mindedness Dreyfus employs McDowell’s term to describe the
presence of cognition, without the need for “standing back” or deliberating on
rules and principles.33 By analogy, then, there is also no cognition present during
32Dreyfus 2007, fn 5.
33Dreyfus 2007, 355.
127
expert moral action, and the moral expert has no access to the content of moral
experience when he or she moves to the plane of reflection.
To criticise this aspect of Dreyfus’ account, it will help to appreciate how
Dreyfus understands the double effect of habit - the phenomenon that I described
in chapter two - that is at play in becoming an moral expert, and the repercussions
that this has for understanding the role of self-consciousness in moral action and
in moral inquiry. Although Dreyfus never calls it a double effect of habit, he
subscribes to the position that the more highly skilled an moral agent becomes
in performing moral actions, the less self-conscious the agent is to what he or she
is doing. This double effect climaxes when the agent becomes an expert and no
cognition at all is present during the performance of the action. In chapter two, I
briefly argued against orienting the double of effect of habit around a dichotomy
of habituation and reflection by claiming that an increase in habituation does not
necessarily result in a decrease in reflection. Indeed, reflection too can become
habituated.34 Instead, I argued that an increase in habituation leads to a decrease
in a sense of wonder about the contents of moral experience, which in turn leads
to the sedimentation of the value of moral values. This leaves open the possibility,
however, of reflection capturing the contents of moral experience, which Dreyfus
closes off.
Before going into greater depth with this criticism, I will tackle a potential
response that could be open to Dreyfus. One might say that since my criticism
only focuses on the expert level of moral action, it misses the target since Dreyfus
readily admits that self-consciousness and reflection are readily present in all other
levels, ranging from the beginner to the competent moral agent. If the level of
expertise were to be only an ideal, mainly unreachable by the everyday person,
and, hence, not typically realised when we become familiar with moral values,
then it would indeed seem that the criticism fails to hit home.
34See chapter 2, section ‘Sedimentation’.
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As a retort to this, notice that Dreyfus does not set the bar particularly high
for what he thinks counts as an moral expert. Indeed, in ‘Towards a Phenomenol-
ogy of moral expertise’, he talks of “everyday intuitive moral expertise”35, which
suggests that most adults develop such expertise in their everyday moral encoun-
ters. Moreover, as seen in the example of lying quoted above, Dreyfus suggests
that one reaches expertise in this case when one “would learn to tell the truth or
lie, depending upon the situation, without appeal to rules and maxims.”36 The
ability to “spontaneously respond” to a situation that could require lying with-
out having to deliberate on stock rules or maxims is something which we would
plausibily think a large majority of adults would be capable of. Finally, although
the analogy with highly skilled actions is more ambiguous here, many examples
that Dreyfus employs, are reached in our everyday behaviours, such as navigating
ourselves around our environment (such as opening a door), and driving.37
Now, to return to the criticism of Dreyfus, we can note that the principle
means for reaching a level of expertise is through a familiarity with successfully
performing an action in certain contexts. It is this familiarity that constitutes
highly skilled knowledge, and, by analogy, moral knowledge, according to Dreyfus.
Thus in the case of driving, he writes that “[t]he expert driver, generally without
any attention, not only knows by feel and familiarity when an action such as
slowing down is required; he knows how to perform the action without calculating
and comparing alternatives.”38 Dreyfus thus takes that which is everyday, expertly
familiar as that which is known by the expert. This, I suggest, commits Dreyfus to
that “error of errors” described by Nietzsche in the ‘origins of knowledge’ passage
from the Gay Science. Here is a selection of it again:
For “what is familiar is known”: on this they [men of knowledge] are
35Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991, 240.
36Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991, 237.
37The exceptions here would be the grandmaster chess player, and the professional sportsper-
son.
38Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1991, 235; my italics.
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agreed. Even the most cautious among them suppose that what is
familiar is at least more easily knowable than what is strange, and
that, for example, sound method demands that we start from the
“inner world”, from the “facts of consciousness,” because this world is
more familiar to us. Error of errors! What is familiar is what we are
used to; and what we are used to is most difficult to “know”- that is,
to see as a problem; that is, to see as strange, as distant, as “outside
us.
GS 355
For Dreyfus, achieving the familiarity with moral values that an moral expert
achieves, just is moral knowledge. Not only is reflection on those moral values
to bring their value into question not a part of this knowledge, but it also never
could be, given that reflection can never accurately capture that familiarity. As a
result, Dreyfus’ position essentially attempts to safe-guard our current dominant
moral values in their familiarity from inquiry. These moral values are taken in
their immediate givenness, and, understood as such, they are removed from any
possibility of being brought into question through self-conscious cognition. Now,
on this particular issue, Dreyfus could just bite the bullet and accept that our
everyday, expert familiarity cannot be brought into question. This becomes a
serious problem, however, when our current moral values are sedimented to the
point where we have obtained this expert familiarity, and, yet, their foundations
have been lost due to the collapse of Christianity. Once we appreciate that our
moral values could be otherwise then we are drawn to pose the question as to
whether these values remain good for us. There is no scope under Dreyfus’ account
to engage with this question since, on his account, it is not possible to bring into
view the value of our moral values as a questionable phenomenon.
To conclude my criticism of Dreyfus’ position, Dreyfus misunderstands the
nature of our familiarity with moral values at the expert level. I argued in chapter
two that when our moral values become so familiar, they become sedimented. We
come to take their value for granted. Dreyfus mistakenly takes this to involve an
absence of cognition, rather than the absence of cognitive questioning. Rather
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than this familiarity resolving into a form of responsiveness to non-cognitive and
non-linguistic solicitations of attraction and repulsion, we should see it as still
functioning on the dynamic of command and obedience. This leaves scope for our
familiarity with moral values to still involve self-consciousness and language in
the roles discussed above: as an active means of the expression of power, on the
one hand, and as a means of conceptual fixing of distant commands and duties
that are to be obeyed, on the other.
Let me now turn to McDowell’s account. In Mind and World, McDowell
argues that the sphere of conceptuality is unbounded. By this he means that it
runs all the way down from the spontaneity of the understanding to our receptive
sensibility to the world. Our spontaneous employment of “conceptual capacities”
to grasp the world are already at work in the sensible world as it is presented to
us. “Our conceptual capacities that belong to spontaneity,” as McDowell puts it,
“are in play in actualisations of sensibility.”39
McDowell later claims that there is a parallel between cognition and action:
“Intentional bodily actions are actualisations of our active nature in which concep-
tual capacities are inextricably implicated.”40 Just as our receptive sensibility to
the world is an actualisation of the spontaneous exercise of conceptual capacities,
our intentional actions are similarly also an actualisation of the spontaneous ex-
ercise of such capacities. Our moral actions then realise the conceptual capacities
that spontaneity exercises in action.41
Importantly, the paradigmatic case of moral action for McDowell is that which
involves reflective deliberation since “...unreflective action can instantiate the “I
39McDowell 1994, 66. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider in any great detail
McDowell’s Kantian understanding of spontaneity and receptivity. See N. Smith 2002, 283:
“What my project requires is that we see how spontaneity in the strong Kantian sense, although
it is “freedom” in the sense of something “full-blown, reflective, self-possessing, radical,” is
exactly not an “emancipation from nature”.”
40McDowell 1994, 90.
41“In particular, I think the way certain bodily goings-on are our spontaneity in action, not
just effects of it, is central to a proper understanding of the self as a bodily presence in the
world.” McDowell 1994, 91 fn 5.
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do” only because it is engaged in by a subject who on other occasions explicitly
decides what to do.”42 This means that, on McDowell’s account, the moral agent
always has access to the contents of his or her moral experience by virtue of
it already being the realisation of a conceptual capacity. He or she might lack
the proficiency in the language to articulate it, but it is nevertheless already in
conceptual form.
Now, to understand how we become initiated into conceptual capacities, Mc-
Dowell draws upon the Aristotelian notion of second nature, and Gadamer’s notion
of Tradition, which we inherit as we grow up in a community.43 To understand
how this complex phenomenon is assimilated, McDowell points us to language
acquisition, since through language “a human being is introduced into something
that already embodies putatively rational linkages between concepts, putatively
constitutive of the layout of the space of reasons, before she comes on the scene.”44
Language is what McDowell calls “a prior embodiment of mindedness”, as such,
it offers “the possibility of an orientation in the world.”45 Moreover, ‘[t]he feature
of language that really matters is rather this: that a natural language, the sort
of language into which human beings are first initiated, serves as a repository of
tradition, a store of historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for
what. The tradition is subject to reflective modification by each generation that
inherits it.”46
I will consider the nature of this “reflective modification” shortly. Before this,
however, I will take a closer look at the role that language plays in our familiarity
with moral values in McDowell’s account. First, for McDowell, unlike for Dreyfus,
the role of language as we develop our moral expertise does not diminish. On
the contrary, the better we develop our conceptual capacities through language
42Schear 2013, 55.





acquisition, the more refined and nuanced our actions will become, and the more
we are able to develop a greater sensitivity to the demands of the moral situation.
At this point, however, McDowell’s understanding of the process of the acqui-
sition of a tradition misses an essential element, which has wider ramifications for
his position. McDowell gives us the idea that the acquisition of a second nature
is a rather easy, fluid and peaceful affair in which human beings are at once re-
ceptive to tradition and active in sharing in it.47 The manner in which infants
acquire their mother tongue and the social cannons of appropriateness, this would
suggest, is for the most part a facile process, which they tend to be remarkably
proficient at.
What is missing from McDowell’s account is the role of law and command, and
their enforcement through compulsion in the assimilation of a tradition. Interest-
ingly enough, as we have seen in chapter two, Nietzsche is much more faithful to
Aristotle’s account on this score than McDowell.
Customs and laws are imposed on us as commands to compel us into obedience
through a variety of institutions as we grow up.48 Language cannot do the work
required here without such an accompanying imposition. That is to say, one does
not learn what the right or reasonable thing to do is only by coming to have one’s
eyes “opened up to reasons” as McDowell suggests on many occasions.49 The
component of applied force to achieve compulsion is fundamental here as opposed
47For example, McDowell often talks of one having one’s eyes simply “opened to reasons” as
when develops a second nature: “Any second nature of the relevant kind, not just virtue, will
seem to its possessor to open his eyes to reasons for acting. What is distinctive about virtue, in
the Aristotelian view, is that the reasons a virtuous person takes himself to discern really are
reasons; a virtuous person gets this kind of thing right.” McDowell 1998, 189.
48Here is Aristotle again: “But whether these laws are written or unwritten would seem to
make no difference, nor whether, through them, one person or many will be educated, just as it
does not matter either in the case of music or gymnastic and the other practices. For just as it
is the laws and customs [e¯the¯] that hold sway in cities, so also it is the speeches and habits of
the father that do so in households...” 1180b1-5.
49See McDowell 1994, 82: “When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of
thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons.” And:
“If we generalise the way that Aristotle conceives the moulding of moral character, we arrive at
the notion of having one’s eyes opened to reasons at large by acquiring a second nature.” ibid,
84. See also McDowell 1998, 189.
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to simply receiving “a prior embodiment of mindedness” that is readily open to
reflection.
It is true that McDowell never explicitly rules out the presence of compulsion in
the process by which we become familiar with moral values. However, its absence
in his account has implications for how we understand this familiarity. Dreyfus’
criticism of McDowell is correct on this score: that the awareness of “facts and
affordances”, which language offers through the acquisition of conceptual capac-
ities can only help us become familiar with moral values is they can compel us
into obedience. This is because facts and affordances do not propel us to do
anything unless we experience them as compelling. In other words, we require
something like a command that we experience as a command that compels us to
obey. However, this does not mean that we are left only with Dreyfus’ alterna-
tive position, which claims that the moral expert is responsive to non-conceptual
and non-cognitive solicitations that “attract and repel.” Here we can navigate
between McDowell’s and Dreyfus’ positions by finding the middle-ground, where
solicitations can be both conceptual and expressive of the power of command,
even at the expert level. While there can be commands that are non-linguistic,
as seen earlier in this chapter, language itself can also be employed as a means of
command, and function in the dynamic of command and obedience in the man-
ner outlined in the previous section. That is, it can aid the fixing of commands
beyond our current state in a more powerful manner than non-linguistic signs.
This criticism also has important implications for the nature of moral inquiry.
I have argued that our moral values have become fixed and taken as facts through
a process of ascetic habituation. And that, as a result, the value of these values has
become taken for granted. Since McDowell fails to recognise the role of compul-
sion, and, hence, the ascetic structure of the dynamic of command and obedience,
he is unable to see that, what he calls, the “prior embodiment of mindedness” that
language affords is a product of this. Due to this he fails to see that its value could
be an object of possible questioning. That this is indeed the case becomes evident
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when considering the nature of critical reflection that McDowell describes. It is
fundamentally a piecemeal critique that remains internal to the inherited “prior
embodiment of mindedness,” and which is unable to question whether such an
embodiment as a whole is good for us. Let us take a closer look.
McDowell describes the nature of this critical reflection as both radical and
piecemeal. To capture these two features, he employs the metaphor of Neurath’s
boat.50 Similar to a person in a boat at sea repairing parts of the boat whilst
remaining afloat in it, in a moral outlook one can question and alter certain
aspects of that outlook whilst remaining firmly inside it. The imagery is meant
to capture the “radical” nature of the critical reflection, since any aspect of the
moral outlook can be brought into question (just like any part of the boat can be
mended); and, yet, it also depicts the necessary piecemeal aspect of the process.
The outlook cannot be perceived and questioned as a whole externally, just as the
boat cannot be mended in its entirety whilst being on board.
Now, I do not want to argue against the fact that we often engage in this type
of reflection and that it is an important feature and resource of our Christian
moral outlook. Indeed, it is clearly true that in Europe we often question our
moral values and sometimes even the most dominant of them.51 When we do so,
we typically question from within the same familiar moral outlook, by questioning
the coherence of the value of the particular value in relation to the other values
that belong to the outlook. This is fine when questioning the coherence of a
particular value in relation to other values of the outlook.
However, this method comes up short when one wishes to question the value
of an entire outlook, or “prior embodiment of mindedness.” When we bring
into question a particular moral value, we necessarily do so, as the metaphor of
the boat suggests, on the backdrop of the wider moral outlook. That is to say,
50The image is introduced by Neurath in Anti-Spengler, and was employed before McDowell
by Quine in his Word and Object. See Quine 2013, 3 fn.
51For example, the question of the value of free speech surfaces every so often in Britain when
deciding whether to give a platform to the BNP.
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when bringing into question the value of specific values, we have to necessarily
assume the value of the other values that afford us an evaluative perspective from
which to bring those particular values into question. This becomes problematic
when we seek to question the value of our moral outlook due to the loss of its
Christian foundations. The problem arises because we are not simply troubled
by the coherence of particular values within an outlook, but by the legitimacy
of the outlook as a whole.52 Again, we want to ultimately pose the question as
to whether our moral values could be in some sense detrimental for us. As a
result, moral inquiry needs to be able to pose the question of the value of the
Christian moral outlook in its entirety, and not only of particular values within
that outlook. Questioning only particular values in a piecemeal manner necessarily
begs the question of the value of the other values of the outlook that form part of
the background upon which the questioned values are interrogated.
Instead, what is required is to bring the value of the entire moral outlook into
view as a questionable phenomenon. That is to say, its value needs to be brought
into view as a possible object of questioning. This raises several questions and
difficulties with respect to the type of inquiry that could achieve this, and the
position that the inquirer has to take up. I will explore these issues in the next
section.
To conclude this section, I have argued with McDowell and against Dreyfus
that self-consciousness has an important role to play in moral inquiry. To do
so, I have attempted to show, first, that cognition including self-consciousness is
not inimical to expert moral action, and that the double effect of habit occurs
between increased habituation and the reduction in taking the value of our moral
values as an object of possible questioning. Second, self-consciousness has an
active part to play in moral action through concept determination, which functions
52Nietzsche makes this point in On the Genealogy of Morals when he describes how his initial
questioning of the value of pity lead him to have to question ‘all morality’. See GM preface 6.
See also Freyenhagen 2013 for a similar argument with regards to an entire moral outlook being
considered wrong, with the example of the moral outlook of Nazi Germany.
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as an expression of the power of command and the fixing of commands beyond
our current state, which compel us to obedience. Dreyfus erroneously removes
such activity from ‘expert’ moral action by limiting this action to a form of re-
sponsiveness to ineffable solicitations. This has the undesirable consequence of
rendering self-consciousness and critical reflection epiphenomenal for the expert,
and, hence, for moral inquiry at this level.
I have argued with Dreyfus against McDowell that upbringing and the devel-
opment of one’s second nature does not simply open one’s eyes to reason. Customs
and laws are fundamentally commands that are imposed through the use of force
in order to compel action. While this force can be expressed through language,
it is not always the case. McDowell misses this since he mistakenly derives the
conceptual nature of habitual moral action from reflective action.53
The result of this is that we must adjust our understanding of the role of self-
consciousness for moral inquiry in times of potential crisis. It cannot be limited
to a form of reflection that remains within our current, dominant moral outlook
and that functions via piecemeal questioning. It must instead seek to bring into
view the value of the whole phenomenon of our dominant moral outlook so that
we can come to see that value as an object of questioning.
3.5 The Role of Self-Consciousness
The two major philosophical problems that have so far come out of this chapter
can be articulated as follows. First, since our moral outlook has lost its Christian
foundations, to see its value as a questionable phenomenon will require posing
the question of the value of the outlook as a whole. This will mean to bring
into question the value of all our moral values simultaneously, rather than in a
piecemeal fashion. This seems to imply that the inquiry will have to take place
53See Rietveld 2008, 983 for more on this specific point.
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in some sense “outside” of this outlook. Or, to be more precise, the inquirer
needs to come to see all the moral values of the outlook as external to him or
herself. This demand, however, raises several difficulties. First, as argued in
chapter one, the inquirer must remain sufficiently familiar with moral values so
that moral phenomena show up to him or her in the world. If this familiarity
with moral values is lost, then as a necessary consequence, it will not be possible
to bring into view the value of these values. Second, as seen in chapter two,
the inquirer cannot go beyond his or her moral psychological framework, since
it is only within this framework that any valuing at all occurs by means of the
sui generis dynamic of command and obedience. As a result of all of this, the
inquirer must then remain within this moral psychological framework, and, yet,
render moral values estranged, such that their familiarity remains, but their value
is rendered conspicuous. How to achieve this will be the central topic of chapter
four, although I will begin to touch upon it in this section.
Second, self-consciousness is to play a central role in moral inquiry, for the
task of bringing into view the value of our moral values. Since these values have
become sedimented their value has become inconspicuous to us. To disrupt this
sedimentation, we need to show that our moral values have not always been sedi-
mented in this manner; that they have a conditional right to existence; that their
value can become an object of possible questioning. However, we have seen how
self-consciousness has often had the opposite effect of this by contributing to the
process of sedimentation by affording a more powerful means of fixing moral val-
ues through conceptualisation. This has the further effect of hiding the struggle
for command that our moral values have gone through before they became sedi-
mented. The difficulty here then is to understand how self-consciousness can be
effectively employed to disrupt the process of sedimentation. I will deal with this
specific problem in this section.
I have argued against the possibility of piecemeal reflection being adequate
for the task of posing the question of the value of our moral values. We saw
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that this is because the piecemeal approach necessarily assumes the value of other
values in the moral outlook when it questions the coherence of particular values.
There is, however, another form of internal critique that is more radical than this
piecemeal approach since it attempts to bring into question the entire outlook
from the inside. This approach has been called a form of “ironic disruption.”54
I will consider it in detail here, before returning to it again in chapter four in
relation to the structure of estrangement that I will offer there.
Ironic disruption functions fundamentally by attempting to loosen and open
up the referent of our moral concepts. As such, it can be understood as an at-
tempt to disrupt the sedimented nature of the values that the concepts capture.
It does this by attempting to free up the concept from its referent, by rendering
its fixed nature problematic. The desired result is that we lose confidence in what
the concept signifies. As Jonathan Lear has stressed in his work on this subject,
this is not simply a process of piecemeal reflection where one’s eyes are, as John
McDowell would say, opened up to alternative reasons. Rather it instigates a
violent divorce from the familiar referent, such that the inquirer becomes disori-
ented, and is no longer quite sure how to go on. Lear describes the experience in
the following manner: “That is, an experience of standard-issue uncanniness may
give us goose bumps or churn our stomachs; the experience of ironic uncanniness,
by contrast, is more like losing the ground beneath one’s feet: one longs to go
in a certain direction, but one no longer knows where one is standing, if one is
standing, or which direction is the right direction. In this paradigm example,
ironic uncanniness is a manifestation of utter seriousness and commitment... not
its opposite.”55 Yet, ironic disruption is also not a breakdown of the sort where
moral phenomena become destroyed during the experience of the disruption, as
54Other forms of internal critique, such as critical theory, are not the right kind of critique
since they are concerned with exposing a form of “false consciousness”, as opposed to bringing




suggested by Hubert Dreyfus’ account. The very idea of loosening the fixed na-
ture of the concept is not to sever it completely from the familiar phenomena,
but rather to render that phenomena more foreign, such that it appears in its
familiarity as “strange” and as “outside of us” (GS 355). It is to be, as Lear says
above, an experience of uncanniness.56
Lear considers both Kierkegaard and Socrates as exemplar philosophers who
engage in ironic disruption. This is demonstrated, first, in their initial forwarding
of a question, and, second, in their attempts at posing that question adequately.
This question is formulated by placing the concept of the valued phenomenon in
a question that is uncannily structured. Kierkegaard’s question is: “among all
Christians, is there a Christian?” and (one of) Socrates’ question(s) is: “among
all politicians (in Athens), is there a a single politician?”57 Now, we can see
that Nietzsche’s question - “what is the value of moral values?” - also has an
uncanny structure. Like those of Kierkegaard’s and Socrates’, it takes a familiar
phenomenon - moral values - and repeats it by raising a question concerning our
understanding of that same phenomenon. It is true that Nietzsche’s question has
a slightly different structure from that of Kierkegaard’s and Socrates’, and I will
return to this later when the difference becomes of greater significance.
In its first instance in the question for Kierkegaard and Socrates, and its sec-
ond instance for Nietzsche, the concept captures our familiar grasping of the
phenomenon. That is to say, it captures what we “know” Christians, politicians
and moral values to be in an everyday, pre-philosophical manner. However, this
concept is then repeated in the question in a manner that disturbs, or at least
demands the disturbance of this familiar referent. In Kierkegaard’s and Socrates’
cases, the repetition of ‘Christian’ and ‘politician’ respectively casts a direct chal-
lenge to our familiar understanding of the phenomena that we take to be captured
56The phenomenon of “uncanniness” was first explored in detail by Freud in his 1919 essay
‘The Uncanny’.
57See Lear 2011, 12, 22.
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by these concepts. Lear considers the different possible ways of understanding this
challenge, and I will follow his lead here.
First, he rejects the idea that all the question demands is giving a fuller account
of what it is to be a politician or a Christian. By adding more or alternative
conditions as to what should count as capturing a politician or Christian would
keep the inquirer firmly within the familiar conception of the role of the politician
and Christian. The concept would not be loosened in this case, but simply fixed in
a different manner. Second, Lear considers whether the re-iteration of the concept
makes an appeal to the norms of the phenomenon that are not sufficiently met by
the current practices of that phenomenon. This would suggest that if we could
tweak our practices then we might be able to better satisfy these norms. The
problem, however, that ironic disruption engenders is not, as we shall see, that
the practices fail to live up to the norms, but that the norms themselves seem to
no longer fit into the totality to which they previously belonged. This is precisely
the issue facing our moral values and their loss of foundations. That is to say,
the worry is not that our practices fail to live up to our moral values, but that
the values themselves have lost their Christian foundations, and that no change
to our practices would then help to alter this loss.
Lear writes that ironic disruption is initiated by “a movement that exposes
a pretense in the nonpejorative sense to be pretense in the pejorative sense.”58
The movement here that Lear explains is one in which the pretense - by which
Lear means that which has become familiar59 - is no longer the measure of how
members fit into the totality of the phenomenon of interest, be it Christianity,
politics or our European moral outlook. Lear expands on this in the following
manner:
That is, a social pretense already contains a pretense-laden under-
58See Lear 2011, 23.
59Lear 2011, 16.
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standing of its aspiration, but irony facilitates a process by which
the aspiration seems to break free of these bounds. In each case a
purported totality is interrogated as to whether any of its members
actually fits the bill. So, irony interrogates a totality not for its al-
leged inclusiveness, but for whether it has anything at all to do with
the totality it purports to be.
Lear 2011, 16
The shift that Lear describes here is from how the members measure up to the
demands of the totality, to whether the members belong at all in that totality.
The issue here then is not that of the coherence between members within the
totality, as it is in McDowell’s piecemeal position, but instead with the relation of
the members to the totality itself. Let me explain this further. Before the ironic
experience, the members of the totality, say the politicians, were understood as
politicians (i.e. their measure was taken) from the familiar pretense of what it
means to be a politician. (This is the “totality.”) During ironic experience, Lear
claims, this measure of what it is to be a politician breaks away from the familiar
understanding, and comes to “transcend” it. The measure should be understood
as transcending the familiar totality in so far as we come to question this familiar
understanding: all examples of politicians show up to us as wholly inadequate.
Our demands on what a politician should be goes beyond the familiar pretense, in
so far as previous members of that pretense now all show up as deficient. Yet, as
we shall see, this transcendent measure is not itself substantive, since it transcends
all familiar content. Let us consider a detailed example, offered by Lear, to render
this process clearer, and to understand how the disruption comes about.
So, I am sitting at home in the evening grading papers, and I begin to
wonder what this has to do with actually teaching my students. For
a while, this is a normal reflection in which I step back and wonder
about the value of my activity. I still have a sense of what the ideal is; I
am just reflecting on how well the activity of grading contributes to it.
I decide to talk this over with my colleagues at a department meeting:
perhaps we can figure out a better way to evaluate students, one more
in line with our core function of teaching. This sort of reflection is
part and parcel of inhabiting a practical identity. Thus far I am at the
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level of reflection that might lead me to engage in educational reform.
But then things get out of hand. I am struck by teaching in a way that
disrupts my normal self-understanding of what it is to teach (which
includes normal reflection on teaching). This is not a continuation
of my practical reasoning; it is a disruption of it. It is more like
vertigo than a process of stepping back to reflect. When it comes to
previous, received understandings of teaching — even those that have
been reflectively questioned and adjusted in the normal ways — all
bets are off. No doubt, I can still use general phrases like “helping
my students to develop”; but such phrases have become enigmatic,
open-ended, oracular. They have become signifiers whose content I no
longer grasp in any but the most open-ended way. I no longer know
who my “students” are, let alone what it would be to “help” them
develop.
Lear 2011, 17
There is a detachment of the elements of the totality from the social pretense: ele-
ments of teaching, first objects of basic reflection, become open to a more dramatic
questioning. This occurs with the familiar social pretense appearing as pejorative:
all the members of the totality of “teaching” are questioned as to whether they
fit. Thoughts like “everything I was doing before was not in fact teaching” come
to the fore. They become associated with things which now look very much unlike
teaching: marking exams, evaluating students’ progress, managing behaviour, and
so on. We are familiar with these as members of what it is to be a teacher, but
they now appear strange to us since they no longer fit into the totality of what
teaching is. Notice, importantly, that what we take the value of teaching to be
now transcends that totality. Our demands of what teaching should be breaks
out of our familiar understanding of it. These demands, however, remain without
content in so far as they appear simultaneously with the disconnection of our
previous conceptions of teaching from the familiar understanding. They represent
the absence of what would be required to count as teaching.
I will now consider whether the resources that Lear offers in his account of
ironic disruption can be employed for the task of moral inquiry, and whether they
can help us to further understand the role of self-consciousness within it. To do so,
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I will, first, see how applicable the account is to posing the Nietzschean question
of the value of our moral values.
Nietzsche explicitly states in his account of On the Genealogy of Morals in Ecce
Homo how each of the essays argues for a “pejorative sense” of the phenomenon
in contrast to the familiar understanding of that which “people believe” (EH; On
the Genealogy of Morals). Thus, the first essay explains “the birth of Christianity
out of the spirit of ressentiment, not, as people may believe, out of the “spirit.””
The second essay argues that the conscience is not “as people may believe, “the
voice of God in humans”” but self-directed cruelty. The third essay argues that
the ascetic ideal does not derive its power “as people may believe, because God
is at work behind the priests” but because it has had no rival.
I will focus on the first essay in particular, since it specifically concerns our
moral values. In this essay Nietzsche traces our dominant moral values such as
benevolence, pity, compassion and charity back to emotions of rancour, hatred
and ressentiment. First, we can note that sentiments of rancour, hatred and deep
resentment are considered pejorative from within the evaluative perspective of our
moral values. From this perspective, they show up to us as immoral since they
run counter to precisely those values of benevolence, compassion, etc.
The aim here is to detach our moral values from their familiar social pretense
- the “totality” or outlook - where their value is taken for granted. They are
associated with phenomena which look foreign or even contrary to that which we
take to be morally good: strong, dark sentiments of rancour and hatred. The
desired effect is that our familiar moral values will come into view as strange in
so far as their value comes to show up as an object whose positive evaluative
orientation can no longer be taken for granted. If successful, our moral values
will no longer easily fit into our familiar outlook, and our notion of the good will
break out of our familiar understanding of it. None of our moral values will seem
to be able to live up to it.
For this to work, Nietzsche needs to set up a meaningful, evaluative contrast
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by associating our moral values with these sentiments. To achieve this Nietzsche
appeals to the origins of these values in a manner which involves what Ken Gemes
calls “displacements of identity and temporality.”60 Nietzsche employs the con-
cepts of the central objects and characters of the genealogical inquiry in a manner
that loosens up both their historical standing, and their referents. For example,
in the first essay, the people that partake in “the morality of pity” - in the moral
values to be brought into question - radically differ in their genre and histori-
cal positioning. Nietzsche oscillates between talking of these people as Jewish,
Christian, priests, slaves, common people of ancient Greece, and of describing
them as participants and supporters of the Reformation and French Revolution,
as “domesticated animals”, and as contemporary European people. Through the
juxtaposing of these different referents under the same concept, Nietzsche seeks to
render the “ignoble origins” of moral values evaluatively relevant for the present.61
The result of this, if successful, is a complete, if only momentary, disorientation
in relation to our entire Christian moral outlook. We come to experience our
familiarity with moral values in their familiarity as something that cannot simply
be thrown off or jettisoned at will, and, yet, our commitment to those values is
compromised by other familiar phenomena that are captured under the concept.
At this point, we simply come to a halt and cannot go on as usual. Our habituation
breaks down, and we are no longer compelled to act.62 The values which were the
lens through which we perceived and acted in the world, now appear somehow as
“outside of us,” as strange in their familiarity.
This standstill that ironic disruption engenders, as Lear notes, is not simply
because more thought or reflection is required to get us back on track, for example,
60Gemes 2006, 204.
61Moreover, throughout the first essay, Nietzsche switches between recounting a history of the
origins of moral values, and of talking in the present about such things as the “manufacturing of
idols” and the state of play in Europe today. See GM I 9, GM I 12, GM I 14. See also Janaway
2007, which describes this movement.
62Lear makes this point of us coming to a halt. His account of this occurrence to Socrates is
particularly informative. See Lear 2011, 84, 85. Lear, however, does not describe it in terms of
a breakdown in habituation.
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by overcoming a loss of coherence among our moral values. Rather the values
themselves now show up to us as strange in their familiarity. Disorientation sets
in due to a loss of faith in the givenness and fixed nature of the moral concepts.
We begin to feel an ignorance towards our knowledge of what is morally valuable.
There is now a dearth of reference of the concept “the good.” Everything that
it has meant so far in its familiarity pretense now comes to the fore, and shows
up as inadequate. This inadequacy occurs simultaneously with the presence of
a conception of the good that now transcends the familiar pretense. We fail to
know what this good is - its contents - since it transcends all familiarity, but our
commitment to it is shown by the fact that the familiar moral values all fail to
live up to it. Not only do we then fail to know what to do next, but we also get
a larger view of the phenomena of familiar referents that fail to compel us. The
outlook in its entirety shows up as problematic as the ground, so to speak, shifts
below our feet.63
This disorientation is often only momentary, since we are put back on track
rather effortlessly by the imposition of our day-to-day practices and customs, and
the presence of others around us participating in such activities.64 Now, when we
return to our daily activities and practices, we are still habituated and obedient
to them, and, yet, we now have a different relation to them. Their evaluative
orientation is no longer taken as given, as fixed and unalterable. We thus engage in
them knowing that they could have been otherwise. The internal critique thus has
the possibility of altering our everyday relation to familiar phenomena, especially
when the critique is sustained. In fact, Lear argues that Socrates and Kierkegaard
developed a capacity or disposition for irony that allowed them to engage in a form
63Here is Lear on Socrates engaging in this kind of “balancing act”: “But, for the moment,
notice that Socrates’ ironic questioning seems to maintain a weird balancing act: simultaneously
(i) calling into question a practical identity (as socially understood), (ii) living that identity;
(iii) declaring ignorance of what it consists in.” Lear 2011, 24.
64Lear’s interpretation of Alcibiades’ account of Socrates on the battlefield at Potidaea cap-
tures this effectively. Socrates stands still all night having come to a halt, only moving on again
when time for his morning prayer. See Symposium 220c–d for the story of Alcibiades, and Lear
2011, 34 for Lear’s interpretation.
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of life that was essentially a sustained ironic existence.65
One might argue, as Lear in fact does, that ironic existence has its own moral
import as, say, a form of human excellence,66 and thus that it is a fundamental
part of moral life. This may also seem to be the case with Nietzsche’s approach
especially if we rephrase his uncannily structured question in line with that of
Lear’s articulation of Kierkegaard’s and Socrates’ demands: “among our moral
values, are any of them valuable?”
Nietzsche’s question - what is the value of moral values? - clearly differs,
however, from Kierkegaard’s and Socrates’ questions as set out by Lear. The
referent of the value of our moral values need not be limited to our familiarity with
moral values, or with our commitment to value that transcends such familiarity,
and which manifests itself during ironic disruption. That is to say, Nietzsche leaves
scope for a critique that lies in some sense external to our moral values, but which
takes up an alternative measure of value. In fact, although ironic disruption, as
articulated by Lear, is clearly present in Nietzsche’s first essay, it is supplemented
there with a form of external critique, which I shall consider in detail in the next
chapter.
This supplement is important since there is a certain limitation with internal
ironic disruption, which I will consider here to motivate the move to the external
critique in the next chapter. The main issue with limiting moral inquiry to the
form of radical, internal critique described by Lear is the worry that this disruption
ultimately becomes assimilated into the moral outlook. The problem is that rather
than disrupting the outlook in a manner that demands a confrontation with the
implication of the loss of the foundations of that outlook, the breaking free of the
measure of the totality that ironic disruption engenders risks becoming once again
a feature of that totality. The totality itself becomes permeated with a kind of
65See Lear 2011, 30.
66See Lear 2011, 32.
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“reversion to crisis,” as Turner puts it.67
This risk arises in particular with the Nietzschean question of the value of
our moral values. This is because when ironic disruption engenders the posing
of this question, all our moral values are seen to no longer fit in to the moral
outlook. This occurs simultaneously with the experience of a commitment to the
good that transcends this outlook, and which these moral values fail to live up to.
The conception of the good that transcends the outlook in this case belongs to the
experience of ironic disruption. If, however, ironic disruption itself is cultivated as
something which has moral import, then the worry is that the transcendent con-
ception of the good that belonged to the experience of ironic disruption becomes
incorporated into the familiar pretense, along with the experience itself. What
we end up with here is a kind of coping strategy that deals with the loss of the
foundations of our moral values by incorporating the experience of this loss into
the moral outlook as the moral thing to do under such circumstances.
The danger here is that the critical purchase, which ironic disruption affords
us, is undermined by this process. The loss of foundations is then accommodated
for, rather than radically confronted.68 One way of avoiding this assimilation is by
taking up an external critique that poses the question of whether our moral values
are harmful to us from an alternative outlook. Nietzsche raises this question in
the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals :
One has taken the value of these “values” as given, as factual, as
beyond all question; one has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in
the slightest degree in supposing “the good human” to be of greater
value than “the evil human,” of greater value in the sense of furthering
the advancement and prosperity of humans in general (the future of
humans included). But what if the reverse were true? What if a
67V. W. Turner and Schechner 1988, 34.
68The demand for a more radical confrontation is made by Nietzsche in an unpublished note:
“We new philosophers, however, not only do we start by describing the actual order of rank
and differences in the value of people, we also desire precisely the opposite of an assimilation,
an accommodation: we teach estrangement [die Entfremdung] in every sense, we open up gulfs
such as have never existed before, we desire that humans should become more evil than they
have ever been before” (WP 988; my translation).
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symptom of regression were inherent in the “good,” likewise a danger, a
seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through which the present was possibly
living at the expense of the future?
GM, preface 6 ; translation modified
To pose this question would invoke a momentary inversion of our values, achieving
a disruption to their sedimented value. For this to be achieved, we shall see that
a kind of aspect-shift will be required, to bring into view our moral values from
an opposing moral outlook. To render this outlook morally meaningful to us, self-
consciousness will be actively required. Seeing how this occurs will be the topic
of chapter four.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have investigated the role that cognition is to play for the task
of bringing into view the value of our moral values. To do so, I have analysed
how it arises within our moral psychological framework, how it functions in moral
action, and how it can aid moral inquiry.
I have argued that a minimal form of cognition is at work to achieve a stable
dynamic of command and obedience. This form of cognition has an important role
to play to achieve the necessary stability of the soul, which is enforced through
habituation, and enables the possibility of willing.
This form of cognition, however, is not sufficient for the task of moral inquiry
since it is not reflexive. It is unable to take the necessary meta-intentional position
to bring into view the value of our moral values, since it is not self-conscious. As a
result, I considered whether self-consciousness has a part to play in our familiarity
with moral values. To show that it does, I argued against epiphenomenal positions
such as that of Hubert Dreyfus’ that deny the presence of self-consciousness in
this (expert) familiarity. I then argued for the positive role that self-consciousness
plays in our familiarity; I found that it contributes to the process of sedimentation,
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by being an active expression of the power of command, as well as a conceptualised
duty that is to be obeyed.
To understand whether self-consciousness could also function positively for
moral inquiry by disrupting the process of sedimentation, I considered possible
ways of understanding the type of critical reflection it can undertake. For this I
looked at John McDowell’s piecemeal reflection, before turning to the more radical
internal critique of ironic disruption offered by Jonathan Lear. I argued against
McDowell’s account of piecemeal reflection, since it was unable to bring into view
our Christian moral outlook in its entirety. We saw how Lear’s account was better
placed to achieve this.
In ironic disruption, self-consciousness plays a very different role than in that
of piecemeal reflection, or what we typically take to be our more everyday form of
“standing back.” Lear describes it as a kind of questioning that induces “vertigo”
in so far as it results in the ground shifting beneath our feet, as we bring into
question the taken-for-granted foundations of our dominant moral outlook. To
achieve this, active engagement in the association of our moral values with other
phenomena is undertaken in order to loosen the referents of our moral concepts.
I argued, however, against ironic disruption doing all the work, since it risks
assimilating the disruption that it occasions, rather than enforcing a rupture with
the outlook. As a result, a turn to an external critique as a manes of a more
radical disruption will be made in the next chapter.
150
Chapter 4
The Task of Estrangement
4.1 Introduction
At the end of chapter three, I concluded that a more radical form of external
critique of our moral values was required to supplement ironic disruption, so as
to engender a more radical break with our familiar Christian moral outlook, and
avoid assimilating the disruption (and the transcendent good that it engenders)
into the outlook itself. I also tentatively suggested that this would involve an
appeal to an alternative outlook. This demand for a critique that lies external
to our familiar outlook raises several issues. First, there is the issue concerning
exactly what the moral inquirer should be external to. Indeed, as articulated in
chapter one, I suggested that we should see the task of estrangement as one in
which we attempt to see our moral values as “outside of us”, as opposed to us
stepping outside of the Christian moral outlook. This makes more sense given
that in chapter two I argued that our moral values provide a foundation and lens
through which we see the world, and moral phenomena within it. Rather than
stepping away from this foundation, it is more apt to understand the task as one
in which we need to see these moral values as not only foundational for us, but
also external to us, in such a manner that we can take them up as an object
of possible questioning. The major problem that arises here is how this can be
possible without losing our familiarity with our Christian moral values. As argued
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in chapter one, if we become alienated from these moral values then we will no
longer see the world through them. As a result, morally valuable things will no
longer show up to us in the world. Due to this, we could no longer pose the
question of the value of these values. Such a question would become redundant.
We must then remain familiar with our Christian moral values, whilst also coming
to see them as external to us in a manner that puts their value into question. This
problem is heightened by the difficulty of seeing what position the inquirer could
take up in order to see moral values as “outside of him- or herself.” Indeed, it is
not clear if it even makes sense to talk of an “outside” at all here.
Second, as I argued in chapter two, our familiarity with moral values per se is
afforded by our moral psychological framework, and the sui generis dynamic of
command and obedience that it involves. The inquirer cannot take up an external
position to this framework, since it is only within such a framework that valuing
occurs at all.
Third, we saw, contra piecemeal approaches in chapter three, that the entire
Christian moral outlook must be brought into view, and not only particular mem-
bers of it. A piecemeal approach is insufficient since the question of the value of
the outlook as a whole needs to be posed.
The paradoxical task that presents itself then is to explain how a position
of estrangement can be taken up, such that familiarity with the Christian moral
outlook is maintained, and, yet, it is brought into view from a distance in its
entirety as external to us, such that we see its value as a questionable phenomenon.
This has to be achieved without taking up a position that is external to our moral
psychological framework, and, hence, must be grounded in this framework, but
not trapped within a familiarity with the dominant moral outlook that begs the
question of its value. Additionally, the disruption caused by estrangement should
not be assimilated back into the Christian outlook.
In this chapter, I will argue that we can find a solution to this paradox if
we understand estrangement as essentially following the structure of a ‘rite of
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passage’ as first articulated by Arnold van Gennep, and later developed by Victor
Turner. This is a tripartite structure that was first introducted in ethnographic
studies, but which has since gained prominence in the field of sociological theory,
with particular interest in the middle, “liminal” phase of the structure.1 Although
Nietzsche himself could not have been familiar with the taxonomy first introduced
by van Gennep, I will argue that we can shed light on the task of estrangement
by interpreting it as following the same structure.2 This will offer a more nuanced
understanding of the relation between the moral inquirer and the Christian moral
outlook, and will show how an external appeal to an alternative moral outlook is
to function. It will also help us to understand the role of Nietzsche’s genealogical
method for the task of estrangement, since I will argue that there is a robust sense
in which Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals seeks to evoke a transition in its
readers, to compel them into a position of estrangement, and, hence, to pose the
question of the value of our moral values.
I will begin by explaining the structure of estrangement in terms of the tripar-
tite structure of a rite of passage. We shall see that it follows the three phases of
separation, margin and aggregation. I will then focus on the marginal phase in
particular, to understand how the critique of our Christian moral values is to func-
tion through an appeal to an alternative moral outlook. This phase is a period of
reflection, and of destabilisation through such reflection, where I shall argue that
a temporary inversion of values is experienced such that the question of whether
our moral values could be harmful to us is posed. Nietzsche’s account of the slave
revolt will help us to bring into view an opposition between our Christian moral
outlook and an alternative, noble outlook. It will also show how an inversion of
values is possible through the kind of experience that Wittgenstein has described
as an “aspect-shift.” This is a radical shift in our perception of the referents that
1See Thomassen 2009 for an overview of the concept ‘liminality’ and its history in different
disciplines.
2Interestingly enough, as a side note, the only philosopher cited by Van Gennep in Rites of
Passage is Nietzsche. See Van Gennep 1960, 194.
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our moral concepts capture. I will then argue that this type of aspect-shift can
be achieved in the liminal, marginal phase by bringing marginal experiences of an
alternative, opposing outlook (to that of our dominant moral outlook) into the
centre. This phase will then prime the period of aggregation and the return of
the moral inquirer to the dominant moral outlook. I will conclude by considering
outstanding issues that remain with the phase of aggregation, such as those posed
by the spectre of Nietzsche’s madman, and the ‘down-going’ of Zarathustra.
4.2 The Methodology
In this section, I will justify the methodology that I will employ in this chapter
to understand the process of estrangement, and to deal with the paradox of fa-
miliarity and estrangement and the multiple problems raised in the introduction
of this chapter.
There is a model developed by Arnold van Gennep in his Rites of Passage,
which I will use to understand the structure of the process of estrangement. Van
Gennep describes the rites that are involved in “human passages” in semi-civilised
communities:
The life of an individual in any society is a series of passages from one
age to another and from one occupation to another. Whenever there
are fine distinctions among age or occupational groups, progression
from one group to the next is accompanied by special acts, like those
which make up apprenticeship in our trades. Among semicivilized peo-
ples such acts are enveloped in ceremonies, since to the semicivilized
mind no act is entirely free of the sacred.
Van Gennep 1960, 3
Van Gennep considers the major passages seen in many different societies such as
birth, social puberty, marriage, occupational specialisation and death. By way of
example, consider that of pregnancy:
Often the first rites performed separate the pregnant woman from so-
ciety, from her family group, and sometimes even from her sex. They
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are followed by rites pertaining to the pregnancy itself, which is a tran-
sitional period. Finally come the rites of childbirth intended to reinte-
grate the woman into the groups to which she previously belonged, or
to establish her new position in society as a mother, especially if she
has given birth to her first child or to a son.3
Van Gennep 1960, 41
Contained in this description is the tripartite taxonomy that van Gennep sees
working, to differing degrees, in all rites of passage. Rites of passage form “a spe-
cial category, which under further analysis may be divided into rites of separation,
transition rites, and rites of incorporation.”4 The category is “special” since these
rites involve and evoke phases of transition which function in both a spatial and
temporal sense.
Van Gennep often talks of the transition as a physical movement from one
world to another, such as, for example, crossing a threshold between buildings or
territories. The transition, however, also involves a passage in time, such that the
rites of separation mark the departure from one world and prepare the way for
the crossing of the threshold. The rites of incorporation, then, mark the temporal
end to the transition, and the beginning of reintegration to the new world.5 Due
to the temporal shift that the rites mark, Van Gennep also calls the three phases
pre-liminal rites, liminal rites, and post-liminal rites.6
This transition from the old world to the new world can manifest in many
different forms, such as in the movement between the profane and the sacred,
between the foreign and the domestic, and between childhood and adulthood.7
During the transition, participants experience a kind of symbolic and concep-
tual change, which gives significance to the rites for the subjects and the wider
3Van Gennep stresses that pregnancy involves other rites, and that often the many rites
involved can have more than one function. See Van Gennep 1960, 41.
4Van Gennep 1960, 10-11.





Now, I will turn briefly to Turner’s appropriation of van Gennep’s taxonomy
since he not only applies van Gennep’s classification of rites beyond that of ethno-
graphic studies, but also develops the theoretical underpinnings of the conceptual
shift that occurs between the two worlds. He articulates Van Gennep’s tripartite
structure as follows:
Van Gennep has shown that all rites of transition are marked by three
phases: separation, margin (or limen), and aggregation. The first
phase of separation comprises symbolic behaviour signifying the de-
tachment of the individual or group either from an earlier fixed point
in the social structure or a set of cultural conditions (a “state”); dur-
ing the intervening liminal period, the state of the ritual subject (the
“passenger”) is ambiguous; he passes through a realm that has few
or none of the attributes of the past or coming state; in the third
phase the passage is consummated. The ritual subject, individual or
corporate, is in a stable state once more...
V. W. Turner 1964, 47
Turner differentiates between the three types of rites by arguing that rites of
separation and aggregation are “more closely implicated in social structure than
rites of liminality,” whereas rites of liminality offer an “interstructural situation,”
since this situation is fundamentally a position between fixed states.9 By the term
“state”, here, Turner refers to the broad phenomenon of “a relatively fixed or
stable condition,” which is to include social states such as professions and ranks;
culturally recognised positions such as the “state of infancy” and marriage; eco-
logical states; and, finally, physical, mental and emotional states of individuals
and groups.10 Understood in such a manner, rites of separation involve a move-
ment away from the structure of the old world, and rites of aggregation mark a
8A key methodological aspect of van Gennep’s book is to avoid isolating rites and explaining
them in terms of a utility function. Instead, van Gennep analyses them in “the context which
gives them meaning and reveals their position in a dynamic whole.” Van Gennep 1960, 89.
9V. W. Turner 1964, 46-47.
10ibid.
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movement towards the structure of the new world. The phase of liminality, on
the contrary, “may perhaps be regarded as the Nay to all positive structural as-
sertions, but as in some sense the source of them all, and, more than that, as a
realm of pure possibility whence novel configurations of ideas and relations may
arise.”11
Turner, thus, suggests that the liminal phase is not simply an unstructured
situation of chaos12, but is, on the contrary, a phase in which the subject undergoes
a de-structuring of the old world, and a priming for the restructuring in the new
world, the latter of which occurs during the period of aggregation. Turner offers
a general description of how this occurs in the liminal phase:
In discussing the structural aspect of liminality, I mentioned how neo-
phytes are withdrawn from their structural positions and consequently
from the values, norms, sentiments, and techniques associated with
those positions. They are also divested of their previous habits of
thought, feeling, and action. During the liminal period, neophytes
are alternatively forced and encouraged to think about their society,
their cosmos, and the powers that generate and sustain them. Lim-
inality may be partly described as a stage of reflection. In it those
ideas, sentiments, and facts that had been hitherto for the neophytes
bound up in configurations and accepted unthinkingly are, as it were,
resolved into their constituents. These constituents are isolated and
made into objects of reflection for the neophytes by such processes as
componential exaggeration and dissociation by varying concomitants.
V. W. Turner 1964, 53
Turner describes the possibility of rendering the foundational values and norms
of the “old world” - which were “accepted unthinkingly” - as objects of reflection.
The type of process Turner depicts is one in which familiar values, which were
previously taken for granted by the neophytes in so far as they structured the
state prior to the passage, are brought into view in the liminal phase such that
11ibid, 48.
12Turner sometimes implies this when he describes the liminal phase as ““betwixt and be-
tween” all the recognized fixed points in space-time of structural classification” V. W. Turner
1964, 49.
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their foundational role is no longer taken for granted. Although I will discuss the
workings of this process of “dissociation” in greater detail later in this chapter, I
wish to stress here that the type of experience that the neophyte undergoes in the
liminal period appears to be a kind of temporary estrangement from the familiar
values of the society. That is to say, the neophyte maintains familiarity with
these values, but they momentarily cease playing an inconspicuous, foundational
role. Through the process of destructuring, Turner suggests, familiar values come
into view in their familiar role for the neophyte on the plane of reflection. The
neophytes see that these values were foundational in the old world, but now see
that they could be different. “Liminality here,” Turner, thus, states, “breaks, as
it were, the cake of custom and enfranchises speculation.”13
In this manner, the passage experienced by the neophytes looks, on the surface,
like the kind of experience required for moral inquiry. As we have seen, the moral
inquirer is to bring into view the Christian moral outlook in its familiarity such
that its value becomes a point of wonder and questioning.
Before extrapolating further on this, it will be important to consider first both
the structural parallels between rites of passage and the task of estrangement, as
well as the ways in which the two are disanalogous. First, I claim that there is a
structural isomorphism between Van Gennep’s (and Turner’s) account of rites of
passage and Nietzsche’s understanding of the process of estrangement.
To see this, consider the section entitled ‘Man alone with himself’ in Human all
too Human, where Nietzsche offers us an account of the process of estrangement:
Estranged [entfremdet] from the present. There are great advantages
in for once removing ourselves distinctly from our time and letting
ourselves be driven from its shore back into the ocean of former world
views. Looking at the coast from that perspective, we survey for the
first time its entire shape, and when we approach it again, we have
the advantage of understanding [zu verstehen] it better on the whole
than do those who have never left it.
13V. W. Turner 1964, 53.
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HA 616 ; my translation
Nietzsche suggests here that estrangement from the present involves three steps:
(1) removing ourselves from our time to a time of “former world views”, (2)
looking back at our time from this different view, and then (3) returning to our
time. The benefit of such a process, he claims, is twofold. First, we are able to
see the “entire shape” of our time when we look back at it from a distance, and,
second, once we have returned, we are able to understand our time better than
those who have not made the journey with us.
Now, the structural isomorphism between this process Nietzsche describes and
rites of passage described by van Gennep is, on the face of it, quite evident.
Nietzsche talks of (1) a removal or separation, (2) an in-between phase of looking
back on “our time” and, (3) a return to contemporary society that nevertheless
involves a change: a “better understanding” of our time as a whole. In line with
this structural isomorphism, we can also see that the process of estrangement is
to involve the same movement between states: (1) starting out at a stable state:
the dominant moral outlook as stable at both the social level, and at the level of
the soul of the moral inquirer (as seen in chapter two); (2) a phase of instability
and reflection (as seen in chapter three); (3) a return once again to a form of
stability. Understood in this manner, I claim, we shall be able to comprehend
how familiarity with our moral values can be maintained throughout the task of
estrangement, whilst, nevertheless, affording the possibility of bringing their value
into view as questionable during the liminal period, and, thus, affording a different
relation to the moral outlook on return.
Moreover, a second point of convergence between rites of passage and the
process of estrangement is that this movement functions as a “differentiating pro-
cedure,” which occurs simultaneously at the level of the social and at that of
the individual.14 The rite of passage structure effectively captures this parallel
14See Thomassen 2009.
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between soul and society that I described in chapter two. There, I described it
as a dynamic of command and obedience occurring at both levels in an ascetic
structure. During rites of passage, the participant is differentiated from the old
world that is left behind during the passage. As Turner notes, for example, the
participant often becomes “invisible” to the community both physically and con-
ceptually and typically takes on a different name.15 This division is also played out
at the level of the individual’s soul, since the norms and values belonging to the
“old world” are differentiated in such a manner that they lose their foundational
role for the individual and are taken up by him on the plane of reflection. This
differentiation at the level of the individual is also important if there is to be an
altered relation to the “new world” on return. We shall see how this occurs in the
process of estrangement in a fundamentally ascetic manner later in the chapter.
Now, let us turn to the disanalogies between rites of passage and the task of es-
trangement. My concern is with an individual - a moral inquirer - and his relation
to the dominant Christian moral outlook that is currently prevalent in Europe.
The nature of this relation already implies the existence of several disanalogies
with a rite of passage.
First, the scale is different. Van Gennep employs his taxonomy above all for
tribal communities. While it is true that Turner has since argued that the concept
of liminality in particular can be applied beyond this context to larger groups and
societies,16 this raises further issues for the success of such an application.
There are, for the most part, no traditional rites that occur between a moral
inquirer as moral inquirer and the dominant moral outlook. One reason for this
15V. W. Turner 1964, 48.
16Turner looks mainly at art and leisure in modern society as “liminoid periods” but does
not venture to consider the relevance of rites of passage to the social and political sciences.
This has changed more recently, however, in these fields. Indeed, Bjorn Thomassen goes so far
as to claim that liminality is “now considered by some to be a a master concept in the social
and political sciences writ large.” Thomassen 2009, 5. Thomassen describes the contemporary
use of the concept as follows: “In recent years, the most far-reaching suggestion about liminal
situations concerns the wider claim that whole societies can experience them during crises or
the “collapse of order.” Horva´th, Thomassen, and Wydra 2015, 50, 51.
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could be the impoverished role of moral philosophers in contemporary society. A
stronger reason, however, is simply that in contemporary Europe we find a distinct
lack and reduction in rites and ceremonies to mark passages per se due to a loss
of thick boundaries between the sacred and the secular. (Indeed, the sacred seems
to have now all but disappeared.)
As a result, when understanding the process of estrangement, it should be seen
that no actual rites of passage occur in an analogous way to those in tribal com-
munities. For example, the first phase of separation - which Nietzsche describes
above as “removing ourselves from our time” - requires no rite, ceremony or ritual
to demarcate the separation. Similarly, for the moral inquirer in the other two
phases - that of the liminal phase and the phase of aggregation - no rites are
present. The lack of socially recognised rites and ceremonies for this process is
perhaps rather inevitable given that the moral inquirer is attempting to deal with
a problem that has the distinctive feature of not being recognised as a problem by
society as a whole: i.e., that the value of our moral values could be a questionable
phenomenon.
The absence of rites, however, gives rise to several further issues concerning the
possibility of achieving the task of estrangement, which I will consider throughout
this chapter. First, if there are no rites of separation then the question arises as
to how the moral inquirer would know that they are in a position that is fully
“separated” from the Christian moral outlook, so that it can be brought into view
as a whole in the liminal phase.
Second, with no liminal rites, it is not clear how the moral inquirer can will
himself into taking up a position of estrangement. In the case of rites of passage,
there is the supra-structure of the community within which the liminal phase is
already culturally embedded, and there is also a recognised master of ceremonies
who guides the participants through the liminal phase. For the task of estrange-
ment, however, this is not the case. The initiation of the process of estrangement
does not occur by the community, but rather by the individual. I will argue that
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we should understand Nietzsche’s work as playing an important motivating and
guiding role in the liminal phase to aid the moral inquirer in taking up a position
of estrangement. However, unlike well-established rites of passage, the process of
estrangement from our moral values is an untrodden path that precisely lacks the
control and mastery that is indicative of the process of rites of passage in tribal
communities.
Finally, with no rites of aggregation, how can the moral philosopher understand
himself in relation to the “new world” on return? Moreover, how will society
perceive him without such rites? There are two risk here that run in opposite
directions. The first is that, on return, the inquirer rejoins society in more or
less the same capacity that he or she left it, without any altered relation to the
Christian moral outlook. Turner describes this eventuality: “But this liberty
[of the liminal period] has fairly narrow limits. The neophytes return to secular
society with more alert faculties perhaps and enhanced knowledge of how things
work, but they have to become once more subject to custom and law.”17 The
second is that, on return, the moral inquirer remains an outcast, or worse, is
perceived as a madman, as, for example, recounted by Nietzsche in the famous
parable in The Gay Science.
I will argue that, on return, instead of assimilating the liminal experience
into the Christian moral outlook, (as seen in the case of Lear’s account of ironic
disruption), a more radical break with the outlook is required. However, to evoke
a radical break that can have the effect of altering society, facilitating others to
go through a period of estrangement, to come to see the value of our Christian
moral values as questionable, will be necessary.
17V. W. Turner 1964, 53.
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4.3 On the Genealogy of Morals and the Limi-
nal Phase
Let us first consider the pre-liminal phase of separation in view of the task of
estrangement. Separation from the Christian moral outlook could mean two in-
terrelated and, yet, distinct kinds of separation. First, it could mean separation
from the society in which that outlook functions. Due to the potentially global
reach of Christian morality, this separation cannot be achieved by simply moving
from the Christian society in which one lives. Instead, we should understand such
separation as involving a kind of withdrawal from social interaction, through, for
example, a period of solitude. In this manner, the dynamic of command and
obedience between the inquirer and society is interrupted: the value of Chris-
tian moral values is no longer continually expressed and re-enforced through daily
encounters with others. This can facilitate the move to the liminal phase by re-
moving obstacles that would hinder the passage, since, at least at the social level,
the values that are to be brought into question would no longer be continually
endorsed as valuable through social interaction.
Alternatively, we can think of the separation at the level of the soul as a
means of rendering moral values “external to us.” As argued in chapter two,
moral values play a foundational role in our everyday lives, since familiar moral
phenomena show up to us in the world through these values. This is achieved
when the structure of our soul forms a stable dynamic of command and obedience
through habituation. To become separated from the role that moral values play
here becomes a much more complex issue. Indeed, while one can temporarily
withdraw from social interaction at will, the same is not so obviously true for the
psychical relations of the soul.
On the one hand, this inability to easily separate at the level of the soul is
important during the process of estrangement since it means that familiarity with
moral values is not simply lost through temporary social withdrawal. On the
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other hand, it should be noted that what it would mean to become separated
from those values at the level of the soul is a more delicate issue. The type of
separation required here must afford the possibility of bringing moral values into
view in their familiarity, without becoming alienated from that familiarity. This
task belongs to the liminal phase, since it requires a de-structuring of the soul of
the inquirer through a differentiating process. Let us turn to it now.
I suggested above that Turner describes the liminal phase in rites of passage as
one in which the participant undergoes a de-structuring from the “old world”, and
a priming for a restructuring into the “new world”. As seen in a passage quoted in
the previous section, Turner describes the method by which the taken-for-granted
values of the neophytes are rendered objects of questioning by first reducing them
to recognised “components.” After this, he claims that these components are
recombined in fantastic and monstrous patterns and shapes. The desired result
is the disassociation of the original values from both the recognised components
as well as the monstrous patterns. Turner offers the following cases as examples
of what he has in mind:
I have myself seen Ndembu and Luvale masks that combine features
of both sexes, have both animal and human attributes, and unite in a
single representation human characteristics with those of the natural
landscape. One ikishi mask is partly human and partly represents a
grassy plain. Elements are withdrawn from their usual settings and
combined with one another in a totally unique configuration, the mon-
ster or dragon. Monsters startle neophytes into thinking about objects,
persons, relationships, and features of their environment they have
hitherto taken for granted.
V. W. Turner 1964, 53
Turner draws upon William James’ ‘law of dissociation’ to help understand this
process. James puts it in his own words as follows: “What is associated now with
one thing and now with another, tends to become dissociated from either, and
to grow into an object of abstract contemplation by the mind. One might call
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this the law of dissociation by varying concomitants.”18 While the functioning of
this law is relatively clear in the case of the perception of different objects, it is
a much more complex issue when we consider moral values.19 This is because, in
the case of our moral values in particular, these values function as a foundation
or lens through which we perceive the world. As a result, to render foundational
values objects of questioning, such that they show up in their foundational role,
a more radical means of dissociation is required. Turner claims that the use of
monster- and fantasy-making is employed to this very end:
The second process, monster- or fantasy-making, focuses attention on
the components of the mask and effigies, which are so radically ill-
assorted that they stand out and can be thought about. The mon-
strosity of the configuration throws its elements into relief. Put a
man’s head on a lion’s body and you think about the human head in
the abstract. Perhaps it becomes for you, as a member of a given cul-
ture and with the appropriate guidance, an emblem of chieftainship;
or it may be explained as representing the soul against the body; or
intellect as contrasted with brute force, or innumerable other things.
There could be less encouragement to reflect on heads and headship
if that same head were firmly ensconced on its familiar, its all too
familiar, human body.
V. W. Turner 1964, 53
Turner essentially describes here an uncanny movement: familiar things are thrown
into relief through their association with the strange; and without such an asso-
ciation, they remain hidden in their familiarity. In the above example given by
Turner, the man’s head still shows up in its familiarity as a man’s head, but it
now shows up as a head in a strange manner, since it is set in relief by juxta-
posing it on the body of the lion. The familiar nature of the man’s head is now
18Quoted from V. W. Turner 1964, 52.
19James gives an example of the law at work in James 1984, 118, quoted from Dr. Martineau:
“When a red ivory ball, seen for the first time, has been withdrawn, it will leave a mental
representation of itself, in which all that it simultaneously gave us will indistinguishably co-
exist. Let a white ball succeed to it; now, and not before, will an attribute detach itself, and the
colour, by force of contrast, be shaken out into the foreground. Let the white ball be replaced
by an egg, and this new difference will bring the form into notice from its previous slumber and
thus that which began by being simply an object cut out from the surrounding scene becomes
for us first a red object, then a red round object, and so on.”
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foregrounded, as a head that is human, but as such it shows up as strange in its
monstrosity, as it sits on the body of the lion. This also affords the possibility of
taking up the human head in novel ways, as a symbol of intellect, of headship,
etc. This process causes a de-structuring by forcing the familiar human head out
of its familiar taken-for-granted role. The neophyte can no longer simply take the
human head as it was previously given to him in its familiarity. It now becomes
an object of wonder and questioning, to be approached in different ways.
This employment of monster-making in the liminal period can, I claim, target
our moral values by engendering the same movement in order to achieve estrange-
ment: to make our familiar moral values show up to us as strange in their famil-
iarity, by disassociating the value of our moral values from those moral values.
In fact, we can see this strategy already at work in Nietzsche’s moral philosophy,
and most explicitly in On the Genealogy of Morals. There, we can see Nietzsche
making at least three kinds of association to achieve the required disassociation
by varying concomitants.
First, as described in chapter three, Nietzsche makes an association between
our moral values and rather grotesque emotional states such as rancour, hatred
and ressentiment. These emotional states, found at the “ignoble origins” of our
moral values, are considered ignoble from within the perspective of our Christian
moral outlook. This is why such an association functions internally to the outlook
and, when successful, results in the kind of ironic disruption we saw Lear describe
in the previous chapter. The value of our moral values becomes disassociated from
those values since it breaks out of the totality of the moral outlook.20
Second, Nietzsche associates our Christian moral values and these immoral
sentiments with the development of our cognitive capacities. At the origins of our
moral values, he describes a “deepened spirituality and vengefulness” (GM I 7), a
“cunning”, “cleverness”, and “calculation” (GM I 10), and a widening of the soul
20See chapter 3, section ‘The Role of Self-Consciousness’.
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which makes humans “more interesting”, more profound, and, ultimately, more
capable of “evil” (GM I 6).21 Again, this association seems to be functioning
within the Christian moral outlook in so far as it juxtaposes valued cognitive
attributes in this outlook with immoral sentiments that cause harm, resulting in
a capacity for monstrous forms of evil. In this manner it aids the disassociation
seen in the previous association.
Third, Nietzsche also associates our Christian moral values with ignoble vices
such as impotence, oppression, and passivity (GM I 10); meekness, physical weak-
ness, lack of material wealth and power, and lack of self-reverence (GM I 13). How-
ever, this particular association cannot simply function internally to the Christian
moral outlook, since from within this outlook these attributes do not necessarily
show up as immoral; on the contrary, they are often thought to coincide with
positive Christian values such as humility, obedience, patience, and so on. As a
result, for this association to engender a dis-association of the value of our moral
values from those values, these attributes must show up to us as immoral from an
alternative, moral outlook. This outlook is, I suggest, the noble moral outlook I
considered in chapter two.22 The possibility of taking up the perspective of the
noble outlook in the liminal phase to make such an association will be considered
in the next section.
We can note that the two previous associations need not function only inter-
nally to the Christian moral outlook. They can also be made from the perspective
of the noble outlook once this opposing outlook is in play. For example, from the
noble perspective, the emotional states of rancour and resentment show up neg-
atively in that they stifle activity, spontaneity and vitality; and the increased
cognitive capacities that are tied to these negative sentiments show up as a kind
of profound danger.23
21The process of the deification of the ascetic structure and its ability to fix more distant,
spiritual goals belongs here. See chapter two, section ‘Moral Outlooks’.
22See chapter 2, section ‘Moral Outlooks’.
23For both of these evaluations formed from this association, see GM I 7.
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Nietzsche’s appeal to the monstrous to achieve these three forms of association
and dissociation climaxes in aphorism 14 of the first essay of The Genealogy. Here,
the reader is caught, so to speak, between both the Christian and the noble outlook:
- “...It seems to me one is lying; a saccharine sweetness clings to every
sound. Weakness is being lied into something meritorious, no doubt
of it - so it is just as you said” -
- Go on!
- “and impotence which does not requite into ‘goodness of heart’; anx-
ious lowliness into ‘humility’; subjection to those one hates into ‘obe-
dience’ (that is, to one of whom they say he commands this subjection
- they call him God). The inoffensiveness of the weak man, even the
cowardice of which he has so much, his lingering at the door, his being
ineluctably compelled to wait, here acquire flattering names, such as
‘patience,’ and are even called virtue itself; his inability for revenge is
called unwillingness to revenge, perhaps even forgiveness...
...No! Wait a moment! You have said nothing yet of the masterpiece
of these black magicians, who make whiteness, milk, and innocence
of every blackness - haven’t you noticed their perfection or refine-
ment, their boldest, subtlest, most ingenious, most mendacious artistic
stroke? Attend to them! These cellar rodents full of vengefulness and
hatred - what have they made of revenge and hatred? Have you heard
these words uttered? If you trusted simply to their words, would you
suspect you were among men of ressentiment?. . .[...] “What? Do I
hear aright? They call that ‘the Last Judgment,’ the coming of their
kingdom, of the ‘Kingdom of God’ - meanwhile, however, they live ‘in
faith,’ ‘in love’, ‘in hope.”’
“...Now I can really hear what they have been saying all along: ‘We
good men - we are the just ’ - what they desire they call, not retaliation,
but ‘the triumph of justice; what they hate is not their enemy, no! they
hate ‘injustice,’ they hate ‘godlessness’; what they believe in and hope
for is not the hope of revenge, the intoxication of sweet revenge ( -
‘sweeter than honey’ Homer called it), but the victory of God, of the
just God, over the godless...”
GM I 14
The complexity of this passage can be somewhat appreciated by considering the
various associations at play within it. In the first cited exchange, there is an im-
plicit appeal to the noble moral outlook, and the association of Christian moral
values with the vices of this noble outlook: humility, for example, is identified as
168
impotence. (This is the third association). The second cited paragraph instead
associates a certain cognitive profundity and spirituality with the grotesque sen-
timents: hatred is combined, for example, with “ingeniousness” and “mendacious
artistry.” (This tracks the second association). Finally, the third paragraph sug-
gests a kind of self-deception occurring from within the Christian moral outlook:
justice, for example, is associated with a brutal form of retaliation. (This is an
example of the first association).
Our familiar Christian moral values, such as humility, patience, goodness of
heart, forgiveness and justice, are associated with monstrous configurations of
weakness, impotence, rancour, spiritual vengefulness, artistry, the intoxication of
sweet revenge and retaliation. The intended aim of this onslaught is to “throw”
our moral values “into relief” such that they become foregrounded in their famil-
iarity, whereby they show up as estranged from us due to their depicted monstros-
ity. In the liminal phase here, Christian moral values can no longer simply play
their familiar role: this familiarity becomes a questionable phenomenon, and thus
becomes an object of wonder and reflection.
Note that when understood in this manner, Nietzsche’s hyperbole and rhetoric,
which manifests itself in its most exaggerated form in GM I 14, has a fundamental
role to play in the liminal phase. It has a motivating and de-structuring function
that lies central to the overall task of estrangement. In much of the Nietzsche
scholarship on this particular issue, this role of rhetoric has been either misun-
derstood or entirely overlooked.24 On the one hand, Nietzsche’s employment of
rhetoric is downplayed in various ways either because it is thought to fail to add
philosophical worth to his arguments, or because it is seen as politically danger-
ous.25 On these readings, aphorisms like GM I 14 make for a rather embarrassing
24On this issue, I agree with Tracy Strong, when he claims in a recent article that “[f]or the
most part, however, this [attention to Nietzsche’s use of rhetoric] has remained at the level of
showing that he [Nietzsche] used rhetoric, not in what what his rhetoric does, and especially not
what the political implications are.” Strong 2013, 511.
25Leiter, for example, claims that Nietzsche’s rhetoric hinders rather than aids his philo-
sophical arguments: “Third, and perhaps most importantly, a rhetorical tone like Nietzsche’s
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read. On the other hand, when philosophical import is attributed to Nietzsche’s
use of rhetoric, it is usually associated with having a particular, narrow function:
to appeal to his “reader’s affects” in order to evoke in them an affective reorienta-
tion.26 On this account, an ontological distinction is made between the affective
and the epistemic, with the affective considered in some sense more basic when
we are concerned with evaluative matters. This interpretation splits Nietzsche’s
genealogical inquiry into persuasive outbursts and rhetorical flourishes that entice
affective and evaluative engagement on the one hand, and measured philosophical
and scientific argument to change our beliefs about moral values and their origins,
on the other. When understanding an aphorism such as GM I 14, on this reading,
one should take the rhetoric as functioning for these affective purposes, and then
look “behind or beside the rhetoric” for “an argument that one can construct.”27
This approach, I think, is misguided. As we have seen, the use of rhetoric
in the liminal phase functions as a means of rendering strange our familiarity
with moral values through the association with the monstrous. This association,
however, is not two-tiered. There is not, for example, reasoned argument that
juxtapositions Christian values with particular phenomena, on the one hand, and
rhetorical extravagance to render the association monstrous, on the other. Instead,
- looked at in the context of his life - does not really suggest realism about the content, but
rather desperation on the part of the author to reach an increasingly distant and uninterested
audience.” Leiter 2002, 155. The worry that Nietzsche’s rhetoric is politically dangerous is seen
by the “apologies based on rhetoric” made by Kaufmann and Schacht, to account for Nietzsche’s
appropriation by the Nazis. See Strong 2013, 512 for a discussion on this.
26David Owen and Christopher Janaway both take up this position. Owen, for example
argues that “Nietzsche’s rhetorical strategy shifts to accommodate the fact that he now sees
that the persuasive problem posed for his project of re-evaluation is that our relationship to
our moral values is not simply an epistemic issue but also, and in some respects more basically,
an affective one.” Owen 2014, 49. Here is Janaway: “I shall argue that a consequence of some
of Nietzsche’s descriptive hypotheses - would-be truths - about the mind and way that our
evaluations are formed, is that an affective reorientation is required in order for his therapeutic,
revaluative project to work, and that Nietzsche’s way of writing is well directed to the task of
such an affective reorientation.” Janaway 2003, 261. Indeed, for Janaway, GM I 14 is a good
example of “Nietzsche’s use of artistic methods in pursuit of his diagnostic and therapeutic
aims.” (ibid. There are commentators that acknowledge Nietzsche’s use of rhetoric in a more
embedded manner in his philosophy, but not in relation to its function as a specific form of moral
inquiry or critique (such as that of estrangement discussed here). See, for example, Strong 2013
and Babich 2006.
27See Strong 2013, 512 for a characterisation of this position in these terms.
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the monstrosity of the phenomenon is a fundamental part of the association itself.
Another way of explaining this would be to say that the appeal to the monstrous
does not only appeal to our affects, but rather instigates the rendering strange of
our Christian moral values as a foundation and lens through which we perceive the
world. The monstrosity that the employment of rhetoric helps to bring out, thus,
effects us cognitively as much as it does conatively. The rhetoric employed to bring
out the monstrous association does not simply appeal to non-cognitive affects but
instead gets us to see our Christian moral values as monstrous and to question
whether these values are indeed good ; and, hence, to see in a different manner the
moral phenomena that we perceive through our moral values. In other words, we
see this association as monstrous, and not as a logical association supplemented
by Nietzsche’s rhetoric, as if this rhetoric were simply to persuade us of the logical
connection through an appeal to our conative natures.
The implicit distinction typically at work in these interpretations seems to be
the Humean separation of “blind passions” and “cognitive reason”. Rhetoric is
then associated with an evaluative and affective appeal to our emotions and senti-
ments, and analytic argument with an appeal to our cognitive faculties. However,
this distinction is erroneously applied to Nietzsche since, as we shall see, he is
committed to the position that certain affective states have perceptual awareness.
Although here is not the place to enter into a detailed analysis of Nietzsche’s own
position on this issue, it will be worth considering it briefly in the next section,
to further articulate the role of rhetoric and the monstrous in the process of es-
trangement, and how it is attempted by Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals.
Doing so will also help to tackle the remaining issues concerning how an alterna-
tive outlook can be taken up, and how the Christian outlook can be brought into
view as a questionable phenomenon in its entirety.
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4.4 The Slave Revolt
In Nietzsche’s account of the slave revolt in the first essay of the Genealogy, we find
an appeal to the monstrous that brings out Nietzsche’s understanding of the affects
involved in this event and the perception that they afford. It is no surprise that we
find such an account here since, as we shall see, Nietzsche’s exposition of the slave
revolt plays a fundamental part in the process of estrangement and in the appeal
to the monstrous that I have explained above. Indeed, the slave revolt offers an
account of the most extreme form of association discussed above: the association
of our Christian moral values with the vices of the opposing noble outlook. This
association is the most extreme since rather than functioning internally to the
Christian moral outlook, it demands a momentary inversion of valuing, such that
our familiar, Christian moral values are taken up from an opposing perspective and
seen, not simply as immoral (from the Christian perspective) but ignoble (from
the noble outlook). Additionally, the slave revolt offers an account of how such an
inversion can occur and, indeed, has already occurred historically. Moreover, the
account is a part of Nietzsche’s wider attempts at evoking an inversion of values
in the reader (albeit in the opposite direction to that of the slave revolt itself, and
from the “eye of Zarathustra” rather than the “eye of ressentiment”), which is to
function as a part of the de-structuring experienced by the inquirer in the liminal
phase.
Let us begin to unpack the significance of Nietzsche’s description of the slave
revolt by looking at his depiction of the Greek nobility’s perception of the ruled
class:
One should not overlook the almost benevolent nuances that the Greek
nobility, for example, bestows on all the words it employs to distin-
guish the lower orders from itself; how they are continuously mingled
and sweetened with a kind of pity, consideration, and forbearance,
so that finally almost all the words referring to the common person
have remained as expressions signifying “unhappy,” “pitiable” (com-
pare deilos, deilaios, poneros, mochtheros, the last two of which prop-
erly designate the common person as work-slave and beast of burden)
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- and how on the other hand “bad”, “low”, “unhappy” have never
ceased to sound to the Greek ear as one note with a tone-colour [einer
Klangfarbe] in which “unhappy” preponderates: this as an inheritance
from the ancient nobler aristocratic mode of evaluation, which does not
belie itself even in contempt...
GM I 10
The lower class here is perceived and conceptualised by the nobles through the
feelings of pity and consideration, and these concepts are heard as reverberating a
single tone of “unhappiness.” Note that it is not that the lower class are perceived
and designated with certain concepts, which are then accompanied by affective
states. On the contrary, the lower class shows up to the noble class as unhappy
through the feelings of compassion and pity. Moreover, this “colouring” was the
result of the noble class distinguishing itself from the slavish class, as the noble
class perceived itself in the (opposing) one colour-tone as the “happy”, which
equates to other characteristics in, what Nietzsche calls, the “aristocratic value-
equation” [Wertgleichung]: “good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy =
beloved by God” (GM I 7). The characteristics of the slavish class is thus equated
in the following manner: bad = slavish = impotent = ugly = unhappy = unloved
by the gods.
Nietzsche’s description of the revolt itself further brings out the perceptive
nature of certain affective states, and their role in the revolt:
This, then, is quite the contrary of what the noble man does, who con-
ceives the basic concept “good” in advance and spontaneously out of
himself and only then creates for himself an idea of “bad”! This “bad”
of noble origin and that “evil” out of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred
- the former an after-production, a side issue, a contrasting shade, the
latter on the contrary the original thing, the beginning, the distinc-
tive deed in the conception of a slave morality - how different these
words “bad” and “evil” are, although they are both apparently the
opposite of the same concept “good.” But it is not the same concept
“good”: one should ask rather precisely who is “evil” in the sense of
the morality of ressentiment. The answer, in all strictness, is: precisely
the “good man” of the other morality, precisely the noble, powerful
man, the ruler, but dyed in another colour [umgefa¨rbt], interpreted in
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another fashion [umgedeutet], seen in another way [umgesehn] by the
venomous eye [Giftauge] of ressentiment.
GM I 11 ; last sentence my italics
When describing the inversion of values that occurs, Nietzsche talks of the noble
person becoming coloured anew, umgefa¨rbt, interpreted anew, umgedeutet, and
seen anew, umgesehn, all through the “venomous eye of ressentiment.” This af-
fective state of ressentiment is not simply a blind affect that could be appealed
to, for example by the priestly caste, in an effort to motivate a slavish revolt
(through, say, the use of rhetoric!). Much more than this, it is the affective state
through which the inversion itself occurs. This means that certain phenomena in
the world - such as the “nobles” in Nietzsche’s example above - now show up in
this state in a different and, indeed, inverted manner.
The noble person, who was perceived as “good” under the noble evaluation,
is now perceived through the “venomous eye of ressentiment” as “evil”, hence
Nietzsche’s talk, here, of an inversion occurring. However, the nature of this
inversion does not fundamentally involve a change in the material power structure
of the two classes. That is to say, the inversion is not a result of the ruling
class replacing the nobles as rulers. Nietzsche’s account thus does not recount,
for example, a rebellion on the streets, the toppling of the ruling class, and the
diversion of wealth and power to the ruled people. If that were the case, the
referent of the “good” would instead remain ultimately the same. Instead, the
material power structure remains (initially at least) unaltered and the original
referents of “the good” and “the bad” change. That is to say, that which the
noble had taken to be “the good” - wealth, health, power, beauty, etc. - are now
subsumed under the concept of “the bad”, and that which the noble saw as “the
bad” - being poor, suffering, sickness, ugliness, powerlessness etc. - are now taken
as “the good”.28
28For evidence of the historical accuracy of this inversion see Forster 2011b, 355.
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Now, on the one hand, this inversion cannot be a complete reversal of values,
otherwise the Christian values would never take hold of the ruling class, and they
could never be said to be victorious over noble values. Indeed, it would make no
sense to talk of a battle occurring between these competing outlooks. Moreover,
since the nobles do not experience the emotions of rancour and ressentiment to
the same extent as the ruled class, there must be some other form of commensu-
rability between the two outlooks for the noble to be susceptible to the inversion.
Although I will go into much greater detail on this point in the next section, when
considering the nature of the inversion of values that the inquirer undergoes in
the liminal phase, I will at least point to Nietzsche’s own account of this commen-
surability by way of a couple of examples. First, while the slave revolt appears to
value powerlessness over having power, it in fact expresses a will to power of the
slaves that transcends understanding power in terms of material wealth, and is
manifested most dramatically in the positing of their “kingdom in heaven” (GM
I 12, and GM III 14). Second, the inversion of the valuation of health and sick-
ness is made out of a deeper commitment to the ruled class’s well-being: “...the
ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life which tries
by all means to sustain itself and to fight for its existence” (GM III 13). More
generally speaking, we can understand the inversion that Nietzsche describes in
the following manner. “The good” is not simply rendered “evil,” but is rendered
evil out of a commitment to the good that transcends how it is understood in the
noble outlook. Exactly what this “transcending” involves will be discussed later.
On the other hand, despite this minimal presence of commensurability, the
slave revolt gives an insight into how the value of an entire outlook can become
inverted. That is to say, it is not the case that only a few values are altered by
the inversion, but rather the whole “value-equation” that belongs to the noble
outlook becomes reversed. There is a sense here that, because the change involves
noble values becoming overturned in favour of their opposites, these values stand
and fall together. There is no question here of challenging the coherence of a value
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within the outlook, or seeking to invert individual values. Rather, the inversion of
one value demands the inversion of the whole constellation of values that belong
to the outlook (and which Nietzsche puts together in the “value-equation”).
This account of the slave revolt, thus, offers us an insight into how Nietzsche
thinks of emotional states having a role to play in not only affording perception
of phenomena, but also affording a novel perception of the same phenomena in
radically inverted manner. For the moral inquirer to undergo an inversion in the
liminal phase, a similar type of experience will be required.
There is, however, as issue with taking the slave revolt as exemplary of the
inversion of values that the moral inquirer is to undergo during the liminal phase.
The aim of the slave revolt, as described by Nietzsche, is to ultimately usurp noble
values with Christian values. The inversion is violent and is made through the
“eye of ressentiment”. Any familiarity with noble values here is to be entirely
replaced. This is not the case for the moral inquirer in the liminal phase since
the aim is, on the contrary, to maintain familiarity with moral values, whilst
bringing that familiarity into view as strange. As we shall see later, the inversion
is to be seen through the estranged “eye of Zarathustra,” rather than the eye of
ressentiment, and can be achieved through an aspect-shift.
As suggested above, Nietzsche’s account of the slave revolt also functions as a
part of his attempt to evoke an inversion of values in his reader. (This should be
thought of as part of Nietzsche’s attempts to facilitate the reader to go through
the process of estrangement.) Not only does his account of the slave revolt show
that such an inversion has occurred, and how it can occur, but it also motivates
and evokes an inversion by, first, bringing the noble outlook into the centre as not
only oppositional but also originary to our familiar, Christian moral outlook; and
by, second, depicting the struggle for command that our moral values have gone
through in their attempt to invert and overcome noble values. I will now return
to the liminal phase and unpack these points further to see how such an inversion
is to function.
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4.5 The Inversion of Values in the Liminal Phase
I will begin by considering the possibility of experiencing an inversion of values in
the liminal phase. To do so, I will briefly return to Turner’s work on the subject. In
The Ritual Process, Turner finds that the experience of value inversion is rather
common in rites of passage. In fact, he suggests that there are two “types of
liminality,” which can be distinguished by the nature of the inversion that they
involve. There are, what he calls, “rituals of status reversal,” on the one hand,
and “rituals of status elevation,” on the other.29
Turner argues that the rites that mark important passages in life such as birth,
puberty and marriage, and more generally transitions to higher social positions,
typically involve a status-reversal or humbling during the liminal phase, before
the new position is structurally taken up in the phase of aggregation.30
In the case of status reversal, “groups or categories of persons who habitually
occupy low status positions in the social structure are positively enjoined to exer-
cise ritual authority over their superiors.”31 This often occurs, Turner claims, in
cyclical rituals of “a collective kind”, where “at certain culturally defined points
in the seasonal cycle, groups or categories of persons who habitually occupy low
status positions in the social structure are positively enjoined to exercise ritual
authority over their superiors; and they, in their turn, must accept with good will
their ritual degradation.”32
29V. Turner 1995, 167. Turner does not suggest that the classification is exhaustive, and he
also notes that some passages involve both these types of liminality.
30For example: “The same processes are particu1arly vividly exemplified in many African
installation rituals. The future incumbent of the chieftainship or headmanship is first separated
from the commonalty and then must undergo liminal rites that rudely abase him before, in the
reaggregation ceremonies, he is installed on his stool in final glory.” V. Turner 1995, 170.
31ibid, 167.
32ibid. For example, Bakhtin’s analysis of the carnivaleque notes the presence of this form
of inversion: “Another essential element [of the medieval folk festival] was a reversal of the
hierarchic levels: the jester was proclaimed king, a clownish abbot, bishop, or archbishop was
elected at the “feast of fools,” and in the churches directly under the pope’s jurisdiction a mock
pontiff was even chosen. The members of this hierarchy of fools sang solemn mass. At many
of these feasts kings and queens were elected for a day, as on Epiphany and on St. Valentine’s
day.” Bakhtin 1984, 81.
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The basic structures at work in both cases are understood by Turner as follows:
The liminality of those going up usually involves a putting down or
humbling of the novice as its principal cultural constituent; at the same
time, the liminality of the permanently structural inferior contains as
its key social element a symbolic or make-believe elevation of the ritual
subjects to positions of eminent authority. The stronger are made
weaker; the weak act as though they were strong. The liminality of
the strong is socially unstructured or simply structured; that of the
weak represents a fantasy of structural superiority.
Or again, the liminality of wealth and nobility is poverty and pau-
perism — of poverty, ostentation and pseudohierarchy.
V. Turner 1995, 168, 200
Turner’s account shows how an inversion of values is possible, and indeed often
occurs, during the liminal phase. Moreover, he describes how the inversion can
run both ways, from nobility to poverty, and vice versa.
However, it should be noted that the type of inversion that Turner describes in
both cases here are achieved by playing out inverted social roles during the liminal
period. The inversion is made possible, for example, by the poor taking up an
elevated position of the rich and engaging in the latter’s customs. This manner
of achieving the inversion is not available to the moral inquirer for the task of
estrangement, since he or she has to be able to experience an inversion without
taking up a new, albeit temporary, social role. Indeed, as suggested above, the
most productive means of separation for the inquirer is through some form of
social withdrawal.
Before considering how the inversion is to function for the moral inquirer,
there is a further issue to bear in mind that Turner notes as a repercussion of the
reversal of social roles in particular: “[t]he ritual, in fact, has the long-term effect
of emphasizing all the more trenchantly the social definitions of the group.”33 The
33V. Turner 1995, 172. Also: “To return to rituals of status reversal. Not only do they reaffirm
the order of structure; they also restore relations between the actual historical individuals who
occupy positions in that structure.” ibid, 177.
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liminal nature of the inversion is stressed on return to structure as precisely that:
a temporary reversal that does not belong to the social structure itself. As a
result, the status quo before the liminal period is further strengthened on return.
For the moral inquirer, such a result would be counterproductive to the very task
of estrangement, since the idea of posing the question of the value of our moral
values is to engender an engagement with the loss of their Christian foundations.
To begin to understand how the moral inquirer can experience an inversion of
values in the liminal phase without taking up an inverted social role, I will look
at the importance of the inquirer taking up an ascetic self-relation. It is in such a
self-relation, I claim, that a differentiating procedure can be set in motion without
the need of taking up a reversed social role. On the one hand, social withdrawal
during the phase of separation is essentially an ascetic move, since it is made to
work against one’s habituated social engagement and customs.34 On the other
hand, asceticism has a role to play in the liminal period as a means of “taking
sides” against oneself, and more, specifically, one’s familiarity with the Christian
moral outlook at the level of the soul. Nietzsche describes this asceticism in the
preface to A Case of Wagner :
For such a task [for the problem of decadence (of which the problem of
“Good and Evil is one variation”)] I required a special self-discipline:
to take sides against everything sick in me, including Wagner, in-
cluding Schopenhauer, including all of modern “humaneness.” - A
profound estrangement [Entfremdung], cold, sobering up - against ev-
erything that is of this time, everything timely - and most desirable
of all, the eye of Zarathustra, an eye that beholds the whole fact of
humankind at a tremendous distance - below. For such a goal - what
sacrifice wouldn’t be fitting? What “self-overcoming”? What “self-
denial”?35
34I agree with Patrik Hagman that the “primary work” of the ascetic is “to avoid”, at least
temporarily in this instance, “taking part in the workings of society.” Hagman 2011, 50. Hagman
interestingly argues that traditional priestly asceticism follows the same tripartite structure of
rites of passage. My interest with asceticism here, however, is with how it occurs specifically
in the liminal period in a manner which will not be continued in the same manner during the
phase of aggregation.
35Nietzsche argues in the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals that it was only as an
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CW preface
Nietzsche cannot be claiming to take sides against himself completely here, since
he has to take up a perspective from which he can oppose himself. He qualifies
this somewhat by stating that he is taking sides against “his time” and against
“modern humaneness,” leaving room for an appeal to, for example, a “former
world view”. However, he also talks of beholding “the whole fact of humankind
at a tremendous distance.” The latter demand seems to leave no position from
which one could take sides against oneself.36 I am concerned with the possibility
of taking sides against our familiarity with the Christian moral outlook, which, I
suggest, leaves more scope for taking sides against it, by building up an opposing
outlook from which the Christian outlook can be brought into view.
There remains the worry that what one assumes and employs when taking sides
against oneself is a part of the familiarity that needs to be brought into question.
We have seen earlier in this chapter how an appeal to the monstrous is made
to alleviate this worry by forming a contrast with the familiar. (The monstrous
helps to set into relief that which has become too familiar and overlooked.) This
is particularly important for the internal critique since it is conducted from within
the Christian moral outlook. This appeal to the monstrous also has a part to play
in the external critique by rendering our moral values strange from the perspective
of an alternative outlook. It is also supplemented by the fact that this alternative
outlook forms an opposing outlook, and, hence, attempts to set the familiarity of
our moral values into further relief through such a contrast.
As suggested in the previous section, an important function of the slave revolt
ascetic that the philosopher was initially able to survive and make their “first steps on earth.”:“A
serious examination of history actually reveals that the bond between philosophy and the ascetic
ideal is even much closer and stronger. One might assert that it was only on the leading-strings
of this ideal that philosophy learned to take its first small steps on earth...” GM III 9.
36The intimation here is that one must be outside of life itself to be able to behold it in its
entirety and question its value - i.e., the value of valuing per se. See TI Morality as anti-nature
5. Interestingly enough, although I cannot pursue it further here, Turner notes how neophytes
are often considered dead by the community during the liminal phase. See V. W. Turner 1964,
48.
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was not only to show how an inversion can and, indeed, does function, but also
to motivate and evoke an inversion of values in the reader by bringing the noble
moral outlook into the centre, as oppositional and originary to our familiar moral
outlook. I will now consider how Nietzsche attempts this, and how he deals with
the problem of having to render the noble moral outlook as an outlook that has
relevance to us today, such that it can form an effective opposition to our familiar
Christian outlook.
Nietzsche introduces the noble moral outlook in the Genealogy by way of et-
ymological analysis. He begins the first essay of the Genealogy claiming that the
“signpost to the right road was for me the question: what was the real etymolog-
ical significance of the designations for “good” coined in the various languages?”
Nietzsche makes the etymological link of our familiar concept of “the good” to
that of the “superior in power”, “the rich”, “the possessors”, “the truthful”, “the
men of war” (GM I 5), “the happy”, “the godlike”, “the beautiful” (GM I 6),
and “the healthy” (GM I 7). It should be noted how Nietzsche draws upon val-
ues that lie in opposition to our current, familiar understanding of “the good”.
For example, the value of being “warlike” lies in open opposition to the value of
“pity”, and the value of superiority in power opposes that of equality.37
Nietzsche attempts to draw out the struggle for command occurring between
the two outlooks that is contained within the concept of the good. I argued
in chapter three that the process of sedimentation had the effect of hiding the
struggle for command that our moral values have gone through by aiding the
fixing of moral concepts with a particular meaning and with specific referents.
With etymological analysis, Nietzsche seeks to counteract this process by showing
how our moral concepts have been determined in a different manner, and even
with opposing referents.38 However, this etymological analysis, if it is to help
37In chapter two, section ‘Moral Outlooks’ I drew on Michael Forster’s work to show the
opposition between two moral outlooks: that of Christianity, and that of Greek nobility. See
Forster 2011b, 355-356 for more contrasts.
38See, for example, Migotti 1998, 770, which notes that “our (still) current moral language
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bring noble moral values together to form an outlook capable of opposing our
Christian moral outlook, must be able to form an opposition, such that it can
be drawn upon as a perspective from which the inquirer can “take sides” against
the Christian outlook. That this is, indeed, Nietzsche’s intention, is given by
the fact that the etymological claims Nietzsche makes are for the most part non-
standard, and offered with no substantive supporting arguments. This is not to
say that Nietzsche’s analysis is implausible, but, rather, that the success of the
etymological claims lies less on their historical accuracy, and more on their ability
to render evaluatively salient the marginalised, noble moral values to us, (and,
hence, if we are to see noble phenomena in the world through them).39 This latter
demand is fundamental if the opposing noble outlook is to have relevance for us
today, so that the struggle for command is not simply a past historical event, but
meaningful in the present.40
For this to happen, Nietzsche needs to show not only that these alternative
moral values have relevance for us today, but that they can form a totality from
which we are able to pose the question as to whether our dominant moral outlook
could be harmful. In chapter three, I already suggested this principle by which
the noble values are seen to hang together: the activity of self-determination as a
means of distinction.41 This sets up a contrast with the Christian outlook, which
hangs together on the principle of obedience to God. Much of the work done by
Nietzsche when depicting the slave revolt is to render morally salient the noble
outlook in contrast to our familiar Christian outlook.
is not monolithic, but stratified.”
39See Smith’s introduction in Nietzsche 1996 on the plausibility of Nietzsche’s etymological
claims. Deleuze and Kofman agree that etymology is used as a philosophical tool, although not
in the manner that I argue for here. See Deleuze 2006, 70 and Kofman 1993, 86.
40As Nietzsche questions at the end of first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals: “Must the
ancient fire not some day flare up much more terribly, after much longer preparation? More:
must one not desire it with all one’s might? even will it? even promote it?” (GM I 17).
41Nietzsche suggests the same principle in On the Genealogy of Morals: “[w]ith regard to our
problem, which may on grounds be called a quiet problem and one which fastidiously directs
itself to few ears, it is of no small interest to ascertain that through those words and roots which
designate “good” there frequently still shines through the most important nuance by virtue of
which the noble felt themselves to be men of a higher rank” (GM I 5).
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At this point, however, two worries arise. The first is that even if we acknowl-
edge that there was once such a noble outlook that flourished, the very principle
of the noble outlook - of value determination based on (the feeling of) hierarchical
distinction - and the constellation of values that surround it, still repel and some-
what disgust us today. This raises the difficulty as to whether the outlook could
really take hold of us. The second worry is the opposing concern as to whether
we really want the noble outlook to take hold in any meaningful way since this
could present a social and political danger on return from the liminal phase.42
Nietzsche is arguably rather successful at bringing marginal experiences of
the noble outlook into the centre. We see such experiences, for example, in the
reverence for the monarchy (in the UK for example), in high estimations of ‘great’
political figures such as Caesar and Napoleon, and of artists such as Goethe and
Mozart. When thinking through what exactly we still find noble today in such
cases, Nietzsche hits on the following explanation in the section ‘What is noble’
of Beyond Good and Evil :
It is not the works, it is the faith that is decisive here, that determines
the order of rank - to take up again an ancient religious formula in
a new and more profound sense: some fundamental certainty that a
noble soul has about itself, something that cannot be sought, found,
nor perhaps lost.
The noble soul has reverence for itself.
BGE 287
When recounting the slave revolt, Nietzsche draws on this characteristic in a vari-
ety of different ways to contrast it with the impotence, insecurity, and vengefulness
of the slavish class and the priestly caste.43
42A notable example of this social danger is given by the “trial of the century” of Richard
Loeb and Nathan Leopold in the United States. The famous and successful defence made by
Clarence Darrow during the trial argued that the boys were under the influence of “Nietzschean
philosophy” when committing the murder.
43GM I 7, for example, is highly indicative of this contrast. The importance of Nietzsche’s
demand that “one has first read my earlier writings and has not spared some trouble in doing
so: for they are, indeed, not easy to penetrate” (GM preface 8) is important here to grasp the
type of contrast being made.
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Now, the danger of this noble outlook taking hold in a manner that could
risk the loss of familiarity with our moral values is mitigated in various ways by
Nietzsche. This can be seen in, at least, two separate ways depending on the
audience of the Genealogy that is considered. First, as Tracy Strong suggests, a
potential reader of the Genealogy to consider is that of the German Christian anti-
Semite. While the beginnings of the first essay draw this reader in to identifying
with the noble outlook and the knightly aristocracy against the “priestly people
of the Jews”, GM I 7 turns this on its head by implying that Christianity, our
dominant moral outlook in Europe, “inherited this Jewish revaluation.”44 As a
result, the original identification with the knightly caste collapses.
Another potential reader is the atheist who maintains faith in Christian moral
values (such as “the English” seen in the introduction of the thesis). Their iden-
tification with the knightly caste is tempered by the full-blown depiction of the
noble as a descendent of the savage. Nietzsche shows this from the perspective of
our familiar moral outlook:45 “they [the nobles] go back to the innocent conscience
of the beast of prey, as triumphant monsters who perhaps emerge from a disgust-
ing procession of murder, arson, rape, and torture, exhilarated and undisturbed
of soul, as if it were no more than a student’s prank...” The implications of fully
identifying with the knightly caste, here, are grotesquely brought into view.
The first essay of the Genealogy shifts continually between the two moral
outlooks, often within the same aphorism, and even at times within the same
sentence. We have seen how this is taken to its extremity in GM I 14. Another
example is given by this passage from GM I 7: “It was the Jews [...] saying “the
wretched alone are good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suf-
fering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness
is for them alone - and you, the powerful and noble, are on the contrary evil, the
44See Strong 2013, 517-518.
45“...all this came together, in the minds of those who suffered from it, in the image of the
“barbarian,” the “evil enemy”...” GM I 11.
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cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity...”” Here, Nietzsche
takes up the voice of a Jew who has undergone the inversion of noble values, but
the perspective from which the Jew articulates the inversion is that of the noble
person’s perception of this inversion.
The question, then, arises as to how these momentary shifts back and forther
between our familiar moral outlook and the alternative, noble outlook are possible.
I think a helpful way of approaching these shifts, is to understand them as aspect-
shifts. As suggested earlier, in the example of the slave revolt, we saw how the
inversion of values involves perceiving the same phenomena “in the world”- i.e. two
different political classes of slaves and masters - but, seen in a new manner - they
take on a different “tone-colour” affectively and conceptually. By understanding
the shift in this manner, we can see how the moral inquirer can undergo such a
shift during the isolated, liminal phase of reflection, without the need to take up
a new social role.
In Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, William Day and Victor J Krebs describe the
phenomenon of aspect-seeing in this way. It is “an experience with, one might
say, a double aspect. It is an experience in which, first, something changes – as
it were before our eyes or ears – but in which, second, we know that nothing has
changed, that is, we know that the change is not (so to speak) in the world, but
(so to speak) in us.”46
Wittgenstein’s central example of this is the following: “I contemplate a face,
and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed;
and yet I see it differently. I call this experiencing ‘noticing an aspect’.”47 The
idea here is very similar to the employment of the ‘law of dissociation by vary-
ing concomitants’, which we saw in the case of internal, ironic disruption. This
functioned by associating our moral values with different phenomena, to evoke a
disassociation of our moral values from their value. I want to suggest that for the
46See Day and Krebs 2010, 8.
47Wittgenstein 2003, 193c-e.
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external critique to function, to take up our familiar moral values from an alter-
native perspective requires being able to ‘notice an aspect’ of our familiar moral
values that has remained inconspicuous. This functions not through the associa-
tion of our moral values with phenomena within the dominant moral outlook, but
with taking up a perspective from which we come to see our moral values from a
different aspect as harmful, as dangerous, etc.
Now, a worry with this approach might be the following. Our moral values do
not seem to be the sort of phenomena with which we can engage in ‘aspect-seeing.’
That is to say, one might think that they are just not the kind of things that when
perceived, are seen as something other than valuable. By this I mean that in our
everyday lives, for example, we do not “take” our moral values as valuable, as if
we could also take them as something not valuable, as dangerous, harmful, etc.
Wittgenstein, for example, suggests that in ordinary perception aspect-seeing does
not occur:
It would have made as little sense for me to say “Now I am seeing it
as...” as to say at the sight of a knife and fork “Now I am seeing this
as a knife and fork.” This expression would not be understood. - Any
more than: “Now it’s a fork” or “It can be a fork too.” One doesn’t
“take” what one knows as the cutlery at a meal for cutlery; any more
than one ordinarily tries to move one’s mouth as one eats, or aims at
moving it.
Wittgenstein 2003, 195b-c
One might think then, in a parallel manner, that we do not “take” our moral
values on an everyday basis “as” moral values. However, to conclude from this
that our moral values are not the type of phenomena that can be taken up from a
novel aspect, would be to confuse the nature of our familiarity with moral values
with our everyday experience of this familiarity. The reason why our moral values
are not readily perceived as aspect-seeing phenomena is, I claim, because of the
sedimented and foundational role they play in our everyday lives. As argued in
chapter two, for our moral values to have become familiar to us means that we
186
have come to take their value as given. To take this value as given amounts to
no longer being able to see our moral values from a different aspect with regards
to its value; in other words it means that this value is no longer in question; this
value becomes inconspicuous. If this were not the case, then this value could not
play a familiar, foundational role, since it would still be an issue for us. As a result
of this, sedimentation means that we become blind to the possibility of seeing our
moral values from a different aspect.48 The appeal to the monstrous, and to an
alternative moral outlook should, thus, be understood as a means by which to
overcome this aspect-blindness, to come to see our moral values temporarily as
harmful.49
As said, however, Nietzsche seeks to shift the reader between moral outlooks,
to essentially lead the reader into aporia about the value of our moral values, and
to ignorance about what the concept of “the good” refers to. Yet, this experience
of disorientation is not simply one of total confusion, monstrosity, and uncanni-
ness. It also expresses a commitment and concern for the good in a manner that
transcends both moral outlooks during the liminal phase, and offers a commen-
surability between the two outlooks. During the liminal phase, that is to say,
the moral inquirer experiences a commitment to the good that breaks out of the
familiar conception (be it noble or Christian).
In chapter three, by drawing on Lear’s account of ironic disruption, I explained
how, during this internal critique, our conception of the good comes to transcend
our Christian moral outlook. During ironic disruption, we experience our moral
48Wittgenstein notes this phenomenon of “aspect-blindness”. “...the question now arises:
Could there be human beings lacking in the capacity to see something as something - and
what would that be like? What sort of consequences would it have? - Would this defect
be comparable to colorblindness or to not having absolute pitch? – We will call it “aspect-
blindness”...” Wittgenstein 2003, 213f.
49David Owen offers an account of how Nietzsche’s genealogy functions to release us from
“aspectival captivity”, and also understands this phenomenon in Wittgensteinian terms. See
Owen 2003. Owen’s understanding of aspectival-capacity offers a helpful way of understanding
the process sedimentation. However, Owen is interested in how the loss of faith in God can
result in us no longer understanding ourselves as agents, and how this can motivate the need
for an aspect-shift (or a release from aspectival captivity, as he puts it). I, on the contrary, have
been engaged with the phenomenon where no such loss of self-understanding occurs.
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values (which Lear calls “members”) failing to fit into our Christian moral outlook
(which Lear calls the “totality”), which results in our conception of the good
breaking out from our familiarity with it (the latter of which Lear calls the “social
pretense”). This conception of the good remains empty in so far as it cannot be
provided with content from our familiar understanding of the good since it is this
understanding that is transcended during the ironic experience.50
At this point, however, there is a final concern that needs to be dealt with.
It is often argued in the secondary literature that Nietzsche appeals to a concep-
tion of the good that has both normative content and normative authority that
transcends any and all moral outlooks. This is thought to be important because
not only would such a conception be able to act as arbiter between competing
outlooks, but it would also appear to provide an insight into the nature of the
evaluation of our moral values, and, hence, also the conditions needed to be met
to pose the question of the value of our moral values.
I have already argued at length earlier in this thesis against the possibility of
beholding such a transcendent standard of the good from a view from nowhere
- i.e. from a position free from any familiarity with moral values.51 I have also
shown how Nietzsche rejects the task of attempting to find common standards
across moral outlooks as unhelpful and “immature,” since it fails to touch on the
problem of the value of our familiar moral values.52 It might, nevertheless, be
thought that without some common ground between outlooks, where such ground
informs us of what the evaluation of moral values is to look like, it would be
impossible to give an adequate account of what it would take to pose the question
of the value of our moral values.
Thus, in the secondary literature, we find various attempts at articulating
what this common ground might be according to Nietzsche’s moral philosophy.
50For the discussion of this, see chapter 3, section ‘The Role of Self-Consciousness’.
51See Chapter 1, section ‘Reductionism and Immoralism’ pp35-39.
52see Chapter 1, section ‘The Justificatory Approach’ pp18-22.
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Paul Katsafanas, for example, claims that the “dominant interpretation” of On
the Genealogy of Morals argues that “modern morality undermines flourishing,”
where the value of flourishing is taken as the bridging standard between moral
outlooks, and which can be employed as the yardstick to evaluative between such
outlooks.53 Under this reading, posing the question of the value of our moral
values would be to assess them in terms of whether or not they afford human
flourishing.
As Katsafanas notes, however, the concept of flourishing struggles to do the
transcendent bridging work that is necessary here, since from the perspective
of the Christian moral outlook, it is not considered normatively authoritative.54
Katsafanas himself argues that flourishing should be understood in terms of Ni-
etzsche’s concept of will to power, since power, unlike flourishing alone, “has a
privileged normative status.”55
According to Katsafanas, one advantage of looking to the concept of will to
power to take up this function - i.e., as a measure with transcendent, normative
authority - is that it has a connection to agency, from which it obtains its nor-
mative authority. Will to power is a standard of success for action,56 and as a
result, it does not bear on, what Katsafanas calls “discrete, context-free evalua-
tive judgments”, but rather on “whole systems of moral judgments, coupled with
their associates classes of affects and perceptions.”57 In the literature on this
topic, Aaron Ridley also makes a similar stake for will to power playing this role
by claiming that “self-understanding, the sense of having ‘power over oneself’, is
plausibly a value that sufficiently transcends the kinds of parochial consideration
I have concentrated upon, under the label ‘way of living’, as to have a claim to
53Katsafanas 2011, 171. Katsafanas associates this reading with Janaway and Leiter. ibid,
172.
54ibid, 174: “In sum, the dominant religions teach that flourishing is not normatively author-
itative. The fact that serving the poor, mortifying the flesh, renouncing sexuality, and so forth,
conflict with flourishing is not an objection to these practices; it is their point.”
55ibid, 177.
56See Katsafanas 2013, chapter 9 for a detailed account of this.
57ibid, 177.
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be an intrinsic value for human beings in general.”58
Now, first I want to note that there is some benefit to this approach by Kat-
safanas (and Ridley), but I will then draw upon two shortcomings that it faces.
I think that it is correct to understand the content of the common ground be-
tween the noble outlook and the Christian outlook in terms of the will to power,
and that Nietzsche does this in On the Genealogy of Morals through the use of
other concepts, such as “health”, and “the good.”59 This is required to see the
commensurability between outlooks with opposing values. I have also considered
earlier in the thesis in great detail the broader aspects of our moral psychology
and the ascetic dynamic of the soul in terms of a continuum of compulsion, upon
which different moral outlooks can be situated.60 This account of our familiarity
with values per se offers many resources for understanding the common ground be-
tween outlooks, and agrees with Katsafanas’ assertion that the will to power offers
commensurability between evaluative orientations that involve different modes of
evaluation, rather than simply between opposing values.61
However, I reject Katsafanas’ claim that there is any normative authority to
the content of what Katasafanas calls the “will to power thesis” that lies outside,
or transcends our moral outlooks. There are two main reasons for this. First,
attempts to find normative authority for the content of will to power inevitably
come from a particular outlook. Second, this search for normative authority
reduces the complexity of Nietzsche’s work, and the concept of the will to power
in particular. The common ground between opposing moral outlooks is something
that needs to be constructed so that the question of the value of our moral values
can be posed; it is not a transcendent normative authority to be discovered such
58Ridley 2005, 173.
59I have suggested this earlier in this chapter. See page 175.
60See Chapter 2. This seems to be to some extent what Ridley has in mind with the phrase
‘having power over oneself’.
61A basic example of this (touched upon also by Katsafanas) is the novel slavish mode of
evaluating that ascribes responsibility to agents, and Nietzsche’s interpretation of this move as
an expression of the will to power of the weak.
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that the question could then be resolved.
To begin with the first reason, I will take up Katsafanas’ own example of
how the will to power can be normatively authoritative. He suggests, following
David Owen, that Nietzsche distinguishes between ‘feelings of increased power’
and ‘actual increases in power’. He goes on to claim that Nietzsche endorses, as a
normative criterion, that the feeling of power should track actual power. He quotes
Owen on this score: “the criterion of evaluation that Nietzsche proposes is whether
the feeling of power expresses and tracks power, where this criterion can be taken
to be well grounded just in so far as the principle of will to power provides a
compelling explanation of human behaviour... Hence the crucial question is this:
under what conditions does the feeling of power necessarily express and track
power?”62
The problem with this is that the evaluative criterion suggested itself belongs
to a moral outlook. While Katsafanas acknowledges that how we experience
actions expressing power is dependent on the perspective of our moral outlook, he
fails to see that how we experience the feeling of power tracking the actualisation
of power is also dependent on this perspective. That is to say, the very idea
that the feeling of power should directly track the expression of power is a typical
demand from the noble outlook. With this in mind, it is no wonder that the
obfuscation of the connection between the feeling and the expression of power
that occurs in the Christian outlook is perceived as bad from this perspective.
From the Christian perspective, however, the situation is much more complex,
as Nietzsche himself spends much time demonstrating. The obfuscation of the
feeling of power and its actualisation is a central element in the deification of the
ascetic structure and the widening of the soul.63 It is this process that Nietzsche
suggests has made human beings much more “profound”. Now, the point that
62Katsafanas quotes Owen here in Katsafanas 2011, 186.
63I cannot go into further detail of this process here, but note that I have considered the
phenomenon in detail in Chapter 2, section ‘The Soul’.
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needs to be drawn out here is that the Christian conception of power demands a
novel understanding of power that cannot be achieved from the noble perspective.
From that latter perspective, the Christian conception just shows up as bad or
harmful, as Katsafanas himself unwittingly expresses: “Thus, the Judeo-Christian
interpretation has the result of reducing actual power.”64 Instead, what Nietzsche
attempts to show is that under the Christian moral outlook there has been a
spiritualisation of the noble conception of power. While it is true that Nietzsche
often attacks this spiritualisation, he also clearly acknowledges that without it, we
would never have had the development of culture capable of producing the likes
of Goethe and Beethoven.
This leads on to the second reason. That the Christian moral outlook shows
up as harmful in so far as it dislocates the feeling of power from its actualisation
is beneficial to the task of posing the value of our moral values, since it affords
us an opposing perspective from which to gain an estranged view of those values.
However, this is the result of finding common ground between the outlooks in
terms of an explanation that employs the concept of the will to power. The
important point here is that the concept of the will to power is productively
involved in the construction of common ground between the opposing Christian
and noble outlook in order to pose the question of the value of our moral values;
it is not something to be discovered in order to resolve the question. In this sense
then, it transcends both outlooks, but it simultaneously lacks any positive content.
Let us now enrich this account, by introducing the aspect-shifts between the
moral outlooks just discussed above. From the perspective of the noble outlook,
Christian values show up as potentially harmful. That is to say, not only do these
values, and the mode of evaluating fail to live up to the conception of the good of
the noble outlook, but they are detrimental to it. Once having seen this harmful
aspect, as noted above, Nietzsche often shifts us back to the familiar aspect of
64Katsafanas 2011, 186.
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our moral values. However, when this happens, although our moral values are
still familiar to us, their familiarity becomes strange, since we have just seen their
potentially harmful aspect. This familiarity can no longer be taken for granted
in its familiarity, and, hence, the value of our moral values becomes an object
of questioning. This is all seen from the estranged “eye of Zarathustra”. Now,
to see how this actually occurs, it should be noted that when this happens, the
conception of the good (and, thus, also the conception of power just discussed)
that was tied to our familiar moral outlook comes to transcend that outlook, due
to our familiar moral values failing to live up to the noble conception of the good
(or, again, of power). More than this, it transcends it in such a manner that it
seeks to capture the noble conception of the good that rendered the members of
the familiar outlook show up as harmful. However, when it does this, it cannot
simply incorporate the noble conception of the good since this noble conception
is completely at odds with the familiar conception. As a result of this, we end up
with a conception of the good which has to transcend the social pretense of both the
noble outlook and the Christian outlook. This affords a certain commensurability
between the outlooks. However, since the conception transcends our familiar
understanding of the good in both outlooks, it also remains without content.
Unlike the worry with the internal critique, there is no issue of this transcendent
conception becoming assimilated into the familiar outlook due to the fact that it
is a product of the experience of inverted values.
This is why during the liminal phase, when such a transcendent conception of
the good comes onto the scene, there is a de-structuring and disorienting phase
of reflection, which calls the moral inquirer to a halt. What it also expresses,
nevertheless, is a deeper commitment to the good and to the future of European
values.
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4.6 The Phase of Aggregation
I will now consider the final phase, that of aggregation. This phase is rather
troublesome, but nevertheless fundamental to the process of estrangement. It
marks the end of the liminal phase, which we must remember is only temporary.
This means that the various elements of the liminal phase, such as the ascetic
taking sides against oneself, the experience of the inversion of moral values, the
loss of structure and experience of aporia, all come to an end. This occurs due
to a return to the Christian moral outlook. This essentially signifies a return
to social interaction, which was severed during the phase of separation. As said
earlier, however, when considering the structural isomorphism of the process of
estrangement to rites of passage, this return is not marked by any particular rites.
Unfortunately, this disanalogy does not make the phase of aggregation any easier
to comprehend; on the contrary, with no rites delimiting the liminal phase, the
major issue with understanding the phase of aggregation is how to demarcate the
duration of the liminal phase, and to know exactly when it is over. The difficulty
of articulating this is seen when we attempt to consider what type of world the
moral inquirer returns to. As we have seen, van Gennep suggests that it is an
“incorporation into the new world,”65, and Turner suggests that the phase of
aggregation is a return to stability, but often in “a new achieved status” or social
role for the individual.66 However, this implies that the “new world” is already in
place and structured, ready and waiting for the subjects who have undergone the
rites of passage. This is clearly not the case for the moral inquirer who returns
to the familiar dominant outlook, which is essentially the same outlook that was
left. The difference here is that the inquirer has come to see that the value of our
moral values is a possible object of questioning during the liminal phase. In this
section, I will attempt to articulate how this experience effects the return of the
65Van Gennep 1960, 21.
66V. W. Turner 1964, 47.
194
inquirer.
In Nietzsche’s own work, the phase of aggregation is depicted in various trou-
blesome ways. The most disconcerting of these is given by the figure of the
madman in the famous passage of the Gay Science. Here is an indicative section
of the speech of the madman to the people in the marketplace:
How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe
away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained
this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are
we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually?
Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up
or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we
not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not
night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light laterns in
the morning?
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At first sight, it looks like the madman is spectacularly depicting the experience
undergone in the liminal phase: he describes, for example, some kind of inversion
of fundamental familiar phenomena, as well as the disorientation that it engenders.
This, however, is not quite correct, since the situation he depicts is one in which
our moral values are in crisis due to the ‘death of God,’ (and, hence, due to the
loss of the Christian foundations of our moral values). This, instead, suggests
that the madman is in a phase of aggregation, as he returns to the people in the
marketplace and offers his oration. He sees that the value of our moral values are
questionable, but rather than aggregation leading to a return to stability, no such
stability is available due to the madman now experiencing the loss and absence
of the foundations of our moral values.
The world that the madman returns to is no longer the stable world of the
dominant moral outlook prior to going through the process of estrangement. I
argued in chapter two that the loss of Christian foundations is not experienced
because our moral values have become sedimented, and their value inconspicuous.
Once this sedimentation is disrupted in the liminal phase and the value of our
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moral values becomes an object of questioning, the loss of foundations - as depicted
by the madman as the death of God - becomes salient and troublesome. The value
of our moral values now becomes an object of wonder. It is here that the difference
between the people of the marketplace and the madman becomes apparent. The
madman’s audience are, as Nietzsche tells us, atheists: they do not believe in
God. On this score they do not differ from the madman. Where they do differ,
however, is on the significance of this loss of faith. The response of the atheists
suggests that they do not see any implications or consequences for their loss of
faith in God. This is because, similar to the case of ‘the English’ seen in the thesis
introduction, the atheists take the value of their moral values as given, and do not
see “morality as a problem.” The value of their moral values is sedimented to the
point where it is inconspicuous and, hence, does not show up as a questionable
phenomenon. This is why they deride the madman for his concern for the death
of God. The madman, on the contrary, sees that the value of our moral values
is a phenomenon that can be brought into question, and that, due to this, the
loss of the foundations of our moral values has strong ramifications for that value.
We cannot go on as before since we see that our moral values do not have an
unconditional right to continue to have a foundational role in our lives.67 Note
that this concern and care for the implications of the death of God also expresses
the madman’s commitment to “the good”, which transcends the familiar dominant
outlook. We also get a glimpse of it with the optimistic end to his oration: “There
has never been a greater deed [the death of God]; and whoever is born after us - for
the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto”
(GS 125).
The madman is unable to go through the phase of aggregation since there is no
67See TI Skirmishes of an Untimely Man 5: “We others hold otherwise. When one gives up
the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out from under one’s feet. This
morality is by no means self-evident: this point has to be exhibited again and again, despite the
English flatheads. Christianity is a system, a whole view of things thought out together. By
breaking one main concept out of it, the faith in God, one breaks the whole: nothing necessary
remains in one’s hands.”
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new structure awaiting him in the post-liminal phase. This is seen by the fact that
no one in the marketplace can appreciate the ramifications of the death of God.
For there to be a new structure, or the possibility of creating a new structure, new
social relations would have to be formed. However, as Nietzsche attempts to show
in this passage, such social relations cannot be created unless others undergo the
process of estrangement, and, hence, are able to face up to the loss of foundations
of our moral values. Precisely the opposite happens in this narrative, since the
madman is mocked by his listeners and derided for being insane.
The madman is then in a position that is at once within the dominant moral
outlook, but which, nevertheless, retains the experience of the liminal phase. The
experience of seeing the value of our moral values as a questionable phenomenon
is perpetuated by the experience of the crisis of the value of our moral values in
the dominant moral outlook. The question of this value, which was posed in the
liminal phase, cannot be settled on return since the possibility of grounding it in
the Christian religion is lost.
A potential role for the madman, and, indeed, for the moral inquirer that finds
him- or herself in this in-between position on return, is to attempt to motivate
and evoke the process of estrangement in others. The possibility of taking up this
role is a central issue for Nietzsche, and throughout this chapter I have suggested
that his own work, On the Genealogy of Morals in particular, attempts this very
task. This is supported by another figure that Nietzsche employs elsewhere in his
later works who, similar to the madman, comes onto the scene in the phase of
aggregation. This is the figure of Zarathustra.
In ‘Zarathustra’s Prologue’ in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche works through
the difficulties of Zarathustra’s aggregation, or ‘down-going’ [Untergang], after a
10-year period of solitude in the mountains.68 First, Zarathustra’s return from
68Nietzsche uses the same terminology to describe the philosopher leaving their ‘citadel’: “If
he [the philosopher] were [predestined for knowledge], he would one day have to say to himself:
“The devil take my good taste! but the rule is more interesting than the exception - than myself,
the exception!” And he would go down, and above all, he would go “inside.”” (BGE 26).
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solitude is recognised by a saint, who sees that Zarathustra is “altered.” The
descent out of “a love of mankind” marks his end of the ascetic, liminal period,
unlike the saint who remains a hermit in the forest. Next, as Zarathustra arrives
at a village, he encounters the same problems as the madman. On arrival he is
mocked by the locals, and is charged for speaking like a buffoon. He only finds
complicity with a risk-taking tightrope walker, who ends up falling to his death.
After this, Zarathustra makes the pledge to avoid talking to both people of the
marketplace and the dead, and to, instead, seek out companions. This pledge
indicates Zarathustra’s strategy to evoke a process of estrangement in these com-
panions, and, hence, the role of the inquirer that is to be taken up on return.69
To conclude this section, I want to suggest that the nature of this return so
far described is indicative of a demand for, ultimately, a radical alteration of the
Christian moral outlook. In chapter three, I claimed that Jonathan Lear’s idea of
the moral inquirer developing an ironic disposition within the dominant outlook
was not radical enough for our task since it affords a way in which the inquirer
could persist in light of the crisis of our moral values, without needing to bring
about a more radical change. What is instead required is for the inquirer to
seek to cultivate this ironic disposition in others, for the possibility of new social
relations to arise. There is certainly scope in Lear’s account for this. However,
there is a further resource, not found in ironic disruption, that is afforded by the
external critique. Due to the appeal to the alternative moral outlook in the liminal
phase, opposing values are brought from the margin to the centre to help with
the task of bringing into view our familiar moral values as strange. Although the
moral inquirer returns to the dominant moral outlook, these alternative values
are invovled in the transcendent conception of the good, which must incorporate
and, yet, overcome both the Christian and noble values.
69On occasion Nietzsche links the ‘eye of Zarathustra’ with the achievement of estrangement.
See, for example, the quote above from CW preface. In BGE 56, he also alludes to Zarathustra
when he talks of the “Asiatic, supra-Asiatic eye” that allows one to see ‘beyond Good and Evil.’
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Whichever values come to fill the content of this commitment, and form a new
stable familiarity in the new social structure, will have to go through a complex
process of justification if they are to take hold. How this latter task of justification
is to be achieved is a fundamental question, the answer to which, however, will
require in the very least another book-length study.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that we can understand how the task of estrange-
ment is to be achieved by noting the presence of a structural isomorphism between
the process of estrangement and the phenomenon of rites of passage. This is be-
cause this isomorphism helps to show how the paradox of moral inquiry, which
the demand for estrangement leads us into, can be dealt with. By dividing the
process into three phases of separation, margin and aggregation, the means of
achieving a position of estrangement without forgoing our familiarity with moral
values can be located in the middle phase. This phase, in contrast to that of
separation and aggregation is one in which structure is undermined, in order to
evoke reflection and speculation. We have seen how the use of the monstrous, as
a means of setting into relief the familiar as strange, functions here. This helps
to achieve the disassociation of the value of our moral values from those moral
values without the inquirer becoming alienated in the process.
I argued that an important feature of Nietzsche’s attempts at achieving es-
trangement was an appeal to an alternative moral outlook, so as to be able to
radically pose the question as to whether our moral values could be harmful for
us. Such an attempt raises several difficulties concerning how such an outlook can
be taken up. I have suggested that Nietzsche offers us an example of value inver-
sion in his account of the slave revolt, and that, moreover, this account is part of
Nietzsche’s attempts to motivate and evoke a temporary inversion of values in the
reader. To understand how such a temporary inversion is possible, I suggested
that we can understand it as a kind of aspect-shift that helps to make our moral
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values show up to us as harmful.
The remaining difficulty of the return to the dominant moral outlook after
the liminal phase concerns the relation between the inquirer and others who have
“not made the journey” with him. The initial task, on this return, I suggest is
like that of Nietzsche’s, to evoke and motivate estrangement in others so as to
overcome the main phenomenon of concern of this thesis - the continued faith in
Christian moral values - and to face up to the loss of their foundations.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, I have argued that a certain type of moral inquiry is necessary
to philosophically engage with a pervasive phenomenon in contemporary Europe.
The phenomenon of interest throughout this thesis has been the continued faith
in Christian moral values, notwithstanding the widespread collapse of faith in
Christianity. Due to this widespread collapse, our moral values have lost their
foundations and, thus, also the unquestioned right to their existence and domi-
nance. We have seen that the value of our Christian moral values, nevertheless,
fails to show up to us as an object of questioning, since it is taken for granted on
an everyday basis. How to render the value of our moral values a questionable
phenomenon has, therefore, been the guiding question of this thesis.
In chapters two and three, I offered a detailed account of how we become
familiar with moral values. I argued that this fundamentally involves a process
of habituation (which is structured in terms of the double effect of habit), the
phenomenon of sedimentation, and the linguistic fixing of our moral concepts. I
stressed the importance of the dynamic of command and obedience, which lies
at the heart of our moral psychology, through appeal to work undertaken in this
area by Aristotle and Nietzsche. I also developed an account of cognition and
self-consciousness within this framework. There is, I believe, great scope for sup-
plementary work to be undertaken in this area, especially concerning the role of
the more conative and volitional elements of our moral psychology, their role in our
familiarity with moral values, and within the Christian moral outlook in particu-
lar. Moreover, work in this area would help to further enrich our understanding
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of the dynamic of command and obedience and moral acts of will in terms of
spontaneity and activity, on the one hand, and receptivity and passivity, on the
other. While much interest has been taken here in contemporary philosophy in
relation to human perception and judgment, how it is to be applied to human
action has been largely neglected.70
In chapter one, I established that moral inquiry must maintain this familiarity
with our Christian moral values, if it is to face up to the loss of their foundations.
This is because any loss of familiarity with these values results in alienation from
the putative moral phenomena that are to be brought into question. However, the
foundational certitude that this familiarity affords, necessarily involves the value
of these values becoming inconspicuously taken as given. That is to say, only
when this value no longer becomes an object of wonder and questioning can we
rely on our moral values as a ground upon which we can confidently and securely
stand.
We have seen how this means that to come to terms with the loss of the
Christian foundations of our moral values, requires seeing that the value of our
familiar Christian moral values is a possible object of questioning. It means to
bring the familiar moral values into view in their familiarity. When understood
in this manner, we have seen that this task is the same as posing Nietzsche’s
question of the value of our moral values. Nietzsche’s moral philosophy has, thus,
been an important resource for articulating this task and for framing the original
problem.
However, to maintain familiarity with our Christian moral values, whilst, nev-
ertheless, rendering their familiarity questionable, demands some kind of disrup-
tion of the sedimented nature of our familiar moral values. This necessarily gives
rise to a paradox that faces the moral inquirer, which was described in chapter
70This would also help to further articulate the finer differences between McDowell’s and
Dreyfus’ positions, and, hence, also the correct account that, as I have argued, lies in between
the two.
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one. Articulated anew, now in a slightly different manner, we can see how our
familiarity with moral values must be maintained so that we do not lose sight of
those values, (and the phenomena seen through them), and, yet, this familiarity
must be disrupted such that the value of our moral values can be brought into
view as an object of questioning. We have seen in chapters three and four that the
best way to approach this paradox is by understanding the latter requirement of
disruption in terms of a form of estrangement from our familiar, Christian moral
values. Estrangement offers an insight into how familiarity can be maintained,
but a novel perspective can be taken up, such that this familiarity comes into
view in its familiarity from an estranged position.
This occurrence of becoming estranged from the familiar is, more generally
speaking, a relatively widespread phenomenon, and it has been a topic of study
in many disciplines, ranging from psychology to ethnography. I have briefly con-
sidered it in chapter four in an interdisciplinary manner, when describing the
structural isomorphism that exists between rites of passage and the process of
estrangement from our familiar moral values. There is scope for more interdisci-
plinary work here, to further enrich our understanding of how estrangement arises
already within cultures, how it can be evoked philosophically, psychologically and
sociologically, and the critical purchase that it can afford in relation to different
kinds of familiar phenomena.
In this thesis, I considered particular examples of the critical applications of
estrangement from our familiar moral values. I looked at the different moments of
ironic disruption, dissociation by varying concomitants, and aspect-shifts, to build
up a comprehensive account of how the process of estrangement is to function
for a moral inquirer. We have seen how common to all of these is a process
of rendering the familiar strange through an appeal to the monstrous. I have
attempted to complement accounts of this movement with a more radical form of
external critique that evokes a temporary inversion of values in the moral inquirer.
It is from this inverted perspective that I argued that our moral values can be
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temporarily seen as harmful from a novel aspect.
It has been important to realise that this uncanny movement is highly present,
and, yet, often overlooked or misunderstood in interpretations of Nietzsche’s own
works, and in On the Genealogy of Morals in particular. As seen in chapter four,
a particular feature of Nietzsche’s works that this concerns is the philosophical
employment of rhetoric in the appeal to the monstrous. However, we should also
take the shortcoming of several commentators on this particular point as indicative
of a more basic exegetical misconstrual. Indeed, the very idea that Nietzsche’s
moral philosophy is oriented around the task of facilitating readers to come to see
that our moral values could be objects of questioning - i.e., that the question of
the value of our moral values first has to be posed before it can be answered - is
typically overlooked.
This has lead to further repercussions for interpretations of Nietzsche’s moral
philosophy. We have seen how, for example, Nietzsche’s moral philosophy has
been often misread as engaging in a form of naturalist reductionism, as well as
how it is often taken as explicitly advocating a positive, normative ethics.
Both these examples demonstrate how the resources and explanations that
Nietzsche employs for the task of posing the question of the value of our moral
values - ranging from psycho-physiological explanations on the one hand, to ap-
peals to an alternative moral outlook, on the other - are mistaken for representing
and advocating standalone philosophical theories and positions. I have suggested,
instead, that they should both be understood as functioning as a means of at-
taining a position of estrangement from our familiar moral values so that we can
come to see those values as objects of questioning and wonder.
To finish, I wish to consider the critical question as to whether the philosophical
work undertaken to bring the value of our moral values into view as a questionable
phenomenon is itself a necessity to confront the loss of the foundations of our moral
values. It might, instead, be thought that while this philosophical work can help
deal with this phenomenon, the loss of Christian foundations is in some sense
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catching up with us regardless of whether we directly engage philosophically with
the problem or not. The basic idea here is that nihilism - the feeling that life is
without meaning71 - is already an uncanny monster or guest waiting for us on our
own doorstep,72 and that we do not require moral philosophy to experience it in
this manner.
One might think with good reason that with the collapse of faith in Chris-
tianity, we already experience on a day-to-day basis a fragmentation of our values
(as, for example, described by Max Weber), as well as the self -overcoming of
Christian morality due to our faith in the values embodied through the period of
Enlightenment and into that of modernity.73
I want to suggest that this interest in how our Christian moral outlook is
changing internally due to the widespread collapse in Christian faith, runs com-
plementary, rather than orthogonally, to the study undertaken here. I have fo-
cused on the features of our familiarity with moral values that have maintained
that familiarity notwithstanding the loss of faith in Christianity. As we have seen,
these features are persuasive enough to require a philosophical engagement with
the phenomenon. This is not to say, however, that there are not other features of
this familiarity worth studying that give an insight into the vulnerability of the
outlook and a potential crisis of nihilism that awaits. What we can be sure of
regarding the latter, however, is that the project of rendering salient the threat of
nihilism will be much more effective if we are already in a position to see that the
value of our moral values is a possible object of questioning and wonder. This, it
seems to me, is a good enough reason to strive after this task.
71See Reginster and Reginster 2009, 8, 9.
72See, for example, GM III 14.
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